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Post-conflict law is an area of law that is a composite of a number of different legal 
categories.  The fragmented nature of post-conflict law leads to a lack of clarity in relation to 
a number of different issue areas.  These have been discussed under the rubric of ‘the jus post 
bellum’ concept which has attracted a considerable amount of attention from international 
lawyers.  Its proponents argue that it is useful in terms of clarifying the law as it applies 
during transitions.   
Several theories of the jus post bellum can be identified.  This thesis evaluates the practical 
and theoretical application of two of the most plausible jus post bellum theories: (i) the jus 
post bellum as a new Additional Protocol to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (ii) the jus post 
bellum as an interpretive framework.  These theories are evaluated in relation to child soldier 





For my sister, Jude-Marie Eskauriatza, and my parents, Mary Jude and 







The following were instrumental in helping me to complete this research.  I especially would 
like to thank my supervisors, Professor Robert Cryer and Dr. Gavin Byrne, for their insights, 
their patience, and for their encouragement.  In addition, several colleagues at Birmingham 
Law School were very supportive and they helped me to develop my ideas in different ways.  
I would like to acknowledge especially Professor Fiona de Londras, Professor Sean Coyle, 










CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................................................ 5 
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................................................... 5
 
1.1 Methodology ............................................................................................................................................................................................... 6
 
1.1.1 The fragmentation of post-conflict law ..................................................................................................................................................... 8
 
1.1.2 Why transitional criminal justice? .......................................................................................................................................................... 10
 
1.1.3 Why child soldiers? ................................................................................................................................................................................ 13 
1.1.4 Why post-conflict Colombia? ................................................................................................................................................................. 15 
1.2 Structure of the argument .......................................................................................................................................................................... 16 
1.2.1 Overview Part A ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 17 




CHAPTER 2:  WHAT IS THE JUS POST BELLUM? .................................................................................................................................... 26
 
2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................................................... 26 
2.1.1. Law or morals? ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 27 
2.1.2 The international legal order ................................................................................................................................................................... 35 
2.2 The jus post bellum as ‘post-war justice’ or ‘justice after war’ .................................................................................................................. 42 
2.2.1 The jus post bellum as ‘post-intervention’ justice ................................................................................................................................... 45 
2.3 The jus post bellum as a legal concept ....................................................................................................................................................... 57 
2.3.1. Describing the post-conflict legal framework ........................................................................................................................................ 59 
2.3.2. The jus post bellum as a reform proposal............................................................................................................................................... 61 
2.3.3. The jus post bellum as a new law that has already emerged .................................................................................................................. 66 
2.3.4 Interpretive principles and the lex pacificatoria ..................................................................................................................................... 70 
3. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................................................................. 73 
CHAPTER 3:  THE JUS POST BELLUM AS A NEW ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS ....................... 75 
3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................................................... 75 
3.2 The dilemmas of transitional criminal justice ............................................................................................................................................ 79 
3.2.1 General dilemma:  peace vs. justice ........................................................................................................................................................ 79 





3.3  The Orendian jus post bellum ................................................................................................................................................................... 89
 
3.3.1 Rights Vindication .................................................................................................................................................................................. 92
 
3.3.2 Proportionality and publicity .................................................................................................................................................................. 92 
3.3.3 Discrimination ........................................................................................................................................................................................ 93 
3.3.4 Punishment ............................................................................................................................................................................................. 94 
3.3.5  Compensation ........................................................................................................................................................................................ 96 
3.4 Evaluating Orend ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 97
 
3.4.1 Is Kant relevant? ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 98
 
3.4.2 Applicability problems:  When is the ‘post-’? ...................................................................................................................................... 103
 
3.4.2.1 The end of non-international armed conflict ...................................................................................................................................... 104
 
3.5 Is a new Additional Protocol possible? .................................................................................................................................................... 110 
3.5.1 The Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility .................................................................................................................................... 111
 
3.5.2 Other issue areas ................................................................................................................................................................................... 112
 
3.5.2.1. Transformative Occupations ............................................................................................................................................................. 113 
3.6 Is a new Additional Protocol necessary? ................................................................................................................................................. 121
 
3.6.1 Domestic Law ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 123
 
3.6.2 International Law:  Human Rights ........................................................................................................................................................ 124 
3.6.3 International Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law ........................................................................................................ 129 
3.6.4 Other post-conflict situations ................................................................................................................................................................ 132 
3.6.5 The Peace Agreement between FARC-EP and Colombian Government .............................................................................................. 134 
3.7 Concluding remarks on Orend’s proposals .............................................................................................................................................. 137 
PART B ......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 142 
CHAPTER 4:  TOWARDS A DWORKINIAN VERSION OF THE JUS POST BELLUM? ........................................................................ 142 
4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................................................. 142 
4.2 Gallen’s theory of the jus post bellum ..................................................................................................................................................... 147 
4.2.1. International Law and Policy ............................................................................................................................................................... 149 
4.2.2 Legal Foundations for the Engagement of International Actors............................................................................................................ 151 
4.2.3 The Context of the Transitional Society ............................................................................................................................................... 153 
4.2.4 Summary .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 155 
4.2.5 Interdepdence in Transitions................................................................................................................................................................. 156 
4.2.6 Civic Trust and the Rule of Law ........................................................................................................................................................... 158 
4.2.7 Gallen’s Principles ............................................................................................................................................................................... 160 





4.3.1 Conventionalism ................................................................................................................................................................................... 164
 
4.3.2 Pragmatism ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 167
 
4.3.3 Interpretivism ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 169 
4.3.4 ‘Integrity’ ............................................................................................................................................................................................. 173 
4.3.5 Summary .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 177 
4.4 Threshold objection: Theoretical disagreements in post-conflict Law ..................................................................................................... 178 
4.5 The opposite of integrity in post-conflict law .......................................................................................................................................... 181
 
4.6 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 184
 
CHAPTER 5:  CASE STUDY:  APPLYING THE JUS POST BELLUM AS INTEGRITY IN POST-CONFLICT COLOMBIA ............... 186
 
5.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................................................. 186
 
5.1.1 Preliminary Remarks ............................................................................................................................................................................ 186 
5.2 Historical Context: Colombia and Violence ............................................................................................................................................ 191
 
5.2.2 Context and its relevance for the interpretation of post-conflict law..................................................................................................... 197
 
5.3 Hypothetical case facts ............................................................................................................................................................................ 198 
5.4. A Dworkinian Approach to Criminal Accountability in Colombia ......................................................................................................... 200
 
5.4.1 Ronalda’s method: review of interpretivism ......................................................................................................................................... 200
 
5.4.2 The pre-interpretive stage ..................................................................................................................................................................... 202 
5.4.3 The interpretive stage ........................................................................................................................................................................... 205 
5.4.3.1 Five interpretations ............................................................................................................................................................................ 206 
5.4.3.2 Issues of ‘fit’:  the principles of maturity and responsibility .............................................................................................................. 208 
5.4.3.3 Balancing ‘fit’ with ‘justification’ ..................................................................................................................................................... 215 
5.4.3.4 The principle of local ownership ....................................................................................................................................................... 223 
5.4.3.5 The principle of proportionality ......................................................................................................................................................... 225 
5.4.3.6 Integration: the overarching principle of peace .................................................................................................................................. 228 
5.4.3.7 Summary of interpretive stage ........................................................................................................................................................... 231 
5.4.4 The post-interpretive stage ................................................................................................................................................................... 233 
5.4.5 Summary of post-interpretive stage ...................................................................................................................................................... 236 
5.5 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 236 
CHAPTER 6:  INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL OBJECTIONS TO THE JUS POST BELLUM AS INTEGRITY ...................................... 239 
6.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 239 
6.2. Internal objection:  The role of integrity in interpretations of law .......................................................................................................... 240 
6.2.1 Integrity as a constraint ........................................................................................................................................................................ 242 





6.2.2 Fish’s Critique ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 247
 
6.2.3 Can Fish and Dworkin be reconciled? .................................................................................................................................................. 252
 
6.2.4 Schelly’s ‘middle way’ and Bell’s constructivism ................................................................................................................................ 259 
6.2.5 Internal objection: conclusion ............................................................................................................................................................... 263 
6.3 External objection:  The role of community morality in interpretations of law ....................................................................................... 266 
6.3.1. Dworkinian communities .................................................................................................................................................................... 268 
6.3.2 Is there an international ‘community of principle’? .............................................................................................................................. 271
 
6.3.2.1 Associative Obligations ..................................................................................................................................................................... 271
 
6.3.2.2. Community among States? ............................................................................................................................................................... 275
 
6.3.2.3 Normative hierarchy .......................................................................................................................................................................... 280
 
6.3.2.4 Summary:  From ‘right answers’ to ‘expressive integrity’ ................................................................................................................. 286 
6.4 Concluding Remarks ............................................................................................................................................................................... 288
 
CHAPTER 7:  SITUATING THE JUS POST BELLUM AS INTEGRITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER ........................ 290
 
7.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................................................. 290 
7.2. Natural Law and the jus post bellum....................................................................................................................................................... 291
 
7.3 Liberal international law .......................................................................................................................................................................... 297
 
7.3.1 Two Liberalisms ................................................................................................................................................................................... 298 
7.4 The jus post bellum as global administrative law .................................................................................................................................... 306 
7.4.1 Legal Pluralism .................................................................................................................................................................................... 306 
7.4.2 International legal pluralism ................................................................................................................................................................. 309 
7.4.3 The jus post bellum and global administrative law ............................................................................................................................... 310 
7.5 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 312 
CHAPTER 8:  CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................................................................... 316 
8.1 Research findings .................................................................................................................................................................................... 316 
8.2 Areas of further study .............................................................................................................................................................................. 317 
8.2.1 The jus post bellum as integrity and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties............................................................................ 318 
8.2.2 The jus post bellum as integrity and specific issue areas ...................................................................................................................... 319 
8.2.3 The jus post bellum as integrity and national vs international law ........................................................................................................ 320 
8.2.4 Concluding Remarks ............................................................................................................................................................................ 320 







CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 
1. Introduction 
 
Societies attempting to transition from armed conflict to peace face a number of difficult 
legal challenges.
1
 These arise from the special and unique aims inherent in the idea of ‘a 
transition’.  On the one hand, transitions are about ‘moving away’ from a terrible state of 
affairs.  On the other hand, transitions are about ‘moving towards’ a better and more just 
society.  These aims are sometimes in tension.   
Although every transition is different, similar problems arise.  How a society ought to 
deal with the atrocities committed during the conflict is one recurring concern.2  Yet, despite 
similar stories of individual and collective suffering, transitional societies have found 
different ways of dealing with the past so that there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach.  The 
particularities of each transitional society and of each conflict have coloured the legal 
responses.  Neither does international law (especially international humanitarian law, 
international human rights law and international criminal law) provide easy answers to 
questions of post-conflict criminal accountability.  All of this makes ‘post-conflict law’ an 
intriguing area of study.   
Questions that arise in post-conflict societies have been examined by just war 
theorists and international lawyers.
3
  The discussions have introduced a new term into the 
                                                                        
1
 Christine Bell, Peace Agreements and Human Rights (New York, OUP:  2000); Carsten Stahn, ‘Jus ad bellum’, ‘jus in bello’… ‘jus post 
bellum’? – Rethinking the Conception of the Law of Armed Force’, 17 EJIL (2006) 921;  Jane Stromseth, David Wippman and Rosa Brooks 
(eds.) Can Might Make Rights – Building the Rule of Law After Military Interventions (New York, CUP: 2006); Carsten Stahn and Jann K. 
Kleffner, Jus Post Bellum – Towards a Law of Transition from Conflict to Peace (T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague: 2008); Carsten Stahn, 
Jennifer Easterday and Jens Iverson (eds.) Jus Post Bellum – Mapping the Normative Foundations (New York, OUP: 2014).   
2
 Insofar as there is a ‘peace blueprint’, this usually includes a deal on access to power; minority rights provisions; a human rights 
framework; reform of policing and criminal justice, see Christine Bell, Peace Agreements and Human Rights (New York, OUP:  2000), 1. 
3
 For just war theory, see Brian Orend, ‘Jus Post Bellum’, 31 Journal of Social Philosophy (2000)117; Larry May and Andrew T. 
Forcehimes, (eds.) Morality, Jus Post Bellum and International Law, (New York, Cambridge University Press:  2012); Larry May, After 





respective disciplines – the jus post bellum.  What is not yet clear, however, is whether and 
how this new term helps to resolve any of the difficult legal issues.  The term ‘jus post 
bellum’ is imprecise.
4
 Some contributors have defined it as primarily to do with ‘post-war 
justice’ and as the third branch in just war theory tradition.
5
  Relatively little research has 
been done to explain whether and how the jus post bellum resolves specific post-conflict legal 
dilemmas.6   
1.1 Methodology  
 
The evaluation of whether and how the jus post bellum is relevant to post-conflict law raises a 
number of methodological issues.  The first relates to the meaning of the jus post bellum 
itself.  Several different definitions of the concept exist.  Therefore, chapter 2 takes a 
necessary first step in setting out a chronological review of the different ways the term has 
been used in the literature.  For the purposes of the present study, it identifies two versions of 
the jus post bellum that will be evaluated in relation to their practical use in identifying post-
conflict law.   
The first version is Brian Orend’s proposal that the jus post bellum ought to be a ‘fifth 
Geneva Convention’ (or more accurately Additional Protocol IV) that sets out the law in 
relation to post-conflict issues.7  Orend’s proposal is selected for evaluation owing to the fact 
that the success of his proposal would be a simple way to secure the future of the jus post 
                                                                        
4
 Carsten Stahn, ‘The Future of Jus Post Bellum’ in Carsten Stahn and Jann K. Kleffner (eds.) Jus Post Bellum – Towards a Law of 
Transition from Conflict to Peace (T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague: 2008), 231, 233. 
5
 See Brian Orend, ‘Jus Post Bellum’, 31 Journal of Social Philosophy (2000)117; Larry May, After War Ends, (New York, CUP:  2012).  
For a review of the just war tradition see James Turner Johnson, Ideology, Reason and the Limitation of War – Religious and Secular 
Concepts 1200 – 1740 (New Jersey, Princeton University Press:  1975) and Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York, Basic 
Books:  2006). 
6
 For a concise explanation see Charles Garraway, ‘The Jus Post Bellum:  A Practitioner’s Perspective’, in Carsten Stahn and Jann K. 
Kleffner (eds.) Jus Post Bellum – Towards a Law of Transition from Conflict to Peace (T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague: 2008) 153. 
7
 Brian Orend, ‘Jus Post Bellum – A Just War Theory Perspective’, in Carsten Stahn and Jann K. Kleffner (eds.) Jus Post Bellum – Towards 





bellum as a concept in international law.  A new Additional Protocol that dealt with the 
totality of post-conflict issues would ipso facto be ‘post-conflict law’.  Whether a new 
Protocol is a necessary, desirable and possible development in the law of armed conflict will 
be evaluated in chapter 3.   
The second version is James Gallen’s idea that the jus post bellum is an interpretive 
framework based on Ronald Dworkin’s legal theory – ‘law as integrity’.8  According to 
Gallen, a Dworkinian version of the jus post bellum helps to identify the principles of post-
conflict law.9  These principles help to identify post-conflict law insofar as they explain and 
justify the rules which apply to discrete post-conflict issues.  Dworkin’s legal philosophy was 
concerned specifically with proving that the law can be identified even when ‘the law books 
are silent or unclear or ambiguous’.10  Post-conflict law is a very good example of a situation 
where the law is silent, unclear or ambiguous.  According to a Dworkinian jus post bellum, 
the uncertainty surrounding post-conflict law can be resolved by adopting an interpretive 
approach that focuses on Dworkin’s principle of integrity.11  This approach to the jus post 
bellum attempts to respond to one of the main difficulties involving law during transitions:  
the fragmentation of law.  However, whether and how a Dworkinian jus post bellum adds 
anything of value to those tasked with interpreting the law in post-conflict societies has not 
been investigated.  Chapters 4, 5 and 6 introduce and critically evaluate the added value in 
this more recent formulation of the jus post bellum.   
 
 
                                                                        
8
 James Gallen, ‘Jus Post Bellum: An Interpretive Framework’, in Carsten Stahn, Jennifer Easterday and Jens Iverson, (eds.) Jus Post 
Bellum – Mapping the Normative Foundations (New York, OUP: 2014) 58. 
9
 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Law as Interpretation’, 9 Critical Inquiry 1 (1982) 179; Law’s Empire, (Oxford, Hart Publishing:  2006).  
10
 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, (Oxford, Hart Publishing:  2006), vii. 
11





1.1.1 The fragmentation of post-conflict law12 
 
The jus post bellum as integrity forms the central focus of this research because it is designed 
to combat the fragmentation of post-conflict law.  Fragmentation means that post-conflict law 
is located at the crossroads of various branches of law.  Transitions from conflict to peace are 
regulated by a number of different domestic and international legal categories.13  This means 
that several different legal categories regulate any substantive area of post-conflict 
peacebuilding.14  For example, in relation to transitional criminal justice, a number of 
different rules drawn from international humanitarian law, international criminal law and 
international human rights law affect the nature and shape of post-conflict justice.15  Further, 
domestic legal categories, such as constitutional law and criminal law, are also part of the 
legal matrix during transitions.  Finally, a peace agreement at the end of an armed conflict 
can be read as a pseudo-constitutional document.16  At least, peace agreements represent a 
‘moment of agreement in a conflict’.17  The agreement is a source of rights and obligations 
which sits uneasily in between domestic and international law.  They incorporate and are 
shaped by international law and domestic law.  All of these bodies of law are relevant to the 
identification and implementation of post-conflict law.  The law on any issue that arises in 
post-conflict societies must take all of these different legal categories into account.     
                                                                        
12
 On the fragmentation of international law generally Martti Koskenniemi and Päivi Leino, ‘Fragmentation of International Law?  
Postmodern Anxieties’, 15 Leiden Journal of International Law (2002) 553; Report of the Study Group of the International Law 
Commission, Fragmentation of International Law:  Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, 
International Law Commission, 58th Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4.L.682 (2006). 
13
 Vincent Chetail, Post – Conflict Peacebuilding – A Lexicon (New York, OUP: 2008), 17. 
14
 I define post-conflict peacebuilding as all those activities that take place at the end of armed conflict which aim at the reconstruction of 
the transitional State in question.  The justification for focusing on transitional criminal justice appears below. 
15
 I define post-conflict justice as that part of post-conflict law that deals with criminal justice via trials in post-conflict tribunals. 
16
 See the ‘Final Agreement for the End of Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Long Lasting Peace’, (hereafter the peace 
Agreement) signed on 24 November 2016 and ratified by Congress 1 December 2016.  The full text of the peace agreement is available at:  
http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/procesos-y-conversaciones/Documentos%20compartidos/24-11-2016NuevoAcuerdoFinal.pdf. 
(I will use my translations from Spanish to English throughout).    
17





It is not only the fragmentation of legal rules that makes post-conflict law a difficult subject 
to understand.  The fragmentation of post-conflict law is also compounded by other factors.  
A post-conflict situation can involve a number of different actors and different legal regimes 
and provisions apply to them.  For example, the UN is heavily involved in most post-conflict 
situations but it enjoys absolute immunity from legal suit in the States where it operates.18  
Also, a post-conflict legal framework incorporates the domestic legal framework.  Colombia 
has recently signed a peace agreement with the main opposition armed group, Las Fuerzas 
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejercito del Pueblo (FARC-EP).19  The peace 
agreement requires an array of implementing legislation to be passed by the government.  
However, Colombian law requires that the Constitutional Court revises each legislative 
proposal so that a fast-track legislative procedure is not feasible.  This institutional 
framework is in stark contrast to the post-conflict situation after the 2003 Gulf War in Iraq.  
The Coalition Powers worked relatively untrammeled to transform the Iraqi State into a more 
‘Western shape’.20 
These three factors (various rules, various actors, different States) make it difficult to 
identify post-conflict law in relation to any substantive issue.  It means that questions about 
what post-conflict law requires must be answered by adopting an interpretive approach which 
refers to a number of different legal rules.  At first glance, then, this makes Gallen’s 
suggestion of a Dworkinian approach to the jus post bellum appear very useful.  The whole 
point of Dworkin’s theory of law is to find the best interpretation of the law in situations 
where the law is unclear.  However, the requirement of ‘integrity’ in Dworkin’s theory needs 
                                                                        
18
 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the UN, (adopted 13 February 1946, entered into force 17 
September 1946) available online: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3902.html (last accessed 12 September 2017); on challenges to that 
immunity based on human rights see Rosa Freedman, ‘UN Immunity or Impunity?  A Human Rights Based Challenge’, 25 EJIL (2014) 1. 
19
 A great deal of information on the FARC-EP is available online: https://www.farc-ep.co/ (last accessed 30 August 2017) 
20
 Michael J. Kelly, ‘Iraq and the Law of Occupation:  New Tests for an Old Law’ 6 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 
(December 2003) 127; Kristen Boon, ‘Legislative Reform in Post-Conflict Zones: Jus Post Bellum and the Contemporary Occupant’s Law-





to be examined in more detail.  Chapter 4, 5 and 6 are dedicated to this task and they form the 
basis of the original contribution of this research to the jus post bellum scholarship. 
1.1.2 Why transitional criminal justice?  
 
There are many different areas of law that are uncertain in post-conflict situations.  It would 
be impossible to evaluate the impact of the jus post bellum on every area of practice.  As 
such, this thesis evaluates the usefulness of the jus post bellum in relation to one area of post-
conflict law:  transitional criminal justice.  If the jus post bellum is to be a useful addition to 
the body of international law then it ought to help to identify the rules that apply to 
transitional criminal justice.21  
Transitional criminal justice is a good example of the uncertainty of post-conflict law.  
It provides a good ‘testing ground’ for the jus post bellum theories advanced by Orend and 
Gallen.  Individuals committing war crimes have been tried and punished for as long as rules 
regulating warfare have existed.22 However, it is also true that punishment for war crimes has 
been the exception rather than the rule.  This is owing to the fact that transitional criminal 
justice raises very difficult questions for post-conflict societies.23  Transitions release a 
general tension between a forward-looking desire for a less violent and more peaceful society 
and a backwards-looking desire for accountability, truth and punishment for atrocities 
committed during the conflict.  On the one hand there is a ‘trend towards an expanding notion 
of individual criminal responsibility’.24 On the other hand, the prospect of criminal 
                                                                        
21
 See generally Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice (New York, OUP: 2000); Christine Bell, Peace Agreements and Human Rights (New 
York, OUP:  2000), 259; Vincent Chetail, Post – Conflict Peacebuilding – A Lexicon (New York, OUP: 2008), 368. 
22
 For a brief history see, Robert Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes:  Selectivity and the International Criminal Law Regime 
(Cambridge, CUP: 2005) 9. 
23
 Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice (New York, OUP: 2000) 27; Christine Bell, Peace Agreements and Human Rights (New York, OUP:  
2000), 259; Vincent Chetail, Post – Conflict Peacebuilding – A Lexicon (New York, OUP: 2008), 368. 
24
 Christine Bell, Peace Agreements and Human Rights (New York, OUP:  2000), 260; Christine Bell, Colm Campbell and Fionnuala Ní 





punishment is unlikely to make combatants lay down their weapons and work towards the 
rebuilding of peace.25  Thus, transitional criminal justice is unlike ordinary criminal justice.  
This is owing to its practical role in securing a peaceful solution to armed conflict while 
laying the foundations for a society which upholds the human rights of its citizens.  These 
combined tensions have created compromise solutions which are based on the ‘limited 
criminal sanction’.26 In Colombia, a new Special Jurisdiction for Peace is being set-up which 
will provide for ‘alternative sentences’ in exchange for confession, truth, reparations and 
commitments to non-repetition.27 Yet, the implementation of this agreement is likely to run 
into difficulties and there are still ambiguities in the agreement itself.   
The difficulties in finding the balance between the requirements of peace and justice 
are considerable.  Perhaps understandably, the law on transitional criminal justice has not 
been codified and Orend’s proposal for a new Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions 
suggests that it could be and ought to be.  Chapter 3 critically evaluates Orend’s arguments 
on point.  On the other hand, Gallen suggests that the dilemmas of transitional criminal 
justice can be resolved by relying on the principles of post-conflict law in pursuing integrity.   
A Dworkinian approach to the jus post bellum suggests that integrity is helpful in guiding 
interpreters of the law towards the right answers in the law of transitional criminal justice.  Of 
course, Dworkin’s legal theory was not designed with post-conflict situations in mind.  
Therefore, this thesis also makes an original contribution in that it evaluates whether its 
theoretical and practical scope may be extended.   
There may be certain benefits to thinking in Dworkinian terms about the transitional 
moment.  In Dworkin’s theory, integrity plays a civic role in justifying why a citizen of a 
                                                                        
25
 Anonymous, ‘Human Rights in Peace Negotiations’ 18 Human Rights Quarterly (1996) 249. 
26
 Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice (New York, OUP: 2000) 28. 
27
 Part 5, ‘Final Agreement for the End of Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Long Lasting Peace’, (hereafter the Peace 
Agreement) signed on 24 November 2016 and ratified by Congress 1 December 2016.  The full text of the peace agreement is available at:  
http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/procesos-y-conversaciones/Documentos%20compartidos/24-11-2016NuevoAcuerdoFinal.pdf. 





State ought to be coerced by the legal order.28  This appears, at least prima facie, relevant for 
the parties to the Colombian peace agreement as they attempt to reconstitute their relationship 
under the rule of law.  Equality before the law is at the core of the idea of integrity.  Integrity, 
for Dworkin, arises out of a personal obligation that ‘commands that no one be left out, that 
we are all in politics together for better or worse, that no one may be sacrificed, like wounded 
on the battlefield, to the crusade of justice for all’.29  
This research discovers what this may mean in relation to a specific issue that arises 
in transitional criminal justice:  the criminal accountability of child soldier perpetrators.  In 
all post-conflict societies, child soldiers have usually been considered only victims of the 
armed conflict.30  Therefore, consistency would seem to require that no child soldier 
perpetrators are prosecuted in Colombia.  However, integrity requires more than principled 
consistency in the interpretation of law.  Sometimes, integrity requires that a legal system 
depart from a blind allegiance to precedent.  This is because interpretation, in Dworkin’s 
theory, is a balancing act between questions of ‘fit’ and questions of ‘substance’ (or 
‘justification’).  The point is that precedent can be departed from if and when there is a 
sufficient justification for doing so.31  The example Dworkin uses is the professional liability 
of barristers.32  For many years, and for no principled reason, barristers were held to different 
professional liability standards.  Thus, according to Dworkin, integrity required that English 
law of tort break with tradition to impose the standards of professional negligence on 
barristers which were applied to all the other professions.  Of course, the professional liability 
                                                                        
28
 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, (Oxford, Hart Publishing:  2006), 178. 
29
 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, (Portland, Oregon, Hart Publishing:  2006) 213. 
30
 UNICEF, Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, ‘UN Guide to the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed 
Conflict’ (UNICEF, New York: 2003); Mark Drumbl, Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy (New York, OUP: 
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of barristers in a common law legal order and the criminal accountability of child soldiers in 
post-conflict Colombia are radically different issues in legal, moral and political terms.  
Further, as a matter of law, post-conflict Colombia is not bound to follow the law as 
interpreted in other post-conflict situations.  As such, the transposition of the principle of 
integrity into post-conflict territory admittedly is ambitious.  This thesis examines whether 
and how integrity is a useful aid to resolving theoretical disagreements in post-conflict law.33 
The post-conflict criminal accountability of child soldiers suspected of serious international 
crimes is presented as capable, sometimes, of producing the kinds of theoretical 
disagreements with which Dworkin’s theory is concerned. 
1.1.3 Why child soldiers? 
 
In order to provide a more specific picture of the usefulness of the jus post bellum one 
specific kind of case has been chosen from within the general area of transitional criminal 
justice: child soldier accountability for the commission of international crimes.  In Colombia, 
one of the most complicated areas of transitional criminal justice is the law as it applies to 
child soldiers.  Since 2013, UNICEF has estimated that, at least, 1,000 children have been 
recruited into non-State armed groups.34  A recent study has identified that 47% of FARC-EP 
combatants were recruited as child soldiers.35  Logically, many children and adolescents that 
participated in the armed conflict will be implicated in the commission of international 
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crimes.  The end of conflict raises difficult questions in terms of the reintegration of these 
former child soldiers into their previous communities.  These communities may have suffered 
directly from the actions of child soldiers during the armed conflict.  As such, the dilemmas 
of peace vs. justice are reproduced at the local level when post-conflict societies must decide 
what to do with child soldier perpetrators.   
On the one hand, they may be seen as victims of the conflict.  The particular nature of 
child soldier perpetration may raise difficult due process issues that tend against their 
prosecution.  Further, criminal punishment may simply be unsuited to achieving some 
important aims of post-conflict societies, especially national reconciliation, rehabilitation and 
reintegration of former fighters.  On the other, their acts may have contributed directly to the 
victimization of innocent civilians.  Addressing the needs of victims and survivors appears to 
require some measure of accountability.  This may also be necessary in order to ‘provide new 
political arrangements with legitimacy’ and avoid the perception of impunity which 
undermines the political legitimacy of the new constitutional order.36  All of this suggests 
that, in some cases, there may be good reasons to involve child soldier perpetrators in 
transitional criminal justice mechanisms.   
For the purposes of this thesis, a specific focus on child soldier perpetrators permits a 
specific demonstration of the fragmentation of post-conflict law.  It allows for an 
investigation of the jus post bellum as proposed by Orend.  Whether a post-conflict Protocol 
could be agreed by States in order to deal with this problem runs into major problems.  In the 
first place, the issues of content and temporal applicability (see section 3.3).  Also, States do 
not agree on the minimum age of criminal responsibility (see section 3.4.1).  Further, there is 
also a great deal of law that regulates the particular issue.  A new Protocol would need to be 
clear on how its provisions were meant to interact with already existing legal categories.  This 
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suggests that an interpretive approach to the law may be a better approach.  Whether a 
version of the jus post bellum that proposes integrity as the ‘disciplining rule’ is useful is the 
central issue in this thesis.37   
1.1.4 Why post-conflict Colombia? 
 
There are a number of different post-conflict societies that could have formed the basis of this 
study.  Many of these have had issues with the accountability of children in transitional 
criminal justice.  This research focuses on post-conflict Colombia.  In the first place, 
Colombia has recently signed a peace agreement with very detailed and innovative provisions 
for transitional criminal justice.38  However, in relation to the criminal accountability of child 
soldiers the agreement is very vague.  The legal texts to be interpreted are clear but how they 
ought to be interpreted and what the law actually is in this context is unclear and gives rise to 
different interpretations.  This provides an example of a ‘theoretical disagreement’ in 
Dworkinian terms.  Those children between the ages of 14-18 are in a legal limbo where their 
specific situation ‘will be studied at a later date’.39  Further, the 2016 Amnesty Law attached 
to the peace agreement states that it is up to the prosecutor at the Special Jurisdiction for 
Peace to ‘decide whether those who were under 18 at the moment of the commission of 
international crimes incapable of amnesty, will be exempted from criminal prosecution…(my 
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translation)’.40  This provides an opportunity to test the practical usefulness of the jus post 
bellum as integrity.  If the jus post bellum can help practitioners in post-conflict Colombia 
make decisions in relation to the post-conflict accountability of child soldiers then the 
academic interest in the subject will have been justified.  It will also mean that the jus post 
bellum as integrity might be relevant in identifying the law in other areas of post-conflict 
peacebuilding.  If the jus post bellum does not help to identify the law in relation to the post-
conflict criminal accountability of child soldiers in Colombia then this will provide some 
evidence that ‘the value of the concept and discourse must be called into question’.41 
It would have been impossible to evaluate the impact of the jus post bellum on every 
area of practice and in relation to every post-conflict State.  As such, answering the research 
question depends on making some methodological choices.  This section has attempted to 
justify these choices.  The rest of this introduction sets out the overall structure of the thesis. 
1.2 Structure of the argument 
 
This thesis is divided into two parts.   
Part A (chapters 2 - 3) has three aims.  Firstly, it sets out the ‘story so far’ in the 
historical development of the jus post bellum as a moral and legal concept.  This is important 
insofar as legal and moral concepts cannot be understood in isolation from the social and 
historical contexts in which they emerge.42  Part A culminates in the evaluation of one 
obvious way that the jus post bellum might influence post-conflict law, i.e. by the negotiation 
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and agreement of a new Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions for post-conflict 
peacebuilding (chapter 3).   
Part B (chapter 4 – 8) introduces and evaluates a more sophisticated approach to 
finding the normative relevance of the jus post bellum for post-conflict law.  This is by 
imagining that it provides an ‘interpretive framework’ of principles that help practitioners to 
decide how to interpret the law in the face of the fragmentation of legal categories.  Whether 
this is a useful development is considered in relation to the case-study of the criminal 
accountability of child soldiers in post-conflict Colombia.  The thesis concludes with a 
consideration of where the jus post bellum scholarship ought to be situated in the 
international legal scholarship.  Chapter 7 identifies how the jus post bellum as integrity fits 
into different approaches to the nature of international law.  Chapter 8 summarizes the 
conclusions of the thesis and sets out a few areas for further research.   
1.2.1 Overview Part A 
 
Chapter 2 sets out the different possible meanings of the jus post bellum.  As will be seen, it 
is an area of scholarship which has tended to encourage interdisciplinary approaches.  While 
this may (or may not) give rise to important insights it clearly has led to some analytical 
imprecision.  As Friedrich Kratochwil has argued, interdisciplinary projects often result in 
contributors talking ‘at each other’.43  They can also simply rephrase ‘well-known problems 
in the new language or methodology’.44  The creation of a new interdisciplinary language 
does not always result in problems being resolved.  Of course, in one sense, everything we 
know or say is interdisciplinary in some way.  Our knowledge and perspective is a mixture of 
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different things we have learned from a variety of different disciplines.  More specifically, 
new or emerging problems can be understood as ‘out of bounds’ in the sense that they do not 
fit into the old disciplinary boundaries.45  Thus, new discourses are created which capture the 
new knowledge.  
This dynamic has been very much in evidence in the jus post bellum scholarship.  The 
starting point for most proponents of the jus post bellum has been to identify a number of 
‘post-conflict problems’ which arise owing to existing disciplinary ‘gaps’.46  Examples 
include: the law on the use of force in post-conflict States; the issue of transformative 
occupations; post-conflict detention and, as dealt with in this thesis, transitional criminal 
justice.47  Once these gaps in the law have been identified, one tendency has been to argue 
that they can be ‘filled’ by relying on a conception of the jus post bellum that sometimes 
owes more to particular interpretations of just war theory than law.48   
An alternative approach is to describe the jus post bellum as an ‘emerging’ area of law 
which is evidenced by recent developments in State practice.49  In this more sophisticated 
conception, there are some similarities between the jus post bellum as integrity and earlier 
work by Christine Bell on the ‘lex pacificatoria’.50  The similarity is most clear in the 
descriptive aspects of these legal theories.  Each argues that a set of norms (or principles) 
have emerged around the practice of transitions.  These principles can be discerned by 
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looking at the practice of post-conflict States and the way that peace-making has become ‘an 
international affair’.51  In relation to post-conflict criminal justice, some of the relevant norms 
could be accountability (eliminating impunity and blanket amnesties) and reconciliation (in 
the sense of restorative justice processes, such as truth commissions).52  The point is that it is 
the way that post-conflict justice has been carried out that provides the clues as to what is 
required in new post-conflict justice situations.  Thus, for Bell, the lex pacificatoria grows 
incrementally around a consistent practice that must also respond to the particular 
requirements of transitional States.53 A Dworkinian approach is attached to the idea that post-
conflict principles are, and have always been, the explanation and justification for the rules 
that have been agreed.  The difference in the accounts lies in the normativity of the 
norms/principles from a legal perspective.  Bell does not emphasize the legal character of lex 
pacificatoria norms, whereas, for a Dworkinian approach, post-conflict principles are post-
conflict law.  This will be explained in more detail in chapter 4.   
In the course of these discussions, Gallen and others have argued that a new discipline 
has been identified which blurs the boundary between just war theory and international law. 
For some, this is a case of resuscitating a concept that has considerable historical pedigree (as 
a matter of just war theory and international law).  Orend provides the best example of this 
approach.54  Chapter 3 deals with the issue of historical pedigree and evaluates whether this is 
relevant to the discussions for the reform of the present law of armed conflict.  Part A 
concludes by considering in detail whether this new jus post bellum ought to form the basis of 
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a new Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions that deals with transitional criminal 
justice and the issue of child soldier accountability in particular.     
1.2.2 Overview Part B 
 
Part B begins with the presupposition that if the jus post bellum is to be useful for 
practitioners and scholars it ought to be because it helps to address the problem of 
fragmentation in post-conflict law.  Chapter 4 explains why a Dworkinian approach may be 
relevant to the jus post bellum.  In short, whether post-conflict law permits or requires the 
prosecution of child soldiers implicated in international crimes is a theoretical disagreement.  
Several legal categories are relevant to the decision.  In Colombia these are clearly 
identifiable.  They include domestic criminal law, international humanitarian law, 
international human rights law, international criminal law and the peace agreement itself.  
However, how the law ought to be interpreted, how these different bodies interact is not clear.  
The law is open to different interpretations.  Thus, a Dworkinian approach that favours a 
focus on integrity in interpretation appears prima facie relevant.   
Gallen’s version of the jus post bellum is oriented towards the coordination of ‘post-
intervention’ law and policy.55  In his view, the jus post bellum as integrity can explain and 
justify why different post-intervention situations demonstrate different interpretations of law 
and policy.56  He argues that, within one transition, the jus post bellum could also be useful 
for practitioners who must decide how to best distribute resources.  Chapter 4 reorients this 
version of the jus post bellum and links Gallen’s ideas about integrity in post-intervention 
reconstruction more closely to a specific issue area – transitional criminal justice and child 
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soldiers.  It argues that the decision of whether or not to prosecute child soldiers in Colombia 
will be one for the chief prosecutor (to be appointed).  Thus, in being confronted with 
different possible interpretations of the law, chapter 4 suggests that the chief prosecutor could 
adopt a Dworkinian approach based on integrity in order to find the best interpretation of the 
law.  The difference between Gallen’s account and the one evaluated here is the evaluation of 
whether and how integrity urges the prosecutor to look ‘outside’ of Colombia at other post-
conflict situations.  Gallen was discussing integrity in relation to law ‘inside’ one post-
intervention situation.  A prosecutor in Colombia is under no legal obligation to make their 
interpretation coherent with other post-conflict situations.  These are different legal systems.  
However, there may still be merits in focusing on how an interpretation of post-conflict law 
in Colombia fits with an interpretation of law in other post-conflict situations. 
Chapter 5 provides an example of the Dworkinian framework in action.  It applies the 
jus post bellum as integrity to a specific (though hypothetical) issue of child soldier violence.  
Whether the prosecution of the child soldier perpetrator at the Special Jurisdiction for Peace 
is required, permitted or prohibited is unclear and provides a good opportunity to test the 
practical relevance of the Dworkinian jus post bellum.  Chapter 5 begins by providing some 
historical context to the conflict in Colombia.  It then provides a set of hypothetical facts that 
might be presented to the chief prosecutor.  Finally it applies the Dworkinian method of 
interpretivism to the facts as an example of the jus post bellum as integrity.   
Chapter 6 sets out the challenges to the jus post bellum as integrity.  It focuses on two 
arguments.  The first is an ‘internal’ challenge.  The focus is on Stanley Fish’s argument that 
even if Dworkin is correct about the nature of law as interpretive, the concept of integrity 
cannot guide interpreters towards the right answers.57  This is owing to the fact that integrity 
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itself is a matter of interpretation.  That is, judges, prosecutors, and others, can always be 
described as aiming at integrity.  They do so automatically in their respective roles qua 
judges, prosecutors or officials.  Thus, the point is that there is actually little ‘normative’ bite 
in Dworkin’s theory because the concept of integrity is already embedded into the 
interpretive practice concerned.  Integrity, for Fish, is not a ‘disciplining rule’ of 
interpretation that can guide interpretations in the way Dworkin suggests because it is itself a 
matter of interpretation.58  The second is an ‘external’ objection.  The jus post bellum as 
integrity may presuppose an international community.  This is necessary because on 
Dworkin’s account, any interpretation of the law must be justified according to a community 
morality.  Insofar as post-conflict law includes international law there appears to be a need to 
reconcile the interpretations of post-conflict law in Colombia and the international legal order 
society of States.  This section evaluates the extent to which there is a Dworkinian 
‘community of principle’ among States.  The challenge to the Dworkinian jus post bellum is 
to find a coherent set of ‘international values’ that are evidence for an ‘international 
community’.  On a Dworkinian account, these values are then relied upon to provide the right 
interpretations of international law.  Chapter 6 concludes that a focus on the jus post bellum 
as integrity illuminates the debate that surrounds whether or not child soldiers ought to be 
accountable for their crimes in transitional criminal justice mechanisms.  It does not identify 
what decision the prosecutor ought to make in a simple mechanical way.  Instead, the jus post 
bellum as integrity urges a certain attitude that is founded around a set of questions.  This 
provides an interesting and useful methodology, or lens, with which to think about the issues 
at hand and how post-conflict law ought to be interpreted.   
Chapter 7 situates the jus post bellum as integrity in international legal scholarship 
and argues that its relevance depends on a prior decision to take a particular theoretical 
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approach to international law.59  There are a variety of theoretical approaches to the law in 
international legal scholarship.  However, a traditional approach is discernible and defensible 
which equates ‘law’ with that which States have agreed to.  In this sense, international law 
depends on the traditional sources of law – international treaties, customary international law 
and the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.  If this approach to law is 
adopted, then no amount of academic enthusiasm for the jus post bellum can secure its legal 
nature.  This chapter demonstrates how different theoretical lenses portend different paths for 
the future development of the jus post bellum. 
Chapter 8 sets out some concluding thoughts on the jus post bellum as a new 
Additional Protocol and as integrity.  It also sets out some possible future avenues of 
research.   Most obviously, the methodology adopted in this thesis could be applied to other 
specific post-conflict issue-areas where the law is unclear.  Thus, the interpretive jus post 
bellum, as a concept, could contribute to debates aimed at clarifying the law as it applies to 
several different areas of practice.   
1.3. Conclusion 
 
This research attempts to provide a comprehensive evaluation the jus post bellum by looking 
at two of its proposals.  One of its main proponents has admitted that, at this stage of its 
development, it really is ‘more of a metaphor than a fully developed moral and legal 
concept’.60  In so far as law is concerned, this research agrees and holds out some optimism 
for its future development notwithstanding some considerable challenges.  In relation to 
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morality, it appears that already the jus post bellum has been incorporated into the work of 
contemporary just war theorists.   
Legal solutions to the end of conflict are shaped simultaneously by the past and the 
future.61  In negotiating answers to these questions, post-conflict societies do not proceed in 
isolation from the ‘outside world’.  International law and international society play a crucial 
role in constructing the normative parameters for what is possible.62  Evidence for this has 
arisen recently in relation to the changes made to the peace agreement by the Colombian 
Congress.  The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, has made it 
clear that should Colombia be found ‘unwilling or unable’ to prosecute those most 
responsible for committing international crimes then her office will consider intervening.63  
Yet, whether and how child soldier perpetrators ought to participate in transitional criminal 
justice processes has received only limited attention in the literature.64  This thesis provides a 
contribution to that debate through the theoretical and practical application of the jus post 
bellum.  It also extends the jus post bellum scholarship into post-conflict Colombia and non-
international armed conflict more generally.  Finally, the thesis evaluates whether it is useful 
to adopt a Dworkinian approach outside of the traditional locus of Anglo-American 
constitutional law.65  International lawyers have not paid much attention to Dworkin’s 
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theory.66  In problematizing the issue of integrity in post-conflict law it evaluates the 
obstacles to its application in the field of international law.67  Overall, the hope is that 
engaging with different theoretical approaches to international law will help to solve practical 
problems.  The point is that, whatever the definitional difficulties, the best way to secure the 
relevance of the jus post bellum concept is to remain focused on the practical problems that it 
is supposed to address. 
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This thesis evaluates whether and how the jus post bellum helps to identify the law of 
transitional criminal justice as it relates to child soldier perpetrators in post-conflict 
Colombia.  Therefore, as a necessary first step, this chapter analyses the different versions of 
the jus post bellum which can be identified in the recent academic literature.  It categorizes 
the literature into three ‘waves’ although it is admitted that other categorizations detailing the 
historical development and conceptual nature of the jus post bellum are possible.1   
Section 2.2 introduces the ‘first wave’ of the jus post bellum scholarship.  Scholars 
such as Brian Orend, Michael Walzer and Larry May have defined the concept as ‘post-war 
justice’ or ‘justice after war’.2  Section 2.3 discusses the ‘second wave’ – the jus post bellum 
as ‘post-conflict law’.  Kristen Boon and Jean Cohen were the first scholars to discuss the jus 
post bellum as a legal concept.3  The jus post bellum as post-conflict law was then further 
explored by Carsten Stahn and others at the ‘Jus Post Bellum Project’ at the University of 
Leiden in the Netherlands.4 The jus post bellum as ‘law’ has been strongly criticised by many 
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international lawyers.5  This has caused a new ‘third wave’ of jus post bellum scholarship 
which has attempted to respond to these criticisms.  As such, section 2.4 focuses on one new 
conceptualization that has emerged – the jus post bellum as an ‘interpretive framework’ based 
on Ronald Dworkin’s theory of ‘law as integrity’.6   
2.1.1. Law or morals?   
 
Moral and legal concepts cannot be understood outside of their social and historical context.7 
As Alasdair MacIntyre has argued, it would be a mistake to think that Plato, Hobbes, and 
Bentham were all engaged in a ‘single task of analysing the concept of […] justice’.8  Writing 
in different times and against a backdrop of different political and social contexts, any 
similarities in their prescriptive efforts are likely to be ‘false friends’.9  The same point has 
been made by David Kennedy in relation to international legal scholarship.10  Therefore, this 
chapter adopts a chronological approach to the taxonomy of the jus post bellum.  This 
approach clarifies that the first and second waves of the jus post bellum arose in the context 
of the 2003 Iraq War.   As a result, most contributors were concerned with the rights and 
obligations of States after foreign military intervention.11  Relatively little attention was paid 
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to situations that lacked a significant foreign intervention element.12  Most of the early jus 
post bellum scholarship, therefore, ought really to be understood as concerned with ‘post-
intervention justice’ and ‘post-intervention law’.  The most assertive theory in relation to 
post-intervention law has been presented by Brian Orend.  Whether Orend’s theory helps to 
identify the law of transitional criminal justice in relation to child soldiers in post-conflict 
Colombia will be evaluated in chapter 3.   
For present purposes, the important point is that the interventions in Kosovo, 
Afghanistan and Iraq, along with the various post-conflict measures, led to discussions and 
debates about post-conflict peacebuilding that were located at the intersection between 
morality and law.13  For this reason, perhaps, Carsten Stahn has argued that it is ‘wrong to 
construe a ‘moral’ and a ‘legal’ jus post bellum in isolation from each other’.14  The implicit 
suggestion is that a ‘cross-disciplinary’ approach to the jus post bellum helps international 
lawyers to identify the rules of post-conflict law.  In Stahn’s view, the distinction between 
morals and law in international law is not always as ‘clear-cut as it seems’.15  According to 
Stahn, this rests on the fact that international law sometimes incorporates value judgments 
into its normative framework.  As an example Stahn cites the targeting of civilians which is 
only prohibited by international humanitarian law if it is ‘intentional’.16  For Stahn, therefore, 
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there is no problem in accepting the mixture of moral and legal considerations in identifying 
the new jus post bellum. 
In relation to the jus post bellum, many lawyers have queried whether what is morally 
‘good’ ought to be considered as instructive for the identification of the law.17  Perhaps, for 
this reason Stahn’s argument is also ambiguous.  He has argued that a turn to ‘policy’ in post-
conflict law is ‘shaky from a normative point of view’.18 Further, (though in relation to the jus 
ad bellum) he states, ‘[o]ne may even argue that the use of concepts such as ‘illegal, but 
legitimate’ runs counter to the very purpose of the law since it may actually weaken the 
normative prohibition of the use of force or the constraints in warfare’.19  Thus, what Stahn 
means by the possible ‘isolation’ of law and morals in the jus post bellum is left relatively 
unclear.  
The underlying issue is a matter of legal philosophy.  There are different 
philosophical approaches to identifying the so-called ‘grounds of law’ (i.e. the sources from 
which the content of the law can be identified).20  For some, law is a question of finding a 
social source of law, an empirical social fact.21  This view is associated with H. L. A. Hart’s 
positivism which argued that the law was a combination of different types of rules, all 
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capable of location in a social source.22  The result, in the international context, is that the 
international system of ‘interlocking’ legal norms depends on identifying the sources of those 
norms in the acts of States.23 Thus, treaties between States are considered the ‘primary’ 
source of law because they are easily identifiable evidence of the acceptance of legal 
obligations by States.24  Nevertheless, the content of these rules is not always easy to define.  
Thus, for non-positivists, law must be interpreted and, therefore, it is always a ‘moral 
reading’ of legal texts.25 This opens the door to a view of international law that accepts that 
political and/or moral principles are relied upon to identify the law.  For Dworkin, for 
example, the law at any given time is the best it can be consistent with the legal materials 
from which it must be interpreted and the political morality of the relevant community.26  
Thus, arguments about law which is ‘emerging’ (such as the jus post bellum) hide and 
reproduce deeper underlying philosophical debates about the nature of international law.27   
It is not necessary to ‘resolve’ this broad debate here.  Sometimes, it may not be 
necessary to decide whether a positivist or non-positivist approach ought to be adopted before 
interpreting what the law requires in any given question.28  The point is simply that the 
ambiguity produced by Stahn’s approach to the jus post bellum reflects competing (and 
sometimes incompatible) tensions about the nature of law.  He accepts that if post-conflict 
law is to become international law, then it is States that must consent to the rules that have 
emerged. This would see the jus post bellum become as much a part of the law of armed 
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conflict as the jus in bello.  However, if States have not consented to the new post bellum 
rules then at most the jus post bellum remains (for the moment) the law as it ought to be 
rather than the law as it is.   
Others have been more explicit regarding what is required by a ‘cross-disciplinary’ 
approach to the jus post bellum.  For example, Brian Orend calls for a new post-intervention 
law dealing with what interveners can (and ought) to do after military victory.29  In his view, 
the content of the law ought to be derived from an explicitly moral source – Kantian political 
philosophy.  In Orend’s view, Kant’s jus post bellum is instructive for the contemporary 
development of the law of armed conflict.   
This approach falls into the non-positivist approach to law.  It does not fully emphasize 
that the creation and modification of international treaties on the law of armed conflict is 
fundamentally a multilateral effort by States.30  Treaty law is based on State consensus and it 
is created according to the ‘collective will’ of States (rather than the individual will of each of 
them).31  The circumvention of this multilateral approach to law-making carries certain risks.  
A unilateral interpretation of post-conflict law could simply be imposed on weaker States.32  
As Martii Koskenniemi argues, some actors refer to the ‘special character’ of certain norms 
and this ‘enables them to transgress the preferences of single individuals, clans or nations’.33  
Because reason (in contrast to State will or State consensus) is presented as universal, these 
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commands are presented as enjoying universal validity.  In Koskenniemi’s words, the 
approach can be characterized as follows:  
I can rest confident that I know what principles apply not only to me and my group but to any 
person or any group. If I engage in contacts with them, I need not face them as equals. I need not 
be open to their preferences because I already know that mine are universally valid ….
34
 
This approach to the identification of the law has a historical resonance in the ‘civilization’ of 
the indigenous peoples of North and South America.35 In seeking to legitimize the application 
of the ‘jus gentium’ to the colonization of the indigenous population of America, scholars 
such as Francisco de Vitoria argued that the indigenous population in question was ‘capable 
of reason’.  The consequences of this approach were far-reaching and permitted the 
exploration and exploitation of the new territories.  As Anghie explains, 
 
Vitoria’s apparently innocuous enunciation of a right to ‘travel’ and ‘sojourn’ extends finally to 
the creation of a comprehensive, indeed inescapable system of norms which are inevitably 
violated by the Indians.  […] Vitoria asserts that ‘to keep certain people out of the city or province 
as being enemies, or to expel them when already there, are acts of war.36 
 
It was not necessary for early and classical writers to demonstrate that the civilizations they 
were destroying had not consented to the system of norms imposed on them.  The early and 
classical writers simply did not distinguish between moral and legal norms.  As explained 
more fully in chapter 3, Orend’s approach to post-conflict law runs the risk of following a 
similar pattern.  Orend advocates legal reform in post-conflict peacebuilding according to 
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certain norms that are derived from a Kantian approach to justice.  The ‘reasonable’ nature of 
these norms suffices for their universal validity.  The preference of different States is not 
considered in any detail.  This approach ignores the legitimate normative pluralism that exists 
in the international legal order.  As Brad Roth argues,  
In order to serve its essential function, a legal order must have, in the eyes of a system’s 
efficacious actors, a legitimacy that withstands disagreement among those actors about the 
substantive justness of outcomes.
37
   
This is particularly important in international law given the vast disparity in power between 
States.  In the alternative, the morality (or otherwise) reflected in the policies of powerful 
States can be presented as universal to the detriment of weaker States.  Orend’s jus post 
bellum is the most assertive example of this approach. 
In relation to transitional criminal justice, one difficult question is whether post-
conflict law requires that child soldier perpetrators of international crimes be prosecuted. 
Orend does not deal explicitly with this particular issue.  A positivist approach to this 
question would look to the rules of law as they have been declared, or written down, or 
assented to by States.  After treaty law, a positivist would look to international customary 
law.  If the answer remains elusive, then positivists would consider the ‘general principles’ of 
law as accepted by nations.38  Importantly, for positivists, these are legal principles as 
declared by States in their mutual relations (and as a matter of their domestic law).  In 
relation to criminal law, an example would be the principle of res judicata which prohibits 
‘double jeopardy’.39   But a non-positivist, such as Dworkin, would not discard other political 
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and moral norms from the legal equation.  Instead, he would identify the principles which 
explain and justify the posited rules.  In this sense, ‘gaps’ in the law are resolved by reference 
to legal principles that can be referred to in order to decide any question of law.40   
It may be that the result would be the same in each case.  These characterizations of 
law and legal reasoning do not necessarily produce different answers to difficult questions.  
But they may and, furthermore, they reflect very different pictures of ‘the discipline’ of 
international law.  A positivist approach prioritizes the principles of sovereign equality of 
States in the international legal order.  It accepts that States disagree about the political and 
moral principles that legitimize their internal political orders.  In this way, law-making is 
linked to the consent of States.  State cannot be legally bound unless they consent to be 
legally bound.  This approach seeks to protect all States from unwanted interference in their 
internal affairs.  The Dworkinian alternative does not prioritize the consent of States.  This 
would only be a part of the legal equation.  The law would also be supported by those 
political and moral principles that best explain and justify the rules to which States have 
consented.  This places morality at the heart of the question of legal interpretation in 
international law.  This is controversial.  International law is a decentralized legal order 
where a single authoritative interpreter cannot be found.  For this reason, States have agreed 
already on an interpretive framework in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.41  To 
propose a Dworkinian approach to international law is to raise a number of questions about 
the fundamental principles of the international legal order.  These include the central place of 
the Vienna Convention in the interpretation of treaties and the fact that international law 
derives from the consent of States.  The rejection of the established tradition of international 
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law may have serious implications for the future development of international law and 
relations between States.  
2.1.2 The international legal order 
 
Stahn’s reference to the ‘cross-disciplinary’ nature of the jus post bellum raises an important 
point about the relationship between morals and law in international legal order.  The 
contemporary (mainstream) approach to international legal argument is founded on three 
interrelated pillars:  voluntarism, neutrality and positivism.42  
Firstly, the international legal order is founded on the principle of voluntarism.  
International law is considered to be a ‘system of objective principles and neutral rules that 
emanate from States’ will, either directly through treaty or indirectly through custom [my 
emphasis]’.43 Voluntarism is encapsulated in the Lotus judgment of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice.44 The ‘nature and existing conditions’ of international law are stated to 
be as follows:   
International law governs relations between independent States. The rules of law binding upon 
States therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages 
generally accepted as expressing principles of law and established in order to regulate the 
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This picture of international law brings with it certain consequences.  Chief among these is 
that law appears limited.  The possibilities of gaps in the regulation of State interaction are 
very high.  For this reason, perhaps, international rules have emerged that do not owe their 
existence to State-consent.   
The usual example is the principle of pacta sunt servanda which obliges States to 
keep to their promises.  This does not necessarily affect the mainstream view of international 
law.  It may be possible to understand this rule not strictly as a legal rule but rather as an 
international norm of international politics.  After all, as Hedley Bull explained, any society 
must protect certain values in order to even exist as a society.46  Insofar as the society of 
States constitutes a society, the principle of pacta sunt servanda functions as a rule that is, to 
a certain extent, implicit in their association.47  Without a ‘general presumption that 
agreements entered into will be carried out’ it would not be possible to imagine human 
cooperation in any field.48   
Furthermore, there are other kinds of rules which govern State behaviour which 
emerge ‘beyond the State’, i.e. through private governance networks.49  A private governance 
network is a network of sub-State-officials (legislators, courts, and administrative agencies) 
that interact transnationally with other sub-State officials, each representing the ‘national 
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interest’.50 For Slaughter, these rules are evidence that international law is not only about 
States and their consent.  Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Gunther Teubner, have argued that 
these private networks are engaged in the formation of ‘global law’.  For them, international 
law is a part of a more complex picture of global legal regulation.  The point is that Slaughter, 
Fischer-Lescano and Teubner all say that international law-making is about more than just 
States consenting to rules.51   
Voluntarists may retort that pacta sunt servanda is a norm of customary international 
law (i.e. ultimately subject to State consent).  In terms of governance networks, a 
traditionalist might simply deny that, in this example, ‘global administrative law’ is really 
international law.  Instead they would consider it a collection of ‘best practices’ only.  The 
mainstream view of international law depends on keeping a rigid faith with an easily 
identifiable methodological presupposition.  Unfortunately, as will be seen in relation to 
transitional criminal justice, sometimes this strict methodology fails to provide any easy 
answers.  Novel situations arise where ‘the rules run out’ or conflict and a more sophisticated 
approach to the identification of law is required.   
Secondly, the traditional approach to international law is based on the strict separation 
of law from morals or policy. The traditional approach favours (supposed) ideological 
neutrality as a necessary requirement of a system of law in an international society of 
sovereign equal States.  According to Prosper Weil ideological neutrality is ‘necessary to 
guarantee the coexistence of heterogeneous entities in a pluralistic society’.52  This approach 
is founded on the recognition that States disagree on a number of fundamental political, 
moral and religious questions.  Therefore, as Başak Çali has put it, if ‘morality is called upon 
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to determine the content of international law there is an important danger: the views of the 
mighty may win over the views of the weak.’53  For the traditional approach, therefore, the 
law is a system of objective and neutral rules.  It may be doubted how any rule, or norm, or 
system could be neutral among a diverse number of States.  The rise of human rights norms 
since the end of the Second World War has been driven by a commitment to political 
liberalism.  Further, the economic organization of the international system reflects a 
particular set of ideological interests which suit powerful States.54  Most obviously, in terms 
of peace and security, the international legal order privileges the interests of the five States on 
the UN Security Council that enjoy veto-wielding power.55  The very fact of drawing a 
boundary between ‘the legal’ and ‘the moral’ can be challenged as a political and ideological 
act.56   
Finally, as explained briefly above, the mainstream approach to international law is 
founded on positivism.  The view is that for an international rule to become international law, 
‘it must be shown that it is the product of one, or more, of three law-creating processes: 
treaties, international customary law or the general principles of law recognised by civilised 
nations’.57  It rules out other potential law-creating processes such as ‘natural law [or] moral 
postulates.’58 International treaties are documents that States sign and ratify, thereby 
incorporating the rules of the treaty into domestic law.  International customary law is 
‘evidence of general practice accepted as law’.59   As the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
explained in the Legality of Nuclear Weapons case, customary rules were to be found 
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‘primarily in the actual practice and opinio juris of States’.60  In this scheme, the opinio juris 
represents the ‘acceptance’ of the rules, the psychological commitment to a particular 
practice as law.  Finally, international law also incorporates the general principles of law.  
These are the principles accepted by civilised nations in foro domestico, i.e. ‘certain 
principles of procedure, the principle of good faith, and the principle of res judicata,…’61  
While there may be questions about the incorporation and interpretation of these rules in 
domestic legal systems, these rules form the basis of a (partially) unified legal system which 
eschews reliance on morality for the identification of the relevant legal norms.62 
Positivism, as alluded to above, is not unproblematic.  New situations arise which the 
original rule-makers may not have foreseen.  In this situation, positivists in domestic systems 
argue that judges enjoy a strong discretion to decide the ‘new law’.  This view, obviously, 
results in retrospective legislation (judges make the law and this is applied retrospectively to 
the facts of the case).  Those subject to the new rules appear to suffer for the benefit of the 
system as a whole.  However, positivists can also argue that the system is not as inflexible as 
it appears.  Legal rules (whether agreed to by States or laid down by domestic legislatures) 
are, to a certain extent, ‘open-textured’.63 The rules, once agreed, must be flexible enough to 
be interpreted in future situations.  This means that the ‘individual preferences and political 
choices of the lawyer’ are inevitably part of the interpretation and application of legal rules.64  
Context is important in the interpretation of legal rules so that to avoid charges of 
retrospective legislation lawyers can argue by analogy so that the new situation falls under an 
old rule.  Traditional approaches reflect a number of shared understandings.  These 
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presuppositions and preferences (i.e. in interpretive strategy) can be characterised in different 
ways.  An acceptance that rules are ‘open-textured’ allows for a certain flexibility of 
approach.  It also brings positivism closer to an interpretive approach to law and legal 
reasoning.65   
Interpreting the rules of international law can cause problems.  Sometimes rules 
conflict or factual situations overlap with different sets of rules.  In transitional criminal 
justice, the requirements of accountability and amnesty are in conflict.  On the one hand, 
States are under a duty to punish international crimes committed in non-international armed 
conflicts.66  On the other hand, any duty to punish sits uneasily with the overall aim of 
transitions, i.e. an end to the fighting.  In Colombia, all sides have committed atrocities.  
Thus, Colombia’s duty to prosecute those responsible for international crimes sits uneasily 
with the overall aim of a transition which is to secure peace in Colombia after decades of 
armed conflict.  In relation to child soldier perpetrators, the situation is complicated by the 
view that child soldiers are usually viewed as victims of the conflict.  Those who view child 
soldier perpetrators as ‘victims-first’ support the extension of a full amnesty.  Nevertheless, 
this view is not necessarily shared by the survivors of child soldier violence.  Thus, the 
reintegration of child soldier perpetrators may be affected.  This is especially the case if local 
communities into which the child soldier perpetrators must reintegrate share a perception that 
they are criminals who have failed to atone for the atrocities they committed.  As a matter of 
international law, it is not clear whether a duty to prosecute extends to child soldier 
perpetrators.  This is a situation where the rules do not provide an easy answer.  It is not clear 
whether post-conflict criminal justice ought to be measured by local or international 
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standards.  In Colombia, juvenile justice provisions provide for the special prosecution of 
violent children.  But alternatively, post-conflict justice could be measured by international 
standards on child protection.   
The fragmentation of the law suggests that the law must be interpreted.  Thus, lawyers 
may look for interpretive aids.  Vaughan Lowe has argued that a number of norms are 
emerging in different areas of international law which help in resolving conflicts between 
legal rules.67  So-called ‘interstitial norms’ are not legally binding on courts, or States, in the 
same way as the primary norms of the system (derived from treaty law, or customary 
international law).  These interstitial norms develop in the same way as the law of Equity 
developed in UK law.  The requirements of legal reasoning create these norms which allow 
for reconciliation between different rules and principles.  So, in the example noted above, the 
resolution of the conflicts between amnesty and accountability in post-conflict law may be 
explained by reference to this kind of interstitial norm – not legally binding, but they ‘direct 
the manner in which competing or conflicting norms that do have their own normativity 
should interact in practice’.68  
The identification of these interstitial norms would be a useful exercise for 
international lawyers.  This is one way to understand Stahn’s call for a ‘cross-disciplinary’ 
approach to the jus post bellum.  It refers to the need for an interpretive approach to the rules 
of post-conflict law to switch in focus from the specific rules to the principles or norms which 
support them and give them a particular character in application.69  An interpretive approach 
to the jus post bellum has been suggested by Gallen.70  This is explained in more detail in 
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section 2.4.  Whether this approach to the jus post bellum helps practitioners to identify the 
rules of transitional criminal justice is evaluated in chapters 4, 5 and 6.  Suffice it to say for 
now, that Gallen’s approach is based explicitly on Dworkin’s legal philosophy.  This has 
certain implications.  Dworkin, an avowed ‘non-positivist’ argued that law is always an 
interpretive concept.  In other words, identifying the law is always a case of undertaking a 
‘moral reading of legal texts’.71 A Dworkinian account of the jus post bellum necessarily 
implies that international law is also a case of producing a moral account of legal texts.  
Therefore, the jus post bellum as an interpretive framework, is an explicit attempt to eliminate 
the epistemological divide between the moral and the legal.  Whether this helps practitioners 
to identify post-conflict law in relation to transitional criminal justice is the central question 
of this research (see chapters 4, 5 and 6).  The rest of this chapter sets out in more detail the 
development of the jus post bellum as a moral and legal concept.  It takes a chronological 
approach to the development of the subject. 
2.2 The jus post bellum as ‘post-war justice’ or ‘justice after war’72 
 
The first wave of jus post bellum scholarship defined the concept as ‘post-war justice’ or 
‘justice after war’ – the third (largely forgotten) branch of just war theory.  Proponents of the 
jus post bellum argued that contemporary just war theory distinguished between the jus ad 
bellum (the justice in resorting to armed force) and the jus in bello (just conduct during armed 
conflict) but that the jus post bellum had been ignored.73   
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It is true that many contemporary approaches to just war theory lacked an explicit post bellum 
category.  For example, Michael Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars which lacks any explicit 
reference to the jus post bellum.  Post bellum matters do arise in relation to unconditional 
surrender and justice in peace settlements.74 Also, the last two chapters are dedicated to ‘The 
Question of Responsibility’ and they deal respectively with the crime of aggression and war 
crimes.75 However, Walzer did not refer to these issues as part of any jus post bellum.  Other 
comprehensive reviews of the history and development of just war thought also exclude any 
reference to the jus post bellum and also divide the theory into ad bellum and in bello 
categories.76   
Michael J. Schuck was the first contemporary just war theorists to argue that just war 
theory included post-war justice.77 Schuck argued,  
 
If one assumes for the moment […] that the rubrics of the just war theory are morally 
tenable…then post war behaviour must also come under moral scrutiny.  If [we] are called upon to 
probe the moral propriety of entering and conducting war by using the seven jus ad bellum 
principles (which concern justification for using force) and the two jus in bello principles (which 
apply to conduct in war), should they not also be called upon to monitor the moral propriety of 
conducting a war through some set of jus post bellum principles?
78 
 
Schuck presents a jus post bellum which is historically grounded.  The tone of his argument is 
religious and its theoretical content is drawn from St. Augustine.  He proposed three jus post 
bellum principles:  repentance, honourable surrender and restoration.  There is little detailed 
information in terms of what the fulfilment of these jus post bellum principles would entail.  
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It could be argued that repentance, honourable surrender and restoration are all relevant to 
war crimes trials involving children.  Yet, there is no discussion about the content of these 
principles and how they ought to be operationalised in modern international law.79  Further, 
Schuck does not justify why an Augustinian approach to jus post bellum is warranted over 
and above any other possible approach.  He is not concerned in demonstrating how the 
principles could be used to resolve post-conflict legal issues.  Therefore, from the perspective 
of contemporary international law, there is little value in discussing Schuck’s contribution in 
any detail. 
Orend identified the same lacuna in modern just war theory.  He argued that the jus post 
bellum ought to be recognised as it was present in the Kant’s just war theory. For Orend, the 
lack of any explicit reference to the jus post bellum in most contemporary just war thought 
was a mistake and an oversight.80  Orend first concern was ‘internal’; he was concerned with 
the jus post bellum in relation to his own discipline.  He considered that a just war theory that 
lacked any jus post bellum was open to challenge from its traditional opponents (realists and 
pacifists).81  He argued that even if a State had initiated a just war, and fought justly, it was 
still not possible to say that a State had fought a just war.  Echoing Schuck’s earlier 
sentiments, Orend argued, 
 
…it stands to reason that just as we can imagine a war justly begun being fought unjustly, so too 
we can imagine a war justly begun, and justly fought, but ending with a set of unjust settlement 
terms […] just war theorists must consider the justice not only of the resort to war in the first 
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place, and not only of the conduct within war, once it has begun, but also of the termination phase 
of the war, in terms of the cessation of hostilities and the move back from war to peace.82 
 
Later Orend argued that the conclusions of just war theory scholarship on the jus post bellum 
ought to be instructive for the development of international law of armed conflict.83  In this 
regard, of immediate interest in that there is a certain temporal ambiguity in Orend’s call for a 
jus post bellum.  The issue of identifying the ‘post’ in the jus post bellum continues to be 
important for the legal side of the scholarship.84  At one and the same time, Orend asserts that 
the jus post bellum covers ‘the termination phase of the war’ and ‘the move back from war to 
peace’.85  As will be argued in more detail in chapter 3, contemporary armed conflicts seldom 
follow such a linear pattern.  Many situations fall into a cyclical ‘not-war, not-peace’ 
category that involve a number of State and non-State actors.  Orend’s account (and 
Schuck’s) are premised on the notion that it is possible to say when a post-conflict phase has 
begun.  These definitional difficulties (and other issues) are passed over in much of Orend’s 
jus post bellum theory.  Chapter 3 evaluates in more detail the plausibility and desirability of 
Orend’s jus post bellum theory in relation to transitional criminal justice.   
2.2.1 The jus post bellum as ‘post-intervention’ justice 
 
Many of the early proposals for the jus post bellum must be read in the context of the 2003 
invasion of Iraq.86  The 2003 Iraq War caused many of these contributions to share a number 
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of features.  Firstly, the focus was on the end of international armed conflict and non-
international armed conflict was not discussed at any length.  This thesis extends the scope of 
the jus post bellum towards the non-international armed conflict in Colombia.  If a concept is 
purported to deal with post-conflict law, it ought to deal with the most common type of post-
conflict situations – those that arise after non-international armed conflicts.  But owing to the 
2003 Iraq War most jus post bellum theorists focused on foreign interventions.   
For example, Michael Walzer reviewed his evaluation of just war theory and included 
the jus post bellum defined as ‘justice-in-endings’.87  His most extensive analysis of the jus 
post bellum is conducted in relation to the rights and duties of the States involved in post-
intervention reconstruction.88  The context of ‘foreign intervention’ led Walzer to emphasize 
the principle of ‘local ownership’, i.e. the jus post bellum involves doing ‘everything 
possible’ to ensure that post-intervention reconstruction is conducted by and for the local 
population.89  
Local ownership is a principle that aims to defend defeated States from neo-
colonialism.  However, Walzer does not make clear what ‘local ownership’ might mean at the 
end of non-international armed conflicts, such as in post-conflict Colombia.  In Colombia, 
there has been no foreign intervention and the ‘locals’ have been in a non-international armed 
conflict for over five decades.90  In this type of post-conflict society, international or ‘third 
party’ supervision may be very desirable as a way of guaranteeing the implementation of the 
peace agreement.  The International Criminal Court, by the fact of initiating a ‘preliminary 
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investigation’ into the Colombian conflict, has performed this supervisory role.91  Bell has 
argued that the ‘delegation of powers of interpretation and enforcement to third parties’ is 
also a way of promoting compliance with the terms of the peace agreement.92  This appears to 
be backed up by State practice.  Since the end of the Cold War, 52% of peace agreements 
explicitly involve a third party as a signatory of the peace agreement.93  This may be third 
States or even individual experts perceived as neutral by the negotiating parties.  In 
Colombia, Dag Nylander (a Norwegian official) played a key role in brokering the peace.94 It 
may be that local ownership in this type of context remains a similar principle to that 
espoused by Walzer.  Nevertheless, Walzer’s commentary on post-war justice really must be 
understood as inspired and directed to the question of post-intervention Iraq and the need to 
defend against the charge of neo-colonialism in the reconstruction of the Iraqi State.   
Gary Bass has also discussed the jus post bellum in relation to foreign interventions.  
As with Walzer, much of Bass’s theory is simply inapplicable to the Colombian situation 
owing to the lack of a State vs. State armed conflict.  For example, in terms of transitional 
criminal justice, Bass argues that the jus post bellum requires ‘the arresting and trying of war 
criminals’.95  This view implies that war criminals have fought with the party that ‘lost’ the 
armed conflict.  Bass argues from the position of a ‘just’ party that has ‘won’ the armed 
conflict. This simply makes no sense in post-conflict Colombia where the post-conflict 
context is the result of a ‘no-winner’ situation that leads to a negotiated peace.  It is to the 
detriment of early jus post bellum scholarship that contributors ignored the most common 
form of ending conflicts.  In this context, ‘who’ should be tried, ‘by whom’ and ‘for what’ are 
all difficult questions.  In relation to child soldier perpetrators of international crimes, the 
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parties in Colombia were unable to agree on what ought to happen to those child soldiers 
between 14 and 18 years of age.96  In Colombia, this recurrent dilemma of transitional 
criminal justice will need to be dealt with by a chief prosecutor (to be appointed).  
Importantly, the dilemma must be resolved according to a specific purpose: the establishment 
of a more stable and secure peace.  Thus, a simple injunction that ‘war criminals ought to be 
tried’ is divorced from the complexities of transitional criminal justice in non-international 
armed conflicts.  On a policy level, there may be many reasons to try war criminals, in some 
situations, even though they are children.  It might have a deterrent effect which would make 
child recruitment less attractive to adult commanders of non-State armed groups.  At present, 
the fact that child soldiers tend not to be prosecuted could be seen as encouraging their utility 
in combat roles.  Further, their young age at the time of the commission of the crimes might 
be reflected at the sentencing stage which could focus on restorative justice rather than 
incarceration.  Neither international human rights law nor international humanitarian law 
prohibits post-conflict societies from prosecuting child soldiers (see chapter 3).97  
Furthermore, for some child soldiers, participation in transitional criminal justice mechanisms 
is necessary for the purposes of reintegrating themselves and preventing their social exclusion 
by the affected community.98 Ethnographic research has demonstrated that child soldier 
returnees who are, or are thought to have been, implicated in these types of crimes are a 
serious ‘at-risk constituency’.
99
  They are at risk because their participation in serious human 
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rights violations makes their reintegration into local communities more difficult.
100
  They 
may face open or ‘simmering’ antagonism from recovering post-conflict communities.
101
 As 
a consequence, they are more likely to either remilitarize or turn to organized criminal 
activity and, therefore, become a ‘spoiler-risk’ in terms of the peace process as a whole.
102
  
Mark Drumbl notes that current policy discourages the discussion of children as the subjects 
of criminal accountability.
103
 According to Drumbl, the effect of the ‘international legal 
imagination’ is to reflect an image of the child soldier as a ‘faultless passive victim’.
104
  This 
image informs current law and policy during transitions, and though it may be well-intended, 
it ‘flattens’ and ‘omits details’ which are crucial to the reintegration of this group.
105
  Most 
obviously, reintegration depends on acknowledgement of fault.  But as Drumbl notes,  
[child soldiers] are taken to lack any volition. […] Accordingly, former child soldiers cannot 
plausibly play active roles in transitional justice mechanisms—such as truth commissions and 
reintegrative ceremonies—that examine their agency, authorship, or role in violence.
106
  
The usual exclusion of child soldiers from transitional justice mechanisms is a policy error. 
Of course, the faultless passive victim might be accurate in some instances.  However, the 
pervasive reiteration of this image by NGOs and UN agencies is reductive.  Drumbl has 
written extensively on the range of literature which lies ‘fallow’ and ought to inform the 
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reality of child soldiering.
107
  The stories of how child soldiers become involved in conflict 
vary.  Post-conflict Colombia has an opportunity to take a more nuanced approach to the 
transitional criminal accountability of serious offenders who are under 18.  The very fact of 
being under 18 ought not to remove the possibility of participation in transitional criminal 
justice mechanisms. The peace agreement between the FARC-EP and the government reflects 
a shared understanding that many crimes were committed by child soldiers active on all side 
of the conflict.108  In order to secure the principle of non-impunity, transitional criminal 
justice mechanisms will have to extend to, at least some, child soldiers.   
The issue of child soldiers (and this group of child soldiers in particular) is absent 
from most of the jus post bellum literature.  For Walzer, Bass and other early contributors to 
the jus post bellum debate, the concept was related to ‘humanitarian intervention’ or the 
‘responsibility to protect’.  In other words, Walzer, Bass and others considered post-war 
justice issues in relation to the jus ad bellum considerations of whether to intervene in ‘rogue 
States’ such as Afghanistan and Iraq.  The close conceptual link between the ad bellum and 
post bellum categories will be further explored in chapter 3.  For now, the point is that in the 
early discussions on post-war justice, the criminal accountability of child soldiers at the end 
of non-international armed conflicts was largely overlooked.    
The most comprehensive attempt at crafting a ‘moral’ jus post bellum theory is 
offered by Larry May.109 May’s theory is also that which is most easily applicable to non-
international armed conflicts.  He discusses the jus post bellum as a compendium of six 
normative principles which must all be met in order to ensure a just peace.110  These are: 
rebuilding, retribution, reparation, reconciliation and proportionality.  The principles 
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represent the ideals that post-conflict societies ought to aim at.  Importantly, May argues that 
it is not necessary fully to satisfy all the principles ‘in order to have a just and lasting 
peace’.111  This is owing to the fact that May’s jus post bellum analysis is subjected to an 
overarching controlling principle of meionexia – defined as ‘taking less than one is due’.112  
This principle ought to guide the victors in war ‘in order to better achieve the humanitarian 
goals in the transition from war to peace’.113  However, it is also relevant to parties attempting 
to implement a peace agreement at the end of a non-international armed conflict.  In relation 
to transitional criminal justice, for example, the concept of meionexia is especially important 
insofar as the requirements of ‘peace’ and ‘justice’ for the victims of the war are considerably 
in tension.114  Post-conflict accountability at the end of non-international armed conflicts may 
require victims and perpetrators to accept less than what they are owed.  In Colombia, the 
parties have agreed to set up a Special Tribunal for Justice.115 As a part of transitional 
criminal justice, the agreement sets out accountability measures which balance the interests 
of peacemakers and victims of the conflict.116  The transitional justice measures foresee a 
system of amnesties or reduced sentences in exchange for truth telling and the admission of 
guilt.117  This approach seems to fit quite well with May’s idea that justice after war is 
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‘limited’.  What is not clear is where the balance ought to be struck.  May offers the principle 
of proportionality as an overarching regulative principle.  As a matter of law, proportionality 
is already an accepted principle of international law.  Thus, the principle of meionexia in 
post-conflict Colombia could represent an idea that reconciliation and peace are best served 
by an acceptance, by all sides, that no-one will get everything that they want.  
Orend, Walzer, Bass and May are only a selection of the many writers that have 
discussed the jus post bellum as a matter of post-war justice.  Overall, a review of the 
literature suggests that just war theorists now recognise that the jus post bellum ought to be 
considered as a third branch of (Western) just war theory.118 However, this thesis is concerned 
with the jus post bellum as a matter of international law.  As such, the specific prescriptive 
aspects of these contributions on post-war justice are not directly relevant to this research.  
These theories are only relevant to this research insofar as the jus post bellum is considered a 
new category in international law.  Orend is the only writer who argues that his theory ought 
to be developed into international law.  Therefore, this research will focus in more detail on 
Orend’s work on the jus post bellum.   
Firstly, a focus on Orend’s work allows for a very brief evaluation of the historical 
pedigree of the jus post bellum concept (chapter 3).  Orend claims that the jus post bellum can 
be derived from Immanuel Kant’s moral philosophy – especially The Doctrine of Right and 
Perpetual Peace.  Its historical pedigree is relevant insofar as Orend claims that law and 
morals (just war theory) ought to mirror one another.  In this sense, Orend argues that the 
‘rediscovery’ of the jus post bellum in just war theory ought to be relevant for the progressive 
development ‘real-world realization of morality through law’.119  He argues that ‘there should 
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be another Geneva Convention […] focusing exclusively on jus post bellum…’ and that 
‘[t]here needs to be both moral and legal completion and comprehensiveness in connection 
with the ethics of war and peace’.120  Thus, the role of morality in the development of the 
international legal order is a central feature of Orend’s theory.  A focus on Orend’s work, 
therefore, allows for the evaluation of a simple way that the jus post bellum could ‘help to 
identify post-conflict law’, i.e. as a new Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions for 
the post-conflict phase. 
This would be highly controversial insofar as the current political climate does not 
appear conducive to the negotiation and adoption of large-scale multinational agreements in 
the law of armed conflict.  In terms of on-going conflicts, the discussions would necessarily 
be overshadowed by the ongoing (failed) discussions on how to end the international armed 
conflict in Syria.  Further, the case has not been made that the current legal framework is 
broken to the extent that a whole new area of law is necessary to deal with post-conflict 
issues.  In relation to transitional criminal justice, solutions to difficult questions have been 
found on a case-by-case basis and always in relation to the specific post-conflict situations 
that have arisen.  Existing categories of law, such as international human rights law, 
international criminal law and international humanitarian law, have been used by peace 
negotiators to fashion sui generis approaches to transitional justice which best serve the 
prospects of peace.121  The flexibility of the current approach may be lost by the agreement of 
a new Additional Protocol that set fixed rules on what was permissible in post-conflict 
justice.122  For example, in relation to transitional criminal justice, it is helpful for the law to 
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acknowledge a grey area where ‘accountability and amnesty are useful and permissible’.123  
From a conflict resolution perspective, flexibility, rather than prescriptive rules is more 
helpful.  Moreover, given the variety in State practice, it may be impossible in practice for 
States to agree on these rules.  This is especially the case in relation to the criminal 
accountability of child soldiers.  In this sense, the general exclusion of child soldiers from 
post-conflict accountability mechanisms reflects the disagreements between and within States 
on the appropriate minimum age of criminal responsibility for children.
124
   
In Colombia, the government and the FARC-EP were unable to decide what ought to 
happen in relation to the punishment of child soldiers aged between 14 and 18 who were 
implicated in war crimes.  Natalia Springer has estimated a total of up to 18,000 active child 
soldiers in Colombia.
125
  There are over eight million registered ‘victims’ of the conflict.
126
  
1,000 child soldiers have been recruited by non-State armed groups since the beginning of the 
peace talks in 2012.127  Taking these numbers together, it is highly likely that many child 
soldiers have committed war crimes.  But there is considerable ambiguity in relation to the 
post-conflict accountability of child soldier returnees that are implicated in international 
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crimes.  This is clear from an evaluation of Joint Communique #70 (Agreement on 
Minors).128   
Firstly, there are some points about which the parties reached a clear and 
unambiguous agreement.  For example, the negotiating parties in Colombia have agreed that 
children under 14 ‘can in no case be held criminally responsible’.
129
  This demonstrates a 
desire to find equivalence between the approach of transitional criminal justice and the 
ordinary criminal justice system because the minimum age of criminal responsibility in 
Colombia is 14.  But the parties have also agreed a special bracket of criminal responsibility 
between 14 and 18.  This indicates that disagreement about who is a ‘child’ for the purposes 
of criminal responsibility arises in this range.   
The agreement States that ‘[m]inors aged 14 to 18 who leave the camps of the FARC-
EP…will be granted the benefit of pardon for rebellion and related offences when there is no 
impediment in Colombian law’.130  In the first place, this is in line with international 
humanitarian law.  Article 6(5) of Additional Protocol I urges that ‘the authorities in power 
shall endeavour to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in 
the armed conflict’.
131
  However, there is no indication in the agreement about what would 
count as ‘related offences’ for the purposes of amnesty.  The ‘Final Peace Agreement’ 
includes a chapter on ‘Victims’ which makes no special consideration for child soldiers 
(hence the ‘Agreement on Minors’ which is separate document).  In relation to non-child 
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soldier perpetrators, some ‘related offences’ for the purposes of general amnesty have been 
mentioned.  These include forced displacement, conspiracy to rebel, sedition, rioting, 
kidnapping, and extra-judicial killing.  Further, there is no indication in Joint Communiqué 
#70 of what counts as an ‘impediment in Colombian law’ for the purposes of the ‘pardon for 
rebellion’.  This may be, perhaps, a rebus sic stantibus provision.  In the event that 
circumstances change, the State reserves the right to prosecute 14 to 18 year olds.  But the 
situation is even more uncertain in relation to minors ‘accused or convicted’ of crimes ‘not 
subject to amnesty or pardon’.
132
  The most relevant crimes are serious war crimes and crimes 




The above sketch of the ‘Agreement on Minors’ indicates that the parties in Colombia 
accept that child soldier accountability is permitted and may be required by law.  The 
ultimate decision will be taken by a chief prosecutor.  The variety of possible cases that might 
arise suggests that a case-by-case approach to child soldier accountability could be most 
appropriate.  However, as a matter of international human rights law, the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child has urged State parties to the Convention on the Rights of the Child not to 
determine questions of criminal responsibility by reference to subjective factors such as ‘the 
attainment of puberty, the age of discernment of the personality of the child’.
134
  How the 
Committee’s General Comments affect the interpretation of the peace agreement remains to 
be seen.  But it is doubtful whether a new Additional Protocol that sets out the rules on this 
issue would be agreed at the level of detail needed to resolve the dilemmas.  Furthermore, 
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chapter 3 expands on how the existing categories provide some guidance as to what ought to 
be done.   
Nevertheless, Orend’s proposal for a new Protocol is an assertive and simple way that 
post-war justice could influence post-conflict law.  Further, most, if not all, contributors to 
the field, whether from just war theory or international law, cite Orend as the ‘initiator’ of the 
jus post bellum debate.  As such, to the extent that international lawyers have joined the 
debate on the jus post bellum this is owing to Orend’s call for a new treaty on post-conflict 
matters.  Therefore, chapter 3 is devoted to evaluating Orend’s proposal in detail in relation 
to the question of transitional criminal justice.   
2.3 The jus post bellum as a legal concept 
 
Orend’s proposal is not the only way that a ‘legal’ jus post bellum has been discussed.  Many 
international lawyers have demonstrated interest in the jus post bellum.135  After all, there are 
certain similarities between the moral and legal discourse on armed conflict.  Most apparent 
is that international lawyers also refer to the ‘jus ad bellum’ and the ‘jus in bello’.136  
However, lawyers and just war theorists may mean different things when referring to these 
terms.137  For mainstream international lawyers, these terms function as shorthand for the 
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specific rules and principles of international law.138  For ‘non-positivists’ they include the 
moral principles that govern the use of force and the conduct of war.   
On a traditional reading, the jus ad bellum hinges on the prohibition on the use of 
inter-State force found in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.139   Exceptions to this rule are also 
considered part of the jus ad bellum.  There are only two exceptions in the UN Charter: the 
chapter VII collective measures decided by the UN Security Council (Articles 39 – 51) and in 
self-defence according to Article 51.140  The jus ad bellum as a matter of just war theory is 
related to a discussion of ‘just cause’, ‘right intention’ and ‘proportionality’.  These moral 
principles are not thought to be relevant for the purposes of identifying the law on the use of 
force.  However, as discussed, rules that must be interpreted demand a certain flexibility of 
approach.  An interpretive approach to law blurs the line between legal and moral 
approaches.     
Similarly, for international lawyers the jus in bello denotes the rules of conduct that 
apply to armed conflict.  The modern rules have developed in a piecemeal fashion since the 
middle of the 19th Century.141  There are different rules which apply to different kinds of 
armed conflict.142  The first question in identifying the rules is to ask what type of armed 
conflict is being fought.  Lawyers must refer to a range of different treaties and also consider 
any customary international law that applies to the factual scenario.  The main reference 
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points in treaty law are the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional 
Protocols.143 However, treaties on prohibited weapons such as those prohibiting chemical 
weapons are also included in the jus in bello.144  As in just war theory, the post-conflict phase 
has traditionally lacked a ‘stand-alone’ legal category.  This means that it has been possible 
for lawyers to mirror just war theory arguments in favour of ‘completing’ the law of armed 
force by recognising a tripartite conception.145  Three general approaches can be discerned 
from how the jus post bellum has been used: 
 
i) a term that describes all the existing law that applies 
ii) a term for a new law that ought to come into being 
iii) a term for ‘emerging law’ that has changed the existing law  
 
The remainder of this section evaluates these three conceptions.  
2.3.1. Describing the post-conflict legal framework  
 
The first is the least controversial.  Some have used the jus post bellum as a new descriptive 
term for all the law that applies during the post-conflict phase.  For example, Inger Ӧsterdahl 
and Esther van Zandel have argued that the jus post bellum is an area of law that mixes a 
number of different legal categories, 
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…international humanitarian law, international human rights law, international criminal law, 
national criminal law, national administrative law, national constitutional law, and national 
military law.  Also one can think of incorporating international and national laws relating to the 
financial and economic sectors as economic reconstruction is a very important part of the post – 
conflict phase.146 
 
This approach is echoed by Vincent Chetail who argues that ‘far from being based upon a 
coherent and uniform set of standards’ the law that regulates the move from conflict to peace 
is ‘located at the intersection of various branches of law, as much international as 
domestic’.147 In the context of transitional criminal justice in Colombia, therefore, the jus post 
bellum might include:  international humanitarian law, international criminal law, 
international human rights law, the Constitution of Colombia, the Colombian Penal Code, the 
peace agreement and the ‘special legislative measures for peace’ as confirmed by the 
Constitutional Court.148  The peace agreement states that for the purposes of the Special 
Tribunal for Peace the most relevant bodies of law are international human rights law, 
international humanitarian law and international criminal law.149   
Of course, a simple descriptive account of the law must take into account that these 
bodies of law are subject to international and regional interpretations.  Thus, in relation to 
humanitarian law, the case-law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia has provided interpretations of the law that depart from earlier established rules.  
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The best example is the interpretation of the law on the boundaries between an internal and 
international armed conflict in Nicaragua and Tadić.150 Nevertheless, this way of using the 
term is useful.  In highlighting the mixture of legal categories, and different interpretations, 
which define the ‘post-conflict phase’, the jus post bellum serves as a reminder that a ‘one-
size-fits-all’ approach to post-conflict matters is difficult to sustain.  For example, in relation 
to the criminal accountability of child soldiers, the applicable law depends on the minimum 
age of criminal responsibility in the State concerned.  As States simply do not agree on what 
the universal minimum age of criminal responsibility ought to be, there could be no uniform 
jus post bellum that applies as a matter of international law.151  Each post-conflict situation 
will need to deal with the criminal accountability of child soldiers and adolescents in view of 
the domestic legal system.  For now the point is that using the jus post bellum as a new 
umbrella term for the law as it stands changes very little and is relatively uncontroversial.  At 
most, naming a fragmented legal matrix the ‘jus post bellum’ can be seen as an attempt to 
impose ‘lexical’ coherence on the law of armed conflict.152  But even so, the law itself is 
unchanged and the provisions of the existing legal categories remain the same.  
2.3.2. The jus post bellum as a reform proposal 
 
The jus post bellum has been discussed as a reform proposal in favour of a new post-
intervention law.  This is best exemplified by Orend’s call for a new Geneva Convention on 
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post-intervention reconstruction.153  As noted above, Orend has argued that international law 
ought to follow just war theory in developing a post bellum category.  In his view, a new 
Geneva Convention ought to focus on ‘what the winners of war may and may not do to 
countries and regimes they have defeated.’154 Whether this is necessary, desirable and 
possible is the focus of chapter 3.  Orend has presented the most assertive version of the jus 
post bellum as ‘post-intervention law’ but others have also argued for the development of a 
new legal paradigm.155  As with developments in just war theory, these reform arguments 
emerged in response to the legal issues that arose in the context of the invasion and 
reconstruction of Iraq (see section 2.2.1).  The occupying powers in Iraq carried out extensive 
legislative, economic and political reforms to the structure of the Iraqi State.156  Yet, a so-
called ‘transformative occupation’ is faced with significant legal challenges.  Primarily, 
occupation law contains concrete provisions preventing occupiers from undertaking the types 
of reforms which were seen as necessary (by the victorious powers) in post-intervention Iraq.  
The relevant norms are primarily Article 43 of Convention IV Respective the Laws and 
Customs of War 1907 (the Hague Regulations) and Article 64 Geneva Convention IV 
(GCIV) 1949.157  For example, Article 43 States, 
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The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the 
latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order 
and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.
158 
 
Article 64 GCIV is slightly more permissive.  It allows the Occupying Power to change the 
laws in force in cases where they constitute a threat to [the Occupier’s] security.159  Further, 
the Occupying Power may also subject the population of the occupied territory to, 
  
provisions which are essential to enable the Occupying Power to fulfil its obligations under the 
present Convention, to maintain the orderly government of the territory, and to ensure the security 




There is debate about how these provisions interact with the normative pull of human rights 
law.161  However, the important point for taxonomical purposes is that contributors to the jus 
post bellum debate interpreted the changes made to post-intervention Iraq as non-consensual 
legal reform which took place in relative freedom from any accountability mechanisms.162  
For example, Kristen Boon argued that the intervening forces could ‘operate with nearly 
untrammelled discretion, above the checks and balances’ normally required by the rule of 
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law.163 As a response, Boon called for a jus post bellum which would require that 
‘international authorities and occupants who assume governing and legislative duties exercise 
their powers according to certain principles of justice’.164 In her view, ‘trusteeship, 
accountability and proportionality’ could be used to ‘articulate substantive standards in the 
legal frameworks applicable to occupation’.165 How this would actually operate as a matter of 
law is unclear and vague.  It could be that Boon was simply calling for a new interpretive 
stance rather than new rules and norms.  More will be said about this approach in Part B of 
this thesis.   
As with the just war theorists, these comments are relatively detached from the 
realities of post-conflict Colombia.  Boon’s work calls for a new paradigm of post-
intervention law that creates normative parameters for the possible activities of intervening 
States and international organizations.  A similar approach was adopted by Jean L. Cohen 
who argued that it was imperative to ‘come up with international law principles adequate to 
the normative and structural conditions of the current epoch’.
166
  Thus, the idea that the law 
of occupation was unfit for purpose was, again, the motivating factor behind the definition of 
jus post bellum as a proposal for legal reform.  Cohen’s view was that a new jus post bellum 
was needed to restructure the law of occupation.  For Cohen, this new post bellum law should 
incorporate the principle of self-determination.  The occupier ‘is trustee for the sovereignty of 
the indigenous population, […] it must ensure that the latter has the opportunity, at the 
earliest possible moment and with the greatest possible scope and autonomy, to determine its 
own political institutions’.
167
 This mirrors arguments put forward by Walzer and Bass about 
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the necessity of local ownership in reconstruction processes.  As such, the ‘post-intervention’ 
literature is based on the borrowing of just war theory arguments for the purposes of the 
development of the law of occupation.168   
Furthermore, Cohen argued that the principle of State-sovereignty demanded a narrow 
interpretation of human rights norms by international actors because ‘an occupant cannot be 
expected to institute all the human rights protections that exist in international covenants’.
169
 
In terms of resources, this may be true and arguments made by Charles Garraway in relation 
to an occupiers detention powers support Cohen’s point.  Garraway has argued that faced 
with poor detention facilities in Afghanistan, an occupier may be faced with a conundrum.   
If they hand over detainees to unsatisfactory Afghan facilities, they are open to criticism and 
indeed, may, subject to applicability, be in breach of their own human rights obligations.  On the 
other hand, if they seek to hold the detainees themselves, there are further issues as to authority 
and different human rights obligations may arise.170   
 
Thus, for Cohen, the jus post bellum regime had to chart a middle course between rigid 
adherence to the strictures of occupation law and ‘overly-enabling reforms in the name of 
human rights or ‘democratic regime-change’.171 
These arguments in favour of a new law for post-intervention reconstruction are 
misconceived.  Although made in good faith, the creation of a new legal regime applicable to 
the post-intervention phase would likely encourage military interventions to the detriment of 
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weaker States.172  A set of unilateral legal obligations to reconstruct States may add strength, 
in practical terms, to a legal right to undertake humanitarian intervention.  This is especially 
the case when these obligations are linked to the central tasks of reconstruction (establishing 
the rule of law, order and security, preparing free and fair elections, building democratic 
institutions, implementing economic liberalization and implementing human rights and 
liberties).  These jus post bellum obligations are easily capable of being interpreted as 
powers.  In fact, a new Additional Protocol would arise de jure.  A questionable intervention 
into the affairs of weaker States (on ‘humanitarian’ grounds) would be made more legitimate 
if international law provided concrete norms for post-intervention reconstruction along liberal 
democratic lines.  Boon recognizes as much when she highlights the jus post bellum end 
goals, ‘to establish security, create the political and economic basis for independence, and 
promote a democratic process’. In this way, from the outset, the legalization of the jus post 
bellum raises (rather than diminishes) concerns of neo-colonialism and imperialism.  In 
arguing that the jus post bellum could be used to maximize the accountability of foreign 
interveners and re-establish the rule of law, these same interveners accrue special powers that 
grant them the rights to rebuild States and territories in their image.  This argument will be 
fleshed out in chapter 3 in relation to Orend’s call for a new Additional Protocol.   
2.3.3. The jus post bellum as a new law that has already emerged 
 
The jus post bellum has also been used to denote a new legal practice that has already altered 
the existing law.  Carsten Stahn has argued that the practice of States and international 
organizations in the field of peace-making has provided evidence of the ‘crystallization of 
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certain rules and institutional frameworks for the organization of peace’.173 Stahn focuses on 
peace agreement practice to argue that peace-making has become internationalized.174  For 
Stahn, 
Modern peace agreements regularly contain a large regulatory component, including numerous 
provisions on the organization of public authority and individual rights, such as provisions on 
transitional government, claims mechanisms, human rights clauses, provisions on demobilization, 
disarmament and reintegration, as well as provisions on individual accountability.175 
 
Stahn’s point is that these regulatory provisions, when considered alongside ‘structures and 
institutional frameworks’ to ensure compliance, result in a new legal practice, a new jus post 
bellum.176  Stahn argues that a new legal paradigm has arisen insofar as international practice 
has realised that the outcome of peace agreement negotiations cannot be ‘left entirely to the 
skills of negotiators’.177  Thus, he points to the interconnected nature of contemporary 
international society and argues that it creates a trend towards viewing peace-making as an 
activity of concern to the ‘international community’ as a whole.178   
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It is true that after the Cold War there has been a demonstrable trend towards the 
multilateralization of peace-making efforts.179  It may be that international practice of States 
and international organizations has ‘crystallized’ around a body of new post-conflict norms.180    
However, whether these are probative of a new legal paradigm which has altered the existing 
legal framework is more controversial.  The difficulty arises in ascribing legal status to a 
body of normative parameters which are of uncertain scope and applicability.  Not every rule 
that creates order in the international system of States is a legal rule.181  It is better to see this 
approach to the jus post bellum as an interpretive approach which focuses on principles rather 
than law.  Gallen has argued that the jus in the jus post bellum ought to be thought of as an 
interpretive framework of post-conflict principles.182  But Gallen adds that the interpretive 
framework ought to be understood as a Dworkinian framework.  This involves seeing 
international law as an interpretive system subject to the overarching principle of integrity.  
The full implications of this view, in relation to child soldier accountability, will be discussed 
in detail in chapters 4 - 6.  The important point to make for this chapter is that these principles 
are no less ‘legal’ for their failure to correspond to the formal international law-making 
processes of treaty and customary law.  This is owing to the fact that law itself, for Dworkin, 
includes and is justified by those moral principles which best explain and justify the legal 
order as a whole.  Gallen’s jus post bellum theory attempts to respond to the fragmented 
nature of law and practice in post-intervention reconstruction by relying on post-conflict 
principles.  But using moral principles to resolve the indeterminacy of legal rules is open to 
the criticisms advanced by Koskenniemi, Çali and Cryer.  The views of the powerful may be 
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imposed on those of the weak.  Whether and how Gallen’s theory helps to identify the rules 
of transitional criminal justice is the central task of Part B of this thesis.   
Eric De Brabandere has argued that Gallen’s theory is a rather ‘minimalist’ 
conception of the jus post bellum (especially when compared with the some of the more 
assertive earlier suggestions).183  But this is owing to the fact that Brabandere does not 
consider the implications of, what he calls the ‘rather jurisprudential’ element of Gallen’s 
version of the jus post bellum.184  It is common for mainstream international lawyers simply 
to refuse to engage with any theoretical enquiry into the nature of the international legal 
order.  Reimagining the jus post bellum as an interpretive framework implies that the 
mainstream view of international law is only a part of the broader legal picture.  Emphasizing 
the role of post-conflict principles in regulating the behaviour of States and international 
organizations implies a broader view of ‘international law’ than is usually permitted by the 
mainstream epistemic communities that seek to influence State behaviour.185  Gallen’s 
argument that the practice of States and international organizations during transitions is 
governed and justified by the principles of the jus post bellum implies a departure from the 
mainstream approach to international law.   
In discussing post-intervention peacebuilding Gallen focuses on the principles of 
accountability, proportionality and stewardship.  In relation to transitional criminal justice, 
Gallen might argue that the principles of reconciliation, rehabilitation, non-repetition, 
accountability and proportionality have shaped the practice of States in transition.  According 
to this view, reference to these principles ought to be made when States and international 
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organizations aim to justify any incoherence in their approach to post-intervention 
peacebuilding.  However, many problems surround the re-interpretation of international law 
as an interpretive legal order that aims at integrity.  Very little research has been done on how 
the concept of integrity functions in the international legal order.   
2.3.4 Interpretive principles and the lex pacificatoria 
 
Gallen’s jus post bellum as ‘interpretive principles’ echoes Bell’s work on a new lex 
pacificatoria that covers the peace agreement practice.186  However, Bell is explicit that these 
new norms are not law in the traditional sense of the word.  She argues that as international 
law affects the possibilities of peace-making, so conflict resolution techniques have affected 
the nature of the legal norms.  In her words,  
 
The term lex pacificatoria acknowledges that international law may usefully be shaped by conflict 
resolution innovations, even as it attempts to shape settlement terms, […] In remaining open to 
viewing both those parties to the conflict and international legal actors as peace-makers capable of 
the generation of pluralist and competing legal standards, the term lex pacificatoria also points to 
the contingent nature of new ad – hoc legal developments…
187 
 
Thus, for Bell, the emerging ‘post-conflict law’ is a result of the way peace-makers are using 
the relevant legal categories.  For example, in relation to transitional criminal justice, Bell 
argues that the new lex has emerged from ‘the overall import and direction of human rights, 
humanitarian and international criminal law when read as a unified body’, rather than from 
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‘any one convention or provision’.188  Stahn makes a similar point when he argues that a 
‘piecemeal’ approach to the jus post bellum is misguided.  Instead he identifies the challenge 
of post-conflict law as relating to the definition of the ‘interplay between different legal 
orders and bodies of law’.189 But on this reading, the fragmented nature of post-conflict law 
means that ‘the law’ on many topics is identified as a result of interpretation.  However, the 
way that the law is interpreted, according to Bell, depends on a negotiated response to why 
the conflict emerged, who won, and why it ought to be over.  Thus, the interpreters bring 
their own experiences of conflict to the interpretation of post-conflict law.  The normativity 
in the system comes less from traditional approaches to law and more from the way that 
subsequent post-conflict situations investigate previous transitions.  The way law has been 
interpreted in post-conflict situations presents normative parameters for what is possible as a 
matter of law in subsequent transitions.  For Stahn, all of this means that ‘the conceptual 
development of jus post bellum requires more inter-disciplinary discourse’ and that law ‘may 
draw valuable insights from the content of the classical jus post bellum under just war 
doctrine.’
190
  But States are unlikely to support a new jus post bellum category that relies on 
particular interpretations of just war theory.   
Bell’s approach to the lex pacificatoria is very different to the way that Orend and 
Gallen use the term just post bellum.  This is owing to the strictly inductive methodology that 
is involved in her study.  Orend and Gallen mix inductive and deductive approaches. Orend 
argues for a more ‘robust’ set of top-down rules that are applicable after a victorious power 
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defeats an unjust enemy.191 These are to be deduced from a Kantian approach to international 
justice.  The innovation introduced by Gallen is that the jus in the jus post bellum must adhere 
to the Dworkinian principle of integrity.  This will be explained in more detail in chapter 4.  
Chapter 5 then demonstrates what the jus post bellum as integrity in relation to post-conflict 
Colombia might look like.   Integrity is an overarching moral principle.192  It requires that 
legal interpretations represent the entire legal order as a coherent and unified legal system.   
This aspect of Gallen’s theory is plainly at odds with Bell’s characterization of the emerging 
law which emphasizes that peacemakers are creating the new law from the ‘bottom-up’.  As 
Bell has argued, the lex pacificatoria ‘does not signal a fully-fledged regime as a possible, or 
desirable, end point […] it signals that the indeterminacy of post-conflict law may indeed be 
a ‘good thing’.193  For Bell, instead of regulating negotiation outcomes, it may be better to 
‘provide broad normative parameters’ which ‘support the idea that negotiated outcomes 
should be both capable of implementation and accord with some sense of justice, while 
leaving room for the contestation over what concepts such as “accountability”, “justice” and 
even “peace” require’.194 In relation to transitional criminal justice, Bell’s formulation makes 
sense.  In the context of non-international armed conflicts such as Colombia, peace depends 
on the parties negotiating a solution which is acceptable to victims and former perpetrators 
alike.  This extends to the decisions made by the chief prosecutor in relation to the criminal 
liability of child soldiers.  In this respect, a commitment may be seen potentially as closing 
off certain avenues and possibilities of innovation and interpretation in post-conflict law.  The 
Dworkinian method, as will be seen in chapter 5, emerges from a study of common-law 
                                                                        
191
 Christine Bell, ‘Of Jus Post Bellum and Lex Pacificatoria – What’s in a Name?’, in in Carsten Stahn, Jennifer Easterday and Jens 
Iverson (eds.) Jus Post Bellum – Mapping the Normative Foundations (New York, OUP: 2014), 181, 205. 
192
 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, (Oxford, Hart Publishing:  2006), 178. 
193
 Christine Bell, ‘Of Jus Post Bellum and Lex Pacificatoria – What’s in a Name?’, in in Carsten Stahn, Jennifer Easterday and Jens 
Iverson (eds.) Jus Post Bellum – Mapping the Normative Foundations (New York, OUP: 2014), 181, 205. 
194
 Christine Bell, ‘Of Jus Post Bellum and Lex Pacificatoria – What’s in a Name?’, in in Carsten Stahn, Jennifer Easterday and Jens 





adjudication and the principle of stare decisis.  Thus, the jus post bellum as integrity urges 
coherence in interpretations which the lex pacificatoria does not.  Arguably, when the aims 
are an end to fighting and a more sustainable and peaceful future, the coherence in the law 
ought to make way for the political imperatives of discrete transitional societies.   
3. Conclusion 
 
Good reasons exist for maintaining a strict positivist methodology in the identification of 
international law.  It is a deep concern to many international lawyers, not to mention States, 
that mixing morality into the law increases the risk of allowing the powerful to influence the 
law to their own ends. The international legal order defends against this possibility by 
promoting the sovereign equality of its members as the foundational principle of international 
law.  One way of understanding this principle is that it represents the ‘persistent, though 
bounded, disagreement [about] what constitutes a legitimate and just internal public order.’195 
Therefore, recognising that the foundation of international law rests on sovereign equality 
helps to ‘militate against powerful States’ penchant for invoking universal principles to 
rationalise unilateral (and typically self-serving) impositions upon weak States (and 
subjugated peoples).’196   
This does not preclude an approach to the identification of normative parameters or 
principles which have emerged through State practice.  Not all rules are legal rules.  
However, whether certain rules or norms ought to be ‘hardened’ into law in relation to 
transitional criminal justice might be doubted.  The dilemmas exist because of the social 
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context of transitions.  In these situations, forward-looking analyses that focus on the 
establishment of a stable and secure peace are to be favoured.    
The principle of sovereign equality guards against the transposition of a (moral) 
version of the jus post bellum into international law.  No amount of academic enthusiasm will 
create a new legal category for post-conflict peacebuilding.  The methodology of 
international law is fixed.  If there is to be a new jus post bellum, it will be States that decide 
to legislate to those ends.   Whether a new post-conflict law on transitional criminal justice 
ought to be codified is the subject matter of chapter 3.  Whether a more minimal 
conceptualization of ‘the jus post bellum as principles’ is useful is the subject matter of Part 






CHAPTER 3:  THE JUS POST BELLUM AS A NEW ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO 
THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS1 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter demonstrated how the jus post bellum has been used in different ways 
by different epistemic communities and, sometimes, within the same epistemic community.  
It identified two ways that the jus post bellum has been used as a normative concept in 
international law:   
 
i) as a proposal for a new Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions as 
proposed by Brian Orend or,2 
 
ii) as a Dworkinian interpretive framework for the post-conflict legal landscape 
as proposed by James Gallen.3   
 
The overall aim of this thesis is to evaluate whether and how each of these proposals are 
practically useful.  This chapter evaluates the first of these:  whether the jus post bellum 
ought to be a new Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions.4  The current law of armed 
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conflict provides no single coherent set of rules for transitional criminal justice.  A new post-
conflict set of rules, therefore, might appear as a desirable and necessary development.  All 
States have an interest in the successful termination of armed conflicts.  Therefore, the 
identification of legal rules on reconstruction ought to be, prima facie, desirable.  However, 
the burden of proof for reform of the current legal framework is on Brian Orend and other 
proponents of the jus post bellum.  This chapter evaluates whether the case for a new jus post 
bellum has been made convincingly enough.   
The nature of peacebuilding means that the proposals could be evaluated in relation to 
many areas of post-conflict peacebuilding.  The discussion in this chapter focuses on 
transitional criminal justice and the criminal accountability of child soldier perpetrators of 
international crimes.5  This is an area of law that is unclear.  The law is founded on a mixed 
and fragmented legal framework that draws on domestic criminal law as well as international 
human rights law, international humanitarian law and international criminal law.  According 
to Orend, a new jus post bellum Protocol ought to be agreed in order to resolve some of this 
uncertainty.6  This chapter, therefore, asks whether a new Additional Protocol is needed; 
whether agreement on the rules of transitional criminal justice would be possible and whether 
such a development would be desirable.  Furthermore, a detailed discussion on the law on 
child soldiers is lacking in almost all the jus post bellum literature.7 But the reintegration of 
child soldiers into post-conflict civilian communities is crucial.  Those children who are 
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implicated in international crimes represent a risk in terms of the peace process.8  Yet, in 
Colombia, whether and how child soldiers ought to participate in transitional criminal justice 
measures is unclear.  The transitional criminal justice measures were the most contentious 
aspect of the peace negotiations.9 The measures as they relate to child soldier perpetrators are 
very ambiguous.  Transitional criminal justice, therefore, represents a crucial area of post-
conflict law which is a good ‘testing ground’ for Orend’s idea of a new post-conflict 
Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions.  If the jus post bellum as proposed by Orend 
ought to be supported in relation to this difficult issue, then other areas of post-conflict law 
could also come under consideration for legal reform.  On the other hand, if Orend’s proposal 
ought to be rejected, then similar arguments in relation to other areas of post-conflict law 
might be considered as reasons against legal reform in those areas. 
It is not possible to answer the question of the thesis without taking a position on 
Orend’s theory.  The question asks whether the jus post bellum concept is useful for 
practitioners in solving a particular problem in post-conflict law.  Orend’s proposal represents 
the most direct way that the jus post bellum concept could be useful – i.e. by representing a 
new ‘third branch’ of the law of armed conflict, i.e. a jus post bellum as a matter of positive 
international law, that would take precedent over the other areas of international law by virtue 
of being the lex specialis on point.   
To be clear, as Colombia tries to decide how to deal with the criminal accountability 
of its child soldier perpetrators, there is no post-conflict legal framework in international law 
that provides a direct answer.  Instead, international law provides a number of different rules 
and post-conflict actors in Colombia must use these parameters and arrive at a plausible 
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interpretation of the law. Orend suggests that a Kantian version of the jus post bellum does 
provide answers to the dilemma.  Thus, if Orend is right, the answer to the thesis question 
would be a simple ‘yes’ – the jus post bellum would be useful in helping practitioners solve 
particular dilemmas in post-conflict law.  However, if Orend is wrong and a new additional 
protocol in undesirable, unnecessary or, perhaps, impossible, then one of the most assertive 
and important jus post bellum theories would be unhelpful and the answer to the thesis 
question would be no.  The point of the thesis, overall, is to study the two main jus post 
bellum theories and decide if they are helpful in practice.  If not, then the jus post bellum 
concept probably ought not to attract much more attention from scholars. 
Section 3.2 sets out the dilemma of transitional criminal justice in general and in 
relation to child soldiers implicated in international crimes.  Section 3.3 sets out Orend’s 
proposed answer to this problem.  Section 3.4 critically evaluates two issues that arise in 
relation to Orend’s theory.  First, whether Orend’s reliance on a ‘Kantian’ jus post bellum is 
appropriate in terms of contemporary international law.  Second, it deals with the difficulty in 
identifying the ‘post’ in deciding when a new Additional Protocol ought to apply.  Section 
3.5 evaluates whether Orend’s proposal is possible.  Considerable difficulties would 
accompany negotiations on new rules for transitional criminal justice matters.  Section 3.6 
argues that a new Additional Protocol is not strictly necessary because as a matter of 
international law, human rights law and humanitarian law provide (at least some) normative 
parameters to deal with child soldier accountability.  It is important to recognise that the 
current approach affords post-conflict societies with a certain flexibility to tailor transitional 
criminal justice to the requirements of the transition.  This is important as not all post-conflict 
societies are the same.  Furthermore, child soldiers are not a uniform set of individuals and 
the legal response ought to be tailored to the problems of different post-conflict societies.  In 





and child soldiers, Orend’s jus post bellum proposal ought not to be supported.  Thus, a 
different conceptualization of the jus post bellum is necessary if it is to be relevant to the field 
of post-conflict law.  Part B of this thesis introduces and evaluates a more sophisticated 
version of the jus post bellum that focuses on its possible usefulness as an interpretive 
framework. 
3.2 The dilemmas of transitional criminal justice 
 
Legal reform is premised on the existence of a problem that requires a new legal solution.  
This section begins by setting out the ‘problem’ that Orend’s jus post bellum proposal sets 
out to solve:  the dilemma of transitional criminal justice in general and in relation to child 
soldiers in particular. 
3.2.1 General dilemma:  peace vs. justice 
 
The context of transitions gives rise to a tension between ‘international criminal lawyers’ 
goal of ending impunity [justice] and conflict mediators’ goal of resolving conflicts as 
quickly as possible [peace]’.10 In the context of non-international armed conflict, the very 
point of a transition is the end of the armed conflict and a concerted effort to move towards a 
more peaceful society.  Thus, peace negotiators must design peace agreements that are 
mutually acceptable to the parties to the conflict.  This offers a good opportunity for an end to 
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hostilities and increases the possibilities of a move back towards a ‘positive’ and sustainable 
peace.11  
In Colombia, the FARC-EP demanded a role in the political establishment in 
exchange for bringing to an end the armed struggle.12  Although for many this has been 
controversial, a refusal to accept the transformation of the FARC-EP from guerrilla army to a 
political party would be tantamount to refusing to end the armed conflict.  The peace 
agreement States that the ‘construction and consolidation’ of peace depends on a ‘democratic 
expansion’ that allows ‘new forces to emerge’ in the political landscape.13  Thus, the peace 
agreement guarantees five FARC-EP seats in the Congress and five in the Senate.14  
Furthermore, the FARC-EP party will contest the general elections in 2018.15  
At the same time, the five decades long internal armed conflict has generated many 
victims and survivors of atrocities.  New generations follow the old and ‘the past, 
unaccounted for, does not lie quiet’.16 In Colombia, there are now almost 8.5 million 
registered victims.17  This represents almost one in five of the total population.18  Everybody 
in Colombia knows somebody affected by the armed conflict.  Accounting for serious crimes 
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committed during the conflict, therefore, presents itself as an imperative if the post-conflict 
settlement is designed to enjoy any democratic legitimacy.  Indeed, in campaigning for a ‘no’ 
vote during the peace agreement referendum, former President Alvaro Uribe managed to 
mobilize a significant sector of the Colombian population against the peace agreement.19 His 
campaign argued that the transitional criminal justice measures in the peace agreement were 
tantamount to impunity for the crimes committed by the FARC-EP and would be ‘the 
harbinger of future conflicts’.20 This cannot be dismissed as purely political machinations.  
Human Rights Watch also argued that the transitional criminal justice measures in the peace 
agreement did not go far enough in respecting the rights of victims.21  
Furthermore, post-conflict accountability for FARC-EP crimes can be understood in 
terms of domestic law.  In non-international armed conflicts, rebel groups do not enjoy the 
‘privilege of belligerency’.22  In relation to Colombia, this means that, as a matter of 
international humanitarian law, the FARC-EP have never enjoyed ‘the right to participate 
directly in hostilities’.23 Thus, throughout the armed conflict they have been subjected to the 
territorial and personal jurisdiction of Colombian criminal law.  The Colombian Penal Code 
criminalizes sedition, rebellion and other acts that threaten the existence and security of the 
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State including ‘military hostility’.24 Thus, FARC-EP combatants can be thought of as 
criminals that ought to be prosecuted rather than enemy combatants.25  
Nevertheless, the end of the armed conflict is unlikely to arrive if the terms of the 
peace are perceived as worse (by FARC-EP combatants) than continued hostilities.  In 
Colombia, the FARC-EP has challenged the government for a number of decades.26  This 
situation of persistent armed conflict has come to represent the normal state of affairs for its 
members and for Colombian society.  The transition to a new and uncertain political 
settlement is unlikely to be achieved if rebels are required to lay down their weapons in 
exchange for certain imprisonment.  In these circumstances, peace negotiators are under 
pressure to agree to some post-conflict amnesties in exchange for the end of the conflict.27   
The law on amnesties, however, is relatively unclear.28  On the one hand, Bell and Roht-
Arriaza have argued that blanket amnesties are no longer an option for States.29  Although 
blanket amnesty laws have been challenged, it is not the case that they are altogether 
prohibited by international law.30  Spain’s 1977 Amnesty Law provides for a blanket amnesty 
that continues to shield individual perpetrators from responsibility for atrocities committed 
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during Franco’s regime.31  Furthermore, the Mozambique Amnesty Law 15/92 of 14 October 
1992 also failed to contain any accountability mechanisms for dealing with the atrocities 
committed by both sides during the conflict.32 In relation to the armed conflict in Liberia, the 
Liberian President Charles Taylor, who was indicted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
pressed for an amnesty in exchange for leaving the Presidency.  Furthermore, the 
International Court of Justice recently has confirmed the absolute immunity of any incumbent 
head of State.33  Finally, the peace process in El Salvador included a National Reconciliation 
Law that provided an amnesty law that made it virtually impossible to bring perpetrators of 
international crimes and human rights violations to justice.34 The question, therefore, turns to 
the nature and conditions of the specific amnesties and the extent to which they are 
recognized by international law.   
This is not a question that jus post bellum scholars have dealt with directly.  In 
Colombia, the parties have negotiated a form of ‘limited’ justice.35  The transitional justice 
mechanisms are part of the ‘Integral System for Truth, Justice, Reparation and Non-
Repetition’.36  The agreement contemplates the creation of a number of separate but 
‘integrated’ mechanisms.  These include: a Truth, Reconciliation and Non-Repetition 
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Commission; a Special Search Unit for Conflict-Related Disappeared Persons; the Special 
Jurisdiction for Peace and a range of specific measures on reparations.
37
 The parties have 
agreed that there are some crimes which are not capable of amnesties.  Point 25, Part 5 states 
that ‘[t]here are crimes which are not capable of attracting amnesties or pardons’.38   These 
are stated as ‘crimes against humanity’ and ‘other crimes as defined in the Rome Statute’.39 
Points 40 and 41, Part 5 elaborate on the crimes which are incapable of attracting amnesties: 
…crimes against humanity, genocide, serious war crimes (all systematic breaches of international 
humanitarian law), taking of hostages or other serious deprivations of liberty, torture, extrajudicial 
executions, forced disappearances, violent rape and other forms of sexual violence, the ‘taking’ of 
children, forced displacement, recruitment of children, as confirmed in the Rome Statute.
40
 
However, those persons accused of committing these crimes can still avoid a jail sentence.  
The peace agreement states that sanctions will aim at ‘satisfying the rights of victims and 
consolidating the peace’.41 This means that perpetrators may come forward to accept 
responsibility and give a full factual account of the events that occurred and their 
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involvement in the same.  This can result (in some cases) in a semi-deprivation of liberty and 
service to the community of up to eight years for serious crimes.42  What remains unclear is 
whether this system of transitional criminal justice will apply to child soldier perpetrators.   
3.2.2 Transitional criminal justice and child soldier perpetrators 
 
The general dilemma between peace and justice provides the background to the specific issue 
of child soldiers.  But the relationship between transitional criminal justice and child soldiers 
is complicated by a number of factors.  Child soldiers are not a uniform group of individuals. 
This should not be surprising.  There are an estimated 250,000 children worldwide involved 
in armed conflict.43  Many child soldiers may be ‘forcibly recruited’ into armed groups.44  But 
the individual situations, stories and circumstances of child soldiering vary.45  In Colombia, 
an estimated 18,000 children have taken part in the armed conflict.46  Some estimates in 
Colombia assert that up to 60% of those that joined the FARC-EP joined ‘of their own 
volition’.47 Thus, the difference in individual circumstances makes it difficult to ascertain 
what ought to be the proper relationship between transitional criminal justice and under-18s.    
Further, in Colombia, the involvement of children in armed conflict must be understood in 
the context of Colombia’s juvenile delinquency problem.  Recent estimates from 2013 assert 
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that there are over 34,000 cases of juvenile delinquency in Colombia.  This is owing to socio-
economic factors such as income inequality, institutionalized poverty, and lack of 
opportunities including education.  However, the existence of non-State armed groups, 
associated with the right and the left of the political spectrum, are also to blame for the 
involvement of children in the commission of serious crimes.  In Colombia, the age of 
minimum criminal responsibility is 14.  Those under 14 can never be subjected to the 
criminal sanction.  As a matter of ordinary justice, those between 14 and 18 years of age are 
subject to the Sistema de Responsibilidad Penal para Adolescentes (the ‘System for 
Adolescent Criminal Responsibility’, hereafter ‘SACR’) which treats all cases of juvenile 
criminal responsibility.48 This is a hybrid system of justice which involves the creation of 
specialized teams of individuals that work with the relevant norms and institutions to decide 
what to do with instances of juvenile justice.49  The relationship between the SACR and the 
transitional criminal justice mechanisms set up by the peace agreement remains to be seen. 
The peace agreement states that only children under 14 are immune from prosecution.50 A 
special bracket between 14 and 18 has been agreed and the parties also agreed that the issue 
of child soldier perpetrators in this age bracket ‘will be studied at a later stage’.
51
 This reflects 
the approach of the ‘ordinary’ justice system as reflected in the SACR.  Under this system, 
children and adolescents between 14 and 18 can be subjected to the criminal sanction but the 
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‘superior interests of the child’ must take priority at all times.52  Exactly how this system of 
juvenile justice will apply, and ought to apply, to those child soldiers suspected of the 
commission of international crimes remains unclear.   However, given the high levels of 
juvenile delinquency, and the evidence that some child soldier perpetrators are adolescents 
and have volunteered to join armed groups, it may be argued that participation in transitional 
criminal justice mechanisms ought to be retained.    
On the other hand, in terms of criminal responsibility, it may be possible to challenge 
the extent to which an under-18 is capable of ‘volunteering’ for an armed group.  A typical 
argument from the international legal community is provided by the Special Representative 
of the UN Secretary-General who argued that there was no difference between forced 
recruitment and volunteering in her amicus curiae brief in the Lubanga case at the 
International Criminal Court.53  As a matter of international criminal law, an individual must 
demonstrate ‘intention’ and ‘knowledge’ in order to attract criminal responsibility.54  Thus, 
the issue is one of maturity and whether children involved in armed conflict can ever be 
culpable to the relevant extent.  As mentioned, there are different paths into child soldiering 
and different experiences of child soldiering.  These realities may (or may not) have an 
impact on whether a child soldier is guilty of the commission of international crimes.  
However, it ought not to influence the question of whether they ought to be prosecuted for 
the commission of international crimes.  There is no doubt that in Colombia many children 
will have committed international crimes.  Personal accounts of the type of acts that children 
have committed are available and there ought to be few evidentiary hurdles to providing a 
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detailed factual account of the relevant atrocities.55 Thus, at the very least, the transitional 
justice response ought to be tailored to the individual situations that arise, for example, by the 
installation of a system of post-conflict juvenile justice.56   
On current evidence, the international response to child soldiering is to deal with all 
child soldiers as victims.57  There is a strong trend against the involvement of child soldiers in 
transitional criminal justice mechanisms.  For example, the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia did not prosecute anyone under the age of 18.58  In Sierra Leone, 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone had jurisdiction over persons over the age of fifteen but no 
prosecutions were forthcoming.  It is possible that a similar approach will be taken in 
Colombia.  However, this would not necessarily be the best response to the problem of 
juvenile justice in Colombia.  According to Mark Drumbl, the tendency to present all 
children involved in armed conflict as victims of armed conflict is well-intentioned but 
mistaken.59  It creates problems in terms of reintegration of child delinquents into post-
conflict communities.  Those children that are implicated in international crimes or atrocities 
are a difficult and ‘at-risk’ subgroup of child soldiers.60  Children implicated in war crimes or 
crimes against humanity are likely to require more help and support in the reintegration 
process.  They are also more at risk of being re-criminalized and of joining organized crime 
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as a substitute for their experience as child soldiers.  The reintegration process ought to 
reflect these individual realities.  Those children that have been implicated in international 
crimes ought to be assessed for their potential criminal liability.  The focus of the criminal 
process should reflect their vulnerability as children.  A special juvenile system of justice, 
based on the experiences of the SACR, would be preferable and the punishments for child 
soldier perpetrators should be focused on restorative justice and rehabilitation.  This tailored-
approach to post-conflict justice is hampered by the overwhelming perception that children 
are primarily victims of the armed conflict and not active decision-makers.  The tendency to 
treat all child soldiers as victims translates into post-conflict reintegration mechanisms which 
‘belies considerable on the ground variability’.61  
In terms of ‘peace’ vs. ‘justice’, it may be that a need to secure a stable and peaceful 
future for post-conflict societies militates against the prosecution of young perpetrators of 
armed violence.  On the other hand, in some (serious) cases it is not clear why young 
perpetrators of international crimes ought not to be treated very differently from adults.  In 
this context, the question for this chapter is whether Orend’s jus post bellum proposal helps to 
resolve these issues.   The next section sets out Orend’s proposal. 
3.3  The Orendian jus post bellum 
 
Orend argues that his thinking is ‘located first and foremost within the confines of just war 
theory.’62  However, he also argues that his views are intended to 
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…impact upon international law indirectly…by offering up its deeply considered views 
on the ethics of war and peace…for possible inclusion in a ratified legal document.63 
 
Thus, Orend’s argument can be read as a policy proposal from the perspective of what the 
law ought to be.  He presents a number of principles of a general jus post bellum and then a 
more specific set of principles for ‘forcible post-war regime change’.64  Only the first of these 
is relevant to post-conflict Colombia as ‘forcible post-war regime change’ is a set of 
principles for foreign ‘interventions’ akin to that which the US and its allies carried out in 
2003 in Iraq.  Thus, only the general principles applicable to all post-war settlements will be 
discussed. 
Orend begins by asking what a ‘just’ participant in war may rightly aim at in terms of 
post-war settlement.  He makes a number of starting assumptions.  Firstly, that it is possible 
to separate ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ parties in a classic ‘inter-state’ armed conflict.  This is 
questionable from the perspective of the international law of armed conflict which does not 
focus on the ‘justice’ of war but rather those rules that States have agreed shall apply equally 
to all parties in armed conflict.   
Secondly, Orend assumes that the principles derived from inter-state armed conflicts 
are applicable to other types of armed conflict, such as civil wars and those with a significant 
‘foreign intervention’ element.  The reason for this is that the principles he derives from 
Kant’s theory have a ‘generality’ and ‘moral strength’.  This is not highly problematic.  The 
principles that Orend proposes are very abstract (proportionality, compensation, 
rehabilitation) and the difficulty is likely to be what they mean, or ought to mean, in specific 
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contexts where the local conditions and reasons for the conflict impose themselves on the 
putatively universal norms.      
Third, Orend provides these principles as guidance for those actors who want to end 
their conflicts in a ‘fair, justified way’.65 In this respect, he notes that those actors who do not 
want to follow his principles are unjustified and in violation of the jus post bellum.  He points 
to the specific example of those actors who argue that ‘might is right’ and rejects that 
principle as impossible under a Kantian philosophy.  This only begs the question of why a 
Kantian philosophy ought to be declarative of the issue.  That discussion is left until later in 
the chapter but, more specifically, Orend means that aggressors, those who violate the jus ad 
bellum in legal or moral terms, can never comply with the jus post bellum because their 
settlement terms will necessarily be unjust.  From a legal perspective, this is not clear as the 
law of armed conflict maintains a strict separation between the ad bellum and in bello (and, 
therefore, post bellum) categories.66  For example, the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United 
States and its allies was an illegal use of force (i.e. in violation of the UN Charter rules on the 
use of force between member States).  Yet, the post-war reconstruction of Iraq was legal 
pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1483 and the law of occupation.  This, in turn, 
said nothing about the legality of the initial invasion. 
Keeping these often problematic assumptions in mind, Orend returns to the initial 
question and answers it in the following way:  
 
…what are the ends or goals of a just war?  The general answer is a more secure possession of our 
rights, both individual and collective.  The aim of a just and lawful war…is the resistance of 
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aggression and the vindication of the fundamental rights of societies, ultimately on behalf of the 




3.3.1 Rights Vindication   
 
Orend’s interpretation of the Kantian approach sees armed conflict as primarily a violation of 
the individual and collective rights of societies.  Their vindication is the obvious and 
unnegotiable aim of a ‘just’ post-war settlement.  Yet, it is not clear what vindication means.  
In the context of Colombia, it may be easy to agree that the victims of child soldier crimes 
ought to be vindicated.  However, what this means exactly is less clear.  For example, Orend 
does not demonstrate whether a ‘transitional justice’ system which exchanges truth and 
confession for ‘alternative punishments’ (essentially more lenient punishments) suffices to 
vindicate the rights of victims.  Orend argues that ‘vindicating rights’, rather than ‘vindictive 
revenge’ is what is necessary.  However, lacking in more detail, Orend’s jus post bellum is 
likely to remain too abstract to be useful in practice.   
3.3.2 Proportionality and publicity 
    
Orend argues that the peace settlement should be ‘measured and reasonable’ and ‘publicly 
proclaimed’.68  Of course, proportionality is already a fundamental part of legal reasoning.69 
Thus, there is no problem in accepting that a legal jus post bellum regime ought to reflect the 
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principle of proportionality.  It is also not a problem to argue that any peace agreement ought 
to be publicly proclaimed, and, in fact, State practice is based around recording peace 
agreements at the United Nations.70 Once more, the problem is likely to arise in terms of what 
these abstract principles mean in concrete cases.  Furthermore, some armed conflicts do not 
end with a peace agreement.  Thus, whether it should be measured, reasonable and publicly 
proclaimed is simply inapplicable in certain contexts, for example, the 2003 Iraq War.   
3.3.3 Discrimination  
 
Orend argues that the jus post bellum requires discrimination between ‘the leaders, the 
soldiers, and the civilians in the defeated country’.71 He says civilians are entitled to 
immunity from ‘punitive post-war measures’ such as ‘sweeping socio-economic sanctions’.72  
These comments are most probably directed at the post-intervention reconstruction of Iraq 
and the necessity to ensure that the Coalition Provisional Authority protected the welfare of 
ordinary Iraqis.73  Yet, Orend says nothing about how discrimination affects transitional 
justice mechanisms.  Orend does not provide any details on, for example, how female child 
soldiers ought to receive special treatment in transitional justice mechanisms.  Thus, once 
more, it is easy to agree that discrimination is an important principle in post bellum 
mechanisms.  For the record, international law has already moved towards recognising 
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gender-specific measures in post bellum mechanisms.74  Thus, whether a new post bellum law 
is necessary to secure these principles is doubtful.  
3.3.4 Punishment 
 
On punishment, Orend is not always clear.  He argues that a Kantian jus post bellum would 
punish ‘the leaders of the regime’ in ‘public international trials for war crimes’.75 He also says 
that ‘soldiers, from all sides to the conflict’ should be held accountable.76  It appears, 
therefore, that Orend might be in favour of pursuing the criminal accountability of child 
soldier perpetrators for the commission of war crimes.77  
However, post-conflict countries often do not have the resources (time, money, 
political will) to investigate, prosecute and punish all perpetrators of war crimes.  Orend’s 
views on punishment lack nuance and a sense of the political realities in post-conflict 
societies.  For example, given that he envisages a situation with an ‘overall just winner’ and 
an ‘overall unjust loser’, Orend does not comment nor contemplate on the number of 
alternatives to punishment (in the sense of criminal trials) developed in international law 
since the democratic transitions in Latin America in the 1980s.78   
In general terms, the approach has reflected a policy of prioritization in prosecuting 
some individuals coupled with collective truth and reconciliation commissions that are 
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intended to contribute to reconciliation.  Whether a Kantian jus post bellum could support 
‘alternative sentences’ that exchange disarmament for truth and a more lenient punishment is 
not clear.  But in the Colombian context, the sheer number of perpetrators means that 
prosecuting all putative war criminals is impossible.  Thus, a deal has been struck where 
some truth and confessions are exchanged for a limited sanction of between 5 – 8 years.  The 
peace agreement distinguishes between different types of individual culpability in terms of 
those who recognise the truth and confess to their crimes (limited sanction available) and 
those who do not (full criminal trial).79  This introduces a considerable administrative 
component to the transitional justice system.  It is unlikely that there will be many that fail to 
confess to their crimes and avail themselves of the benefits of the deal.  Nevertheless, this 
approach is probably not in line with a Kantian jus post bellum.  Then again, Orend’s 
commitment to Kantian retributivism is questionable insofar as (in relation to forcible post-
war regime change) he supports prioritization in prosecutions depending on whether the 
individuals concerned may or may not be useful in the reconstruction effort owing to their 
‘expertise’.80  Overall, there is a trend towards accountability or a ‘crystallizing international 
norm’.81 But Orend’s proposals on punishment are unsuited to the complex realities of the 
Colombian context. 
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3.3.5  Compensation   
 
Orend says very little about compensation.  In his view, ‘[f]inancial restitution may be 
mandated, subject to proportionality and discrimination’.82  But, again, he has in mind the 
kind of post-intervention reconstruction that took place after the invasion of Iraq where an 
overall winner decides on how to rebuild the defeated State.  This is not the situation in 
Colombia and, therefore, the views are slightly off point.  For example, Orend discusses the 
feasibility of a ‘post-war poll tax’ on the civilians of a defeated State.  In Colombia, this is 
inapposite and some of the financial resources for the reconstruction of the State have 
actually come from external sources.83 
In fact, reparations are already reflected in the rules and practice of post-conflict 
reconstruction.  As is well known, Germany paid over $60 billion to victims of the 
Holocaust.84  International human rights law grants individuals a ‘right to a remedy’, which 
may include financial remuneration, pursuant to Article 2(3) of International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).85  Of course, financial compensation may not necessarily 
satisfy victims of international crimes committed by child soldiers.  But reparations can also 
be important for symbolic reasons.86  Thus, Orend’s proposals are not really necessary in 
terms of rules of post-conflict law and the context of post-conflict Colombia. 
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3.4 Evaluating Orend 
 
Section 3.3 set out Orend’s suggestions in relation to the law on post-war settlements.  As has 
been seen, he is mostly concerned with situations where an overall ‘just’ winner is 
reconstructing an ‘unjust’ loser in classic inter-State armed conflict.  This is not really 
apposite to the Colombian situation which can more accurately be described as a ‘draw’.  
Further, Orend makes assumptions about the way the principles apply to the post-conflict 
actors which cannot really be supported in terms of law.  Post-conflict actors in Colombia 
simply do not fall neatly into ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ categories and international law does not 
require that they are identified.  Finally, many of the abstract principles that Orend proposes 
lack detail and are not very helpful in the specific context of Colombia.  Others, if they were 
‘legalized’, would not add anything new to the international law and policy that surrounds 
post-conflict peacebuilding.   
This section evaluates Orend’s proposal in more detail.  It asks two questions.  The 
first relates to Orend’s claim for the historical pedigree of the jus post bellum in his reliance 
on Immanuel Kant’s political philosophy.  It argues that the reliance on Kant is neither 
significant nor relevant for the development of the contemporary legal order.  Thus, Orend’s 
proposals should be considered on their own merits.  Secondly, it raises an important question 
in relation to applicability.  A new Additional Protocol on transitional criminal justice 
suggests that there ought to be a defined ‘post’ bellum moment that triggers its applicability.87  
However, transitional criminal justice mechanisms can occur during conflict and can extend 
long beyond the end of hostilities.  The former was the case in Colombia during the 
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demobilization of the paramilitary AUC forces.88  In these circumstances, it is doubtful 
whether a strict ‘post-conflict’ period can be identified which supports can be supported in 
practice.  This suggests that a more dynamic conception of the jus post bellum is necessary.  
The benefits of a more dynamic conceptualization will be explored in Part B.   
3.4.1 Is Kant relevant?  
 
For Orend, the jus post bellum is a Kantian concept which ought to be developed into the 
third branch of the international law of armed conflict.  He argues that Kant was ‘the first 
figure to offer us truly deep, systematic and forward-looking reflections on justice after 
war’.89  But Orend does not explain why Kant ought to be relevant to the development of 
contemporary international law.  There are good reasons not to rely on a Kantian approach to 
international law.  It is better that moral and legal concepts ought to be considered in relation 
to their historical and social context.90  This is necessary because moral and legal concepts 
arise in response to the realities of social life.91 Their existence is linked to a specific role that 
they perform in society.  As society changes, so moral and legal concepts can be expected to 
change in meaning.  Any contemporary relevance of Kant’s ideas needs to consider that his 
approach to political philosophy was conditioned by the era in which he lived and wrote.  In 
Orend’s claim for the historical pedigree of the jus post bellum these social and historical 
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differences are not always taken seriously.  Orend simply assumes that Kant’s comments in 
Perpetual Peace and The Doctrine of Right are directly relevant to the modern era.92  
In fact, several early or classical writers could be deemed to have identified a form of jus post 
bellum.  Stahn has indicated the early aspects of the jus post bellum in St. Augustine, de 
Vitoria and Suárez.93  Robert Cryer has argued that Alberto Gentili might also be thought of 
as the foundation of the jus post bellum.94   Finally, May goes back to Aristotle and the 
concept of meionexia in his formulation of the origins of the jus post bellum.95  These (and 
other) early writers’ thoughts on post-war justice may be interesting.  However, the relevance 
of these writers for the development of contemporary transitional criminal justice is doubtful.  
The field of transitional criminal justice did not come into existence until the 1980s and the 
transitions to liberal democratic governments in Latin America and Eastern Europe.96 The 
social, political and legal context in which the current debate unfolds is radically different to 
that which was known to early and classical writers.  Therefore, as Cryer has argued, 
‘methodological issues need to be thought through with respect to direct reliance on such 
writers in terms of our understanding of the law’.97  
For example, Kant wrote in German.  From a linguistic point of view, the German 
language has two words which are translated into English as ‘law’ – Gesetz and Recht.  They 
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are roughly equivalent to the Latin lex and jus.98 The first word refers to positive law.  The 
second, according to H.L.A. Hart, refers to the ‘morality of the law’.  Hart argues, 
 
The words ‘droit’, ‘diritto’ and ‘Recht’, used by continental jurists, have no simple English 
translation, and seem to English jurists to hover uncertainly between law and morals, but they do 
in fact mark off an area of morality (the morality of law) which has special characteristics.  It is 
occupied by the concepts of justice, fairness, rights and obligation.
99
 
Therefore, for traditional international lawyers, Kant’s work on Recht is about what the law 
ought to be and not about what the law is.100  In particular, Recht justifies the enforcement of 
the law from a moral perspective.  Kant argues that Recht and the [moral] authorization to use 
coercion […] mean one and the same thing’.101 But the contemporary international legal order 
is more concerned with the procedural validity of legal rules.  Legal validity depends on the 
rules emerging from the agreements between States.  The law is, therefore, different from 
what it ought to be because it derives simply from a social fact:  the consent of States.  
Further, it is important to note that Kant wrote for a purpose.  Kant wrote Perpetual 
Peace in response to the events of his time, namely the signing of the Treaty of Basel (1795) 
which secured French non-interference in the partition of Poland by Austria, Prussia and 
Russia.102  This is clear from the form of the text which follows that of a peace treaty.103  Each 
principle in the essay is formulated as ‘no x shall y’ to indicate the necessary changes that 
would have to be made in the reality of international relations for progress towards ‘perpetual 
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peace’.104 Some have argued that Kant adopted this approach in order to criticize the Prussian 
sovereign.105   According to Ellis,  
 
Kant is trying to do a number of different things at once:  write a serious political treatise on 
international legal order, satirize the pretensions of absolutist governing cliques, and 




Orend’s interpretation and reliance on a Kantian jus post bellum fails to take any of this into 
account.  But Orend may have tried to justify the reliance on Kantian political theory.  He 
could have argued that whatever the historical and social context of Perpetual Peace, Kant’s 
political philosophy (including the jus post bellum) is relevant to the modern law because it is 
the product of applying the categorical imperative to the practice of peace-making.  This 
would have required Orend to defend the modern relevance of the categorical imperative for 
international law.  He may have stated that unlike so-called ‘hypothetical imperatives’, the 
categorical imperative was considered by Kant to be the only objective moral principle.  
Orend could have argued that the categorical imperative is a ‘natural’ or ‘universal’ principle 
derived from reason that explains and justifies all law.107  As such, Orend could have argued 
that Kant’s comments in Perpetual Peace could be ‘universalized’, separated from their 
immediate context, and taken as prescriptions for the modern international legal order.   
This would be very controversial for the reasons explained in chapter 2.  
Traditionally, international lawyers eschew moral justification for the law and focus on the 
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consent of States to a set of objective and easily identifiable rules.  Law and morality are 
treated as different and separate.  Orend’s argument would have challenged the traditional 
view of the nature of international law.108  States would be unlikely to agree on a new 
Protocol on transitional criminal justice simply because Kant’s political philosophy can be 
interpreted as requiring it.  But Orend’s reliance on Kant for the development of international 
law does not include an argument in favour of adopting a Kantian concept of international 
law.  Neither does Orend appreciate that there is a great deal of debate about the correct 
interpretation of a Kantian position on international law.109  There is no need to resolve this 
debate here but merely to highlight the problems involved in easily assuming that Orend’s 
interpretation of a Kantian jus post bellum should be instructive for the development of 
international law.   
Given that a number of other writers could be claimed as ‘the source’ of modern rules 
on post-conflict law, the better view is to separate the claims to historical pedigree of the jus 
post bellum from the concrete proposals advanced by Orend.  This is especially important 
given that Orend himself is less than faithful to the Kantian approach when dealing with 
transitional criminal justice. Orend declares himself in favour of an approach that looks for 
pragmatic consequentialism.  According to Orend, ‘middle-ranking civil servants’ ought not 
to be prosecuted for war crimes owing to ‘their local knowledge and bureaucratic 
expertise.’110 This approach has some merits.  It attempts to balance backwards-looking 
requirements of justice and forward-looking arguments that aim towards peace.  In terms of 
State practice, international criminal justice is set up to prosecute those most responsible for 
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international crimes.  However, this approach does not appear to adhere to a Kantian 
approach to criminal justice.111  The Kantian approach to punishment tends towards a 
retributivist approach and is opposed to all forms of consequentialism.112 Retributivism means 
that all those suspected of war crimes should be prosecuted.  Consequentialism accepts that 
some may be spared if that would lead to better consequences.  As a retributivist, Kant’s 
approach would disregard whether or not an individual’s skills are useful for the post-conflict 
reconstruction phase.  Thus, if Kant’s political philosophy is asserted as the origins for the 
development of contemporary international law, it must be followed through and, as Cryer 
has argued, not discarded ‘when it becomes inconvenient’.113  For the purposes of this thesis, 
the Kantian origins of the jus post bellum ought to be disregarded.  Orend’s jus post bellum 
proposal ought to be evaluated and discussed on its own merits.   
3.4.2 Applicability problems:  When is the ‘post-’?  
 
Orend makes no specific mention of child soldiers implicated in international crimes.  He has 
argued simply that a jus post bellum would involve the prosecution and punishment of the 
leaders of the ‘defeated country’.114 This reflects Orend’s interest in post-intervention 
reconstruction, regime change and the 2003 Iraq War.  Orend says that he has provided an 
‘overall blueprint which can be amended, as details demand, in particular as well as 
unconventional cases’.115 However, even though the content of Orend’s jus post bellum is 
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unclear (in relation to child soldiers) the operational aspects of a new Protocol can be 
evaluated.  In this regard, the applicability of an Additional Protocol to the Geneva 
Conventions which deals with ‘post-conflict law’ presumes the prior existence of an armed 
conflict that has ended.  Yet, this is far from a straightforward issue and it has important 
implications.   
3.4.2.1 The end of non-international armed conflict116 
 
If Orend’s jus post bellum proposal is to be taken seriously as a reform of the current law of 
armed conflict it has to follow the rules of the system it seeks to join.117  However, Orend’s 
proposal fails to discuss in any detail the temporal applicability of the new law. He only 
suggests that the rules of the jus post bellum would be triggered when ‘a new day has 
dawned’.118  In his words,  
 
The precise diagnosis of ‘post’ is truly, difficult – but by no means should this difficulty be 
thought to be a good reason to give up entirely on the task of providing belligerents with guidance 
during the termination phase.  To use a crude analogy to the sunrise:  who can say, around dawn, 
exactly where night ends and day begins?  But eventually it is irrelevant and we all come to 
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This may be an acceptable approach in terms of just war theory but it is unsuited to the 
applicability of a new body of post-conflict law.  Orend presents the jus post bellum as an 
area of law for the post-conflict period.  This implies that it ought to have a set of specific 
rules on transitional criminal justice that override the jus in bello (applying during the 
conflict) and other legal categories (such as domestic law).  In this case, then there must be a 
moment in time when an Additional Protocol on post-conflict law would apply.  The lex 
specialis principle in international law asserts that the most specific law to the situation in 
question takes priority.120 Therefore, it must be possible to identify when a particular 
paradigm applies or ceases to apply.  The jus in bello applies during the armed conflict.  The 
jus post bellum, which would contain different rules, applies at the end of armed conflict.   
This is important in relation to the criminal accountability of child soldiers.  The most 
relevant rules are found in Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions, Additional 
Protocol II (when applicable) and customary international humanitarian law.121 The issue may 
be important in relation to children who are caught (or surrender) while the conflict is 
ongoing.  During armed conflict, these children may be subjected to administrative detention 
and prosecution under national criminal law.122  As has been mentioned above, the Colombian 
Penal code applies to members of the rebel armed forces such as the FARC-EP.  Association 
with these groups would open children to potential criminal responsibility in terms of the law 
on sedition and rebellion.123 A jus post bellum would tend to focus on the aims of transition 
and provide for specific rules on children that emphasize their reintegration and 
rehabilitation.  In the Colombian context, a transitional criminal justice mechanism provides 
                                                                        
120
 On the lex specialis principle see Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, ‘Fragmentation of International Law:  
Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law’, 58th Session, A/CN.4/L.682, (13 April 2006), 38. 
121
 See Office of the Special-Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Working Paper No. 3, Children and 
Justice During and in the Aftermath of Armed Conflict, (September 2011). 
122
 Office of the Special-Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Working Paper No. 3, Children and 
Justice During and in the Aftermath of Armed Conflict, (September 2011), 27. 
123
 Articles 111-132, Colombian Penal Code, 2nd Book, Special Part, ‘Delitos contra la Existencia y Seguridad del Estado’, and ‘Delitos 





for ‘alternative sentences’ which focus on restorative justice.  Restorative justice measures 
favour a collective approach to punishment.124  As discussed above, the context of transitions 
prefers this form of ‘limited justice’ to guide the measures dealing with the criminal 
accountability for international crimes.  Therefore, the difference between an ongoing armed 
conflict and the end of an armed conflict can have important implications for criminal 
responsibility of children. 
In relation to non-international armed conflicts, such as Colombia, there is very little 
guidance in international law in terms of how to decide that the armed conflict has ended.  
Treaty law lacks any specific direction.  Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions 
makes no reference to when an ‘armed conflict not of an international character’ ends.  
Article 2(2) of Additional Protocol II refers to the ‘end of the armed conflict’ but it does not 
define when this is.125 The Commentary to Additional Protocol II states that the rules are no 
longer applicable ‘at the end of hostilities’.126  The 1995 Tadić Appeal Chamber decision on 
jurisdiction also provides some guidance.127 The Appeals Chamber Stated that ‘[i]nternational 
humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and extends beyond the 
cessation of hostilities […] in the case of internal conflicts, [until] a peaceful settlement is 
achieved’.128  This is not very clear.  It may mean the end of active fighting (i.e. the 
agreement of a ceasefire) or it may mean the general close of hostilities (i.e. the reaching of a 
peace settlement).  Furthermore, neither ceasefires nor peace agreements are reliable 
indicators that an armed conflict is truly over.  For example, in Sierra Leone, two agreements 
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were signed but the conflict continued until the Revolutionary United Front was defeated.129 
Similarly, in Colombia, the armed conflict has followed a ‘stop-start’ pattern and there have 
been several attempts at peace.130   This has made it difficult to think of the conflict in terms 
of a linear event with a ‘beginning, middle and an end’ in the way that Orend has argued.131  
An alternative approach, therefore, must be found to decide when a post bellum phase has 
been reached.   
One possible approach is to focus on the criteria which signal the existence of a non-
international armed conflict.  The relevant criteria are those which distinguish a state of non-
international armed conflict from lesser types of armed violence such as internal 
disturbances.  The current legal framework emphasizes two criteria:  intensity of fighting, and 
the organization of armed groups.  Roger Bartiels has argued that it may be possible to apply 
these concepts ‘in reverse’.132  It could be argued that the absence of the criteria necessary to 
identify the existence of an armed conflict logically entails the end of an armed conflict.  At 
this stage, the post-conflict Additional Protocol on transitional criminal justice could be said 
to apply.   
Although this seems logical, it is not necessarily an answer to the problem.  The 
categorization of internal violence is a grey area in the law of armed conflict.133 The ICTY has 
considered the definition of non-international armed conflict at some length.134 The Tadić 
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decision became the reference point for all subsequent decisions of the ICTY.  It stated that 
an armed conflict existed ‘whenever there is a resort to protracted armed violence between 
governmental authorities and organised armed groups or between such groups, within a 
State’.135  A thorough review of the ICTY jurisprudence and the surrounding literature is 
provided in the Boškoski judgment.136  In terms of the protracted nature of the armed violence, 
the subsequent jurisprudence has stated that this refers to the ‘intensity’ of violence rather 
than its ‘duration’.137  In Boškoski the ICTY Trial Chamber identified many of the relevant 
factors that must be taken into account.  These included the seriousness of attacks, the use of 
armed forces, the type of actions, the effect on the civilian population, and whether the 
conflict has attracted the attention of the UN Security Council.138    
However, the issue of duration has not been completely removed from the analysis.  
There is still a temporal requirement insofar as the violence must be protracted.  In support of 
this position, the Trial Chamber relied on Article 8 (2) (d) Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court which States that Common Article 3 does not apply to ‘isolated and sporadic 
acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature.’139  Nevertheless, short conflicts can be 
armed conflicts.  On this, there is regional jurisprudence which is of direct relevance to the 
Colombian situation.  The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has found a 
confrontation of 30 hours constituted an armed conflict owing to,  
…the concerted nature of the hostile acts undertaken by the attackers, the direct involvement of 
governmental armed forces, and the nature and level of the violence attending the events in 
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question […] the attackers involved carefully planned, coordinated and executed an armed attack, 
i.e. a military operation, against a quintessential military objective – a military base.
140
 
Thus, the temporal length of the conflict is not necessarily a reliable indicator.  Furthermore, 
in terms of the organised nature of the armed groups, the Trial Chambers have considered 
whether the armed groups have a headquarters and the ability to procure and distribute 
weapons.141  In Colombia, the FARC-EP and other rebel groups have always adhered to an 
organised command structure.  Further, the FARC-EP is set to enter the political arena as a 
political party in the 2018 elections but this is would obviously be after the armed conflict is 
over. 
The point is that these are only indicators of the existence of the conflict.  Although 
they can be successfully applied in the analysis of situations of violence they are not 
necessarily determinative.142   It is still difficult to state with certainty when a conflict is over 
and a transitional phase has begun.  Some factors may be given less weight in certain 
contexts.  For example, there are many conflicts in Africa where the type of weaponry is far 
below that found in the former Yugoslavia.  Further, as mentioned, there is a question is 
whether it is possible to apply these factors ‘in reverse’ to suggest that the non-international 
armed conflict has ended and that the jus post bellum applies.  There is no jurisprudence to 
support this approach.  Further, some factors simply cannot be applied in reverse.143 For 
example, the fact that the violence has not attracted the attention of the UN Security Council 
cannot be indicative of the end of an armed conflict, especially when it concerns one of the 
permanent members.   
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There is a great difficulty in identifying the ‘end’ of a non-international armed conflict.  In 
Colombia, the conflict between the FARC-EP and the government has ended insofar as the 
peace agreement has been signed and is now in its implementation phase.  The ceasefire has 
(for the most part) held and both parties are committed to the transition towards a stable 
peace.  Thus, the applicability of a Protocol on transitional justice would not necessarily be 
problematic.  A new post bellum Protocol, therefore, might be designed to apply after a peace 
agreement and during its implementation phase. However, it would be difficult for States to 
agree on this question.  Sometimes, transitional justice measures are initiated during armed 
conflicts.144  Not all conflicts end in peace agreements.  And as mentioned, peace agreements 
fail and States return to violence, sometimes for many years as a time.  Therefore, States are 
unlikely to agree on a set of rules with such uncertain applicability requirements.  There is 
already a great deal of debate about when the jus ad bellum and jus in bello apply, for 
example, in relation to post-conflict detention and peacekeeping.145  As such, adding another 
difficult applicability problem to the law of armed conflict would be unwise. 
3.5 Is a new Additional Protocol possible? 
 
Putting aside the difficult issues of applicability, there are a further two issues that are 
relevant to the question of whether it would be possible for States to agree on a new Protocol 
that dealt with the criminal accountability of children.  The first relates to the variety of 
different views on the minimum age of criminal responsibility.  The second relates to the 
separation of negotiations on a new post-conflict Protocol for transitional criminal justice 
matters from other post-conflict issues such as ‘transformative occupation’. 
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3.5.1 The Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility   
 
A post-conflict, transitional criminal justice Protocol would need to be clear as to the 
minimum age of criminal responsibility.  There is a great variety among States in the 
minimum age of criminal responsibility.146  In Congo, one 14 year old child soldier has been 
executed and four others received death sentences.147  In the UK, the minimum age of 
criminal responsibility is ten.148  At the 27th International Conference of the Red Cross and 
the Red Crescent, several States declared that the minimum age for children to be recruited 
ought to be raised to 18.149   Although international human rights law encourages States to set 
a minimum age below which children cannot be held criminally responsible, it does not 
specify an appropriate age. 
One approach would be to set 18 as the minimum age of criminal responsibility.  
There is already a strong movement against the enlistment by States of any children under 
18.150  The logic of this approach is that if a child is ‘too young to fight’ at 18, then they are 
too young to be criminal responsible for their actions in the commission of crimes.  However, 
under international humanitarian law, the age below which conscription of enlisting children 
into armed forces is a war crime is 15.151 Therefore, according to the same logic, 16 to 18 year 
                                                                        
146
 Matthew Happold, ‘The Age of Criminal Responsibility for International Crimes under International Law’ in Karin Arts and Vesselin 
Popovski (eds.) International Criminal Accountability and the Rights of Children (TMC Asser Press:  The Hague, The Netherlands: 2005), 
69; Brittany Ursini, ‘Prosecuting Child Soldiers:  The Call for a Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility’, 89 St. John’s Law Review 
(2015), 1023. 
147
 See Congo: Don’t Execute Child Soldiers, Human Rights Watch, (2 May 2001) available at:  
http://www.hrw.org/news/2001/05/02/congo-dont-execute-child-soldiers; Brittany Ursini, ‘Prosecuting Child Soldiers:  The Call for a 
Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility’, 89 St. John’s Law Review (2015), 1023. 
148
 Section 34 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 abolished the previous regime of doli incapax and sets 10 as the minimum age of 
criminal responsibility (although children under 10 may be subject to ‘Child Safety Orders’ under Section 11 of the Act)  available online at: 
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/37/contents.  
149
 See ICRC Study of Customary International Law, Commentary on Rule 136, available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter39_rule136#Fn_98_14 (last accessed 12 July 2017). 
150
 See Child Soldiers International https://www.child-soldiers.org/child-recruitment  
151
 Rome Statute, Article 8 (2)(b) (xxvi) and (e)(vii), available at:  https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-





olds are not too young to fight and ought to be criminally responsible for the commission of 
international crimes.   
States have not agreed on a minimum age of criminal responsibility because the 
decision of when a child becomes an adult is considered to be a question for domestic States.  
It is a question that involves cultural and religious views.  As such, it is incredibly unlikely 
that States would be able to agree on an age.  Indeed, the current framework which leaves the 
decisions to States may be coupled with the lack of prosecutions of child soldiers in order to 
suggest that a customary international norm may be developing that actually prohibits 
prosecutions of under 18s.  This is unlikely given that the Optional Protocol to the UNCRC 
uses language which appears less than mandatory in stating that signatory States ‘take all 
feasible measures [my emphasis]’ not to deploy under 18s in armed conflict.152  Further article 
3 of the Optional Protocol accepts that the voluntary recruitment of under-18s is permitted.153   
3.5.2 Other issue areas 
 
It would be difficult to open discussions on a new Protocol for transitional criminal justice 
without considering other post-conflict issues that arise.  The fact of post-conflict transitions 
raises many questions about the interaction between human rights law and humanitarian law 
in relation to a number of issues.154  This section discusses one issue relatively briefly.  After 
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the 2003 Iraq War, there has been considerable debate about whether international law 
permits the practice of ‘transformative occupations’.155  
3.5.2.1. Transformative Occupations 
 
The legal dilemma faced by practitioners can be framed as a matter of legal principle versus 
political reality.  The law of armed conflict contains a set of norms in the jus in bello which 
reflect the rights and duties of occupiers in post-intervention settings known as the law of 
occupation.  In principle, these rights and duties were designed to be restrictive.  The law was 
designed to regulate ‘a temporary set of affairs pending a peace agreement’.156  The result is 
that the rights and obligations contained in the law reflect a ‘conservationist principle’ which 
supports the maintenance of the status quo ante bellum.   
While some provisions are easy for the Occupying Power to comply with, others 
prescribe more onerous positive duties.157 Article 50 of the Fourth Geneva Convention 
requires that the Occupying Power, ‘facilitate the proper working of all institutions devoted to 
the care and education of children.’158 This provision requires the Occupying Power to ‘take 
all necessary steps to facilitate the identification of children and the registration of their 
parentage’ and to ‘make arrangements for the maintenance and education, if possible by 
persons of their own nationality, language and religion, of children who are orphaned or 
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separated from their parents as a result of the war…[emphasis added]’159 At the same time, the 
law of occupation gives few rights to Occupying Powers, e.g. the law requires that the 
Occupying Power respect the laws in force in the defeated State.160  In this way, the law is 
supposed to protect the sovereignty of the defeated State.  
However, in practice, situations have arisen where the conservationist principle has 
been put under considerable pressure.  For example, the reconstruction of Germany after the 
Second World War included the significant reform of its legal, political and economic 
institutions.  This reflected the political and practical impossibility of reverting to Nazism 
(the status quo ante bellum) after the end of the war.  In these types of extreme case it is, at 
the very least, short-sighted that the law requires a return to the conditions that gave rise to 
the initial conflict in the first place.161  
Transformative occupations, therefore, raise the potential for conflict between 
principle and practice.  While in principle the law tends to prohibit changes to the internal 
political structures of defeated States, the case for doing so can seem unavoidable in certain 
situations.  The war in Iraq provided the most recent illustration of this dilemma.162 According 
to Garraway, there was no way that the coalition forces would hand power back to Saddam 
after invading to remove his government.  But the lack of a UN chapter VII mandate, 
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authorizing the use of force, meant that the post-intervention reconstruction of Iraq fell to be 
regulated by the restrictive law of occupation.   
As occupiers, there was a question about what changes to Iraqi institutions could be 
achieved within the very conservative legal regime. There were other reasons for aiming to 
avoid the law of occupation.  The reliance on the law of occupation for the reconstruction of 
Iraq exposed the US and the UK to an increased risk of liability.163 David Scheffer has 
highlighted several instances where the US and the UK failed to discharge their duties under 
the law of occupation.164 The risk of liability is also heightened when ‘non-occupying States’ 
are involved in the reconstruction efforts.165   There were, therefore, suggestions that the law 
of occupation was not compatible with some of the reconstruction activities required of 
States.   
However, a new body of law that permits transformative goals for victorious States is 
unnecessary.  Human rights norms and the potential ‘fall-back’ option of the UN Security 
Council provide sufficient flexibility.   The leading International Court of Justice decisions in 
the Nuclear Weapons case and the Wall as well as the vast majority of academic opinion 
suggest that human rights norms apply during armed conflict and occupation.166  The relevant 
legal analysis must take place at the level of the specific norms.  For example, in Iraq, 
occupiers might change the laws in force by arguing that their international obligations, or 
even customary international law on human rights, prevented them from maintaining Iraqi 
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penal legislation in force.167 Further, the legitimacy of the transformative project affects the 
content of the law that applies to the practice.  This is, of course, hugely controversial.  The 
question is whether the law of occupation ought to be interpreted more loosely in relation to 
liberal democratic transformations.  The short answer is probably ‘no, but in practice it 
probably is’.  The tone of the UN Charter, and the legal order post-1945, supports and 
promotes the spread of liberal democratic States.  Although the principle of State sovereignty 
remains the fundamental principle in international relations, the effect of human rights norms 
on the interpretation of sovereignty cannot be underestimated.168  The notion that the concept 
of State sovereignty includes a measure of responsibility to protect the State’s population 
came out of the ICISS report and has found relatively universal agreement.169  In reality, there 
is unlikely to be international condemnation of transformative process towards increased 
human rights protections.170    
Advocating a less stringent interpretation of specific provisions of the law of 
occupation is not the same as circumventing its provisions altogether.  Arguably, a new 
Additional Protocol, as proposed by Orend, would permit a relatively untrammelled 
transformation of States towards a more liberal democratic regime.  A victorious Occupying 
Power under Orend’s system would legitimately be able to change the political institutions of 
defeated States, by declaring the beginning of the ‘post-intervention phase’.  This state of 
affairs would lead to the effective removal of important legal barriers to the questionable use 
of unilateral inter-State armed force.  This should be resisted while at the same time 
acknowledging the reality of specific situations.   
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Iraq was a classic ‘not-war, not-peace’ society of the kind which causes uncertainty in 
the applicability of the law.  The occupation was at an end, in formal terms, yet it was 
ongoing.  The international conflict between the U.S. and Iraq was at an end, yet a new non-
international armed conflict had just begun.  In these circumstances, the rules of the law of 
occupation are not fixed in stone but relatively open to interpretation.  In particular, the effect 
of a long term occupation and the loosening of the relevant restrictive norms might be 
achieved through an open interpretation of the relevant ‘escape clauses’.  A number of 
‘escape clauses’ are built into the most prohibitive regulations in question, specifically 
Article 43 of the Hague Regulations and Article 64 of Geneva Convention IV.  For example, 
the rules of the Hague Regulations 1907 are clear that the Occupying Power must not change 
the laws in force, unless absolutely prevented (the necessity requirement).171 Further, Article 
43 of the Regulations assumes that the existing framework is the product of a ‘legitimate 
powers’.172  In Iraq, the necessity requirement and the legitimacy of the previous regime were 
both open to interpretation and debate.  As a matter of legal doctrine, it is not clear whether 
the illegitimacy of the defeated regime means that the laws in force can be changed or how, 
but the notion that the laws in force would be satisfactory and should be protected ought to be 
doubted.   
Further, the more recent Article 64 GC IV is slightly more permissive than Article 43 
and allows the Occupying Power to change the laws in force in cases where they constitute a 
threat to [the Occupier’s] security.173 This would permit significant security sector reform in 
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Iraq and, perhaps even, the deployment of a multinational security force.  Further, the 
Occupying Power may also  
subject the population of the occupied territory to provisions which are essential to enable the 
Occupying Power to fulfil its obligations under the present Convention, to maintain the orderly 
government of the territory, and to ensure the security of the Occupying Power, of the members 
and property of the occupying forces or administration, and likewise of the establishments and 
lines of communication used by them.
174 
 
The provision provides the Occupying Power with a considerable amount of leeway.   
Further, it could plausibly be argued that the ‘maintenance of orderly government of the 
territory’ required the formation of a Governing Council of Iraq to represent the sovereignty 
of the Iraqi people.  Arguably, CPA Orders on ‘de-ba’athification’, the establishment of an 
Iraqi Civil Defence Corps and the establishment of an Iraqi Ministry for Human Rights could 
all be brought within the scope of Article 64.175  
The contextual interpretation of the law of occupation, which involves the effect of 
human rights law, can lead to the repealing and creation of new laws.  This happens so that an 
intervener obliges with international human rights commitments.  The fact that this practice is 
likely to be controversial politically means that the intervener will need to revert to the UN 
Security Council in order to obtain a mandate for the necessary regime change.  This is as it 
should be.  The UN Security Council is the only body with the legitimacy to circumvent the 
law of occupation and dis-apply the relevant norms of occupation law.  As Eric de 
Brabandere has argued, it should not be surprising that the law of occupation is unsuited to 
regime change.  This is the whole point of the law.  As he says, ‘the very reason the laws of 
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occupation are inadequate to deal with comprehensive post-conflict reconstruction missions 
[…] is precisely the reason for their existence, namely to limit the occupier’s powers in a 
territory for which the occupier has no title.’176 In this way, the law of occupation is supposed 
to present an obstacle to unwanted interference in the internal affairs of States.  It stands as a 
barrier to the use of illegal armed force for the purposes of regime change.   
Orend’s argument, in favour of a new jus post bellum enables victorious powers to 
engineer post-intervention political ‘rehabilitation’. They would be able to do so without 
incurring the risk of legal liability and, therefore, to many States these proposals would 
appear as an aggressive liberal imperialism.  Negotiations on specific issues, such as 
transitional criminal justice, would be difficult to separate from broader issues raised during 
post-conflict situations.  Further, as demonstrated in relation to the issue of post-intervention 
governance, the current system is not ‘beyond repair’.  Contextual approaches to the 
interpretation of the law provide some flexibility in regulating post-conflict situations.  
Furthermore, a sensible fallback option is the UN Security Council.  Many previous 
reconstruction missions in the 1990s had taken place under the auspices of the UN (Bosnia 
1995- ongoing, Kosovo 1999-ongoing, East Timor 1999-2002).  As such, the Occupying 
Powers made a proposal to the UN Security Council which after several drafts became the 
UNSC Resolution 1483 (2003).  Pursuant to Articles 25 and 103 UN Charter, the obligations 
imposed on States by the UN Security Council override any other obligations that they might 
have in international law.177   
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Thus, transformative occupations are possible by way of a post bellum appeal to the 
UN Security Council.  In Iraq, as in other situations such as Kosovo, this might be seen as a 
dubious ex post legalization of the initial intervention (which in each case violated the jus ad 
bellum).  However, this is a consequence of the separability thesis in international law.  The 
rules of international law on the use of force do not affect the rules on the conduct of 
hostilities.  Neither of these bodies of law affects the possibility and the legality of a post-
intervention reconstruction mandate.   
Unfortunately, although a transformative mandate might be agreed at the UN Security 
Council, political accommodation might cause considerable imprecision in the resulting law.  
For example, UN Security Council Resolution 1483 on Iraq can be read in support of two 
irreconcilable legal interpretations.  On one view, the resolution States that the US and the 
UK were Occupying Powers and subject to the law of occupation, thereby opening them up 
to liability under the law as argued by Scheffer.  However, it also authorised the Coalition 
Provisional Authority, ‘to promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through the effective 
administration of the territory….’.178 The Authority was authorised to do so as long as it acted 
consistently with the UN Charter and ‘other relevant international law’.179  This necessarily 
includes occupation law.  UN Security Council Resolution 1483, therefore, created a 
complicated legal structure which effectively dis-applies certain aspects of the law of 
occupation (i.e. those prohibitions on legal, political and economic reform necessary to 
promote the welfare of the Iraqi people) while insisting that the law of occupation forms the 
legal basis for the (transformative) occupation.   
Subsequently, Scheffer and others have questioned whether the resolution is clear 
enough to mandate the necessary reforms.  Scheffer is right.  Any liability incurred by the 
                                                                        
178 
UN Security Council Resolution 1483, 22 May 2003, ‘Preamble’, available online at: https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/368/53/PDF/N0336853.pdf?OpenElement (last accessed 15 August 2017) 
179 
UN Security Council Resolution 1483, 22 May 2003, ‘Preamble’, available online at: https://documents-dds-





violation of the law of occupation by any of the States involved in the post-intervention 
reconstruction must lie with the occupying powers.180  However, in other cases, it might be 
possible for the UN Security Council to drop the reference to the law of occupation 
altogether.  This is not a perfect legal solution given that it involves political considerations in 
the identification of the relevant legal norms.  In the case of Iraq, the illegal nature of the 
initial intervention made it impossible for the UN Security Council to drop the law of 
occupation completely.  But when compared with Orend’s jus post bellum (which would 
circumvent the need for a UN Security Council mandate altogether) it seems a sensible 
approach to the question of transformative occupation.   
 
3.6 Is a new Additional Protocol necessary?  
 
The Orendian suggestion of a new jus post bellum Protocol implies that the current system is 
broken.  As mentioned above, Orend is mostly thinking in terms of post-intervention 
reconstruction.  His view is that when States intervene and defeat enemy States, there is 
uncertainty about the rules of reconstruction.  Particularly, in relation to the lack of a post 
bellum set of rules in the law of armed conflict, Orend says that a new Additional Protocol is 
necessary.  However, if States have refrained from setting up a post bellum branch to the law 
of armed conflict and detailed rules on reconstruction then this is owing to the fact that this is, 
at least in part, considered unnecessary.    
In the first place, post-intervention reconstruction may be subject to the detailed 
guidance as laid down by the UN Security Council.  In relation to transitional criminal 
justice, for example, the UN Security Council has set out detailed rules on the potential 
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prosecution of child soldiers.  The Special Court for Sierra Leone had jurisdiction over child 
soldiers over the age of 15.181 Given its position at the top of the international legal order, 
States have an obligation to follow its pronouncements.182 In Sierra Leone, the ultimate 
decision whether to prosecute or not was left to the Chief Prosecutor David Crane who chose 
not to prosecute child soldiers.183   According to Crane, the point of the international criminal 
justice system was to pursue those most responsible for the atrocities committed and, in his 
view, child soldiers and adolescents were not those most responsible.  But other 
interpretations of international criminal justice are possible.  Chapter 5 sets these out in the 
context of post-conflict Colombia.  For present purposes, the point is that a lack of an 
Additional Protocol did not affect the ability of the UN Security Council to regulate the issue.   
Furthermore, when the UN Security Council is not involved, negotiating parties are able to 
use international law to design post-conflict transitional justice mechanisms as part of a peace 
agreement.  Certain normative parameters can be found from a number of sources.  Peace 
negotiators use domestic law and international treaty law for the purposes of designing 
transitional criminal justice mechanisms that are appropriate to the local context.   This is 
possible by adopting an interpretive approach to what the law requires when all the relevant 
provisions are taken as a whole.  Chapter 5 sets one way that this might work in practice.  For 
the purposes of completeness, post-conflict Colombia would need to take account of all the 
relevant legal provisions.  Some of the most important international legal provisions are 
found below.   
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3.6.1 Domestic Law 
 
The Constitution of Colombia is the superior normative structure of Colombia.184  Article 44 
guarantees that a number of rights accrue to children and adolescents in Colombia.  These 
include the ‘right to life, physical integrity, health and social security’.185  The State is obliged 
to ‘assist and protect the child in order to guarantee their development and the full exercise of 
their rights’.186  It further States that the ‘rights of the child prevail over the rights of others’.187   
The Prosecutor also needs to consider the Colombian Penal Code.  The most relevant body of 
law in this regard is Law 1098 of 8 November 2006, especially Section II on the ‘System of 
Criminal Adolescent Responsibility’ (SACR).188  Article 139 asserts that SACR applies to 
juveniles between the ages of 14 and 18.  The principles of the SACR are found in Article 
141.  It states that the SACR is based on the principles and definitions found in the ‘the 
Constitution, international human rights treaties’ and in ‘the present law (Law 1098).’189  This 
system accepts that those between 14 and 18 are capable of being investigated, indicted and 
prosecuted.  The only blanket amnesty applies to minors under 14 at the time of the 
commission of the crimes.  Thus, from the perspective of domestic law, there is a barrier to 
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prosecuting under 14s which has been recognised in the peace agreement between the FARC-
EP and the Colombian government.   Furthermore, there is a special system of juvenile 
justice in place which may be relevant in terms of child soldiers.  From the perspective of the 
SACR, a deprivation of liberty for serious crimes is not discarded for those between the ages 
of 14 and 18.  This is reflected in the peace agreement which states that those cases will be 
dealt with at a later date.190  The point is that the domestic structure does not discard the 
possibility of prosecuting some child soldiers if they are suspected of committing very 
serious crimes.   
3.6.2 International Law:  Human Rights 
 
From the perspective of human rights law, the most relevant international treaty is the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).
191
 In article 1, the CRC asserts that ‘every 
human being below the age of 18 years’ is a child.192  Thus, for the purposes of post-conflict 
Colombia, the transitional justice mechanisms must respect that a number of provisions from 
international law are relevant to all those combatants under 18.  The key provision in the 
Convention is Article 3 which states that ‘in all actions concerning children…the best 
interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.’193 These provisions could be 
interpreted as discouraging the prosecution of child soldiers.  However, the CRC does not 
prohibit prosecution.  Instead, it can be read as setting out safeguards that provide for special 
system of juvenile justice.  Article 38 (2) even asserts that States parties ‘shall take all 
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feasible measures to ensure that persons who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not 
take a direct part in hostilities.’194  This provision is directed at recruitment to the armed 
forces.  In terms of those aged between 15 and 18, the CRC says that ‘priority’ should be 
given to those children who are oldest.195  It is important to point out, however, that Colombia 
inserted a reservation to this provision.  For Colombia, the relevant age is 18 as recruitment to 
the armed forces is prohibited below that age.  Of course, this does not apply to those child 
soldiers associated with non-State armed groups.  In this regard, the important point is that 
child soldiers may need a special and separate post-conflict justice system that is founded on 
principles that respond to their particular vulnerabilities.  The CRC does not prohibit the 
prosecution of children.   
However, the CRC does require a minimum age of criminal responsibility.  Article 
40(3) (a) of the Convention provides that State parties shall seek to establish a minimum age 
below which children shall be presumed to be incapable of criminal responsibility.  However, 
the actual age is left to the discretion of States.  The UN Committee on the Rights of the 
Child (hereafter the Committee) stated in its General Comment No. 10 that ‘a minimum age 
of criminal responsibility below the age of 12 years is considered by the Committee not to be 
internationally acceptable’.
196
  However, as this is non-binding, many States continue to fix 
the minimum age of criminal responsibility below this age.197  The Committee has also stated 
that criminal responsibility ought not to be determined by reference to subjective factors such 
as ‘the attainment of puberty, the age of discernment of the personality of the child’.
198
   
                                                                        
194
 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990), 1577 UNTS 27531, 
(CRC), Article 38 (2). 
195
 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990), 1577 UNTS 27531, 
(CRC), Article 38 (3). 
196 
UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), ‘General Comment No. 10 on Children’s Rights and Juvenile Justice’ (25 April 
2007), CRC/C/GC/10, at 5. 
197 
For example, in the UK it is 10. See UK government website: https://www.gov.uk/age-of-criminal-responsibility (last accessed 15 
August 2017) 
198 





Even though a specific Protocol on this issue is not available, rules exist that allow 
States to design appropriate transitional justice mechanisms for juveniles.  Any system of 
post-conflict juvenile justice would be subject to a number of safeguards.  The CRC contains 
a number of relevant rules.  The main principle among these is article 3 which sets the ‘best 
interests’ of the child as the premier consideration.
199
  However, other relevant rights are the 
right to non-discrimination (art. 2); the right to life, survival and development (art. 6); the 
right to be heard (art. 12) and to dignity (art. 40) which includes ‘promoting the child’s 
reintegration and the child assuming a constructive role in society’.200   
States also rely on other non-legal norms.  These norms are found in so-called ‘soft 
law’ instruments.201  As explained above, the traditional way of thinking about international 
law finds legal validity in the consent of States (see 2.1.2).  For some lawyers, this is a 
relatively ‘dated’ way of thinking about how States make law.202   For example, Hillgenberg 
argues that sometimes States prefer to be bound by looser normative parameters.  This may 
respond to ‘a general need for mutual confidence building’ or ‘the need to stimulate 
developments still in progress’.203 It is, of course, true, and it may be possible to define this 
‘soft-law’ in different ways.204   For Boyle and Chinkin, ‘soft law’ simply refers to ‘a variety 
of non-legally binding instruments used in contemporary international relations’.205 These 
norms respond to the kinds of rules that international relations theorists have discussed in 
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relation to the order of international society.206   For others, soft law is a challenge to the 
horizontal ‘inter-State’ nature of the international legal order.207  Agreement on a definition is 
not necessary here.  The point is that whatever their formal shortcomings, ‘soft law’ norms do 
not lack all authority and help States to regulate their behaviour.   
The fact that States have agreed to soft-law measures in the area of child rights is 
significant.   It suggests the recognition of the need for protection of children but also a desire 
for certain flexibility in the implementation of the regulatory requirements.  In instrumental 
terms, the turn to soft law instruments ‘enables States to agree to more detailed and precise 
provisions because their legal commitment, and the consequences of any non-compliance, are 
more limited.208  The most important instrument in this area is known as the ‘Beijing 
Rules’.209  This non-binding set of rules sets out standard minimum rules for the prosecution 
of children.  Rule 1.2 urges States to develop conditions which ensure that the child has a 
‘meaningful life in the community’.210  Rule 1.4 States that ‘juvenile justice shall be 
conceived as an integral part of the national development process.’211  The tone of the rules 
suggests an inclusive and holistic approach to dealing with children and justice.  In terms of a 
minimum age of criminal responsibility, the ‘Beijing Rules’ state that the ‘beginning of that 
age shall not be fixed at too low an age level, bearing in mind the facts of emotional, mental 
and intellectual maturity’.212    
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This may be helpful for interpretive purposes.  It is a recognition that States differ 
legitimately on the minimum age owing to history and culture.  But the commentary on the 
rule suggests that the minimum age ought not to be too different from that age at which other 
social and economic rights are acquired (such as marriage and/or the acquisition of civil 
majority status).213 Rule 5 of the Beijing Rules is more relevant to the issue of transitional 
criminal justice.  It States that the aim of juvenile justice ought to be ‘the well-being’ of the 
juvenile and urges a principle of proportionality.214   This, however, is a reiteration of the 
CRC rules on the question which set out the best interests of the child as the primary 
consideration.  Rule 6 makes provisions for the special needs of juveniles in terms of the 
amount of discretion allowed ‘at all stages of the proceedings’.215 Rule 7 sets out procedural 
safeguards such as, the presumption of innocence, the right to remain silent and the right to 
presence of a parent or guardian during proceedings.216  Rule 11 states that ‘consideration’ 
shall be given to dealing with juvenile offenders without resorting to formal trials.  This rule 
seeks to avoid the stigmatization that comes with criminalization.  However, it is directed 
towards offences of a non-serious nature.  Trials for serious international crimes are not 
specifically implicated and not prohibited.  Taken together with the rest of human rights law 
on children, the Beijing Rules can be interpreted as a specialized system of juvenile justice.  
They do not prohibit prosecutions of children and/or adolescents suspected of committing 
international crimes.  However, neither is this required.  Therefore, these instruments suggest 
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that States have agreed on an international set of rules which leave the decisions on the 
criminal responsibility of children to the States themselves. 217      
3.6.3 International Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law 
 
The conflict in Colombia qualifies as an internal armed conflict.  In terms of a duty to punish 
crimes committed during armed conflict, the relevant provisions are found in Common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions 1977.218  
Neither the text of Common Article 3, nor any provision of Additional Protocol II prescribes 
a duty to prosecute violations of ‘grave breaches’ of the Geneva Conventions.219  This would 
extend to an absence of a duty to prosecute grave breaches committed by children.  However, 
Additional Protocol II States that under-18s cannot be punished by death penalty.220 This 
suggests that under international humanitarian law they can be prosecuted.  Otherwise, there 
would be no need to set out a prohibition on the death penalty. 
Further, a duty to punish becomes clear when international humanitarian law is read 
in conjunction with international criminal law.221 Recent developments in international 
criminal justice suggest that prosecution for the commission of crimes under international 
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humanitarian law is permitted or even required.  For example, article 8 of the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court provides jurisdiction for the court for war crimes.
222
  Article 
8 states that war crimes include ‘[i]n the case of a conflict not of an international character, 
serious violation of [Common Article 3]’.
223
 Furthermore, the Tadić decision, as well as the 
statutes establishing the Ad-Hoc International Criminal Tribunal in Rwanda and the 
International Criminal Court offer support for the view that international criminal 
responsibility for certain crimes is required in non-international armed conflicts.
224
  As such, 
as a matter of humanitarian law, it is clear that Colombia has a duty to prosecute those who 
have committed war crimes.  This would prima facie extend to children.  However, 
humanitarian law is relatively unclear on the minimum age of criminal responsibility.    This 
is reflected in a number of its provisions concerning the recruitment of children into armed 
forces or armed groups.   
Additional Protocols I and II prohibit the recruitment of under-15s.225  Article 77(2) of 
Additional Protocol I States that ‘[t]he Parties to the conflict shall take all feasible measures 
in order that children who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part 
in hostilities and, in particular, they shall refrain from recruiting them into their armed 
forces.’226  This provision might be interpreted as suggesting that if children under the age of 
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15 ought not to participate in armed conflict, then they equally ought not to be prosecuted for 
war crimes.  However, this view might be doubted.   The negotiators at the Diplomatic 
Conference did not accept a proposed amendment by the Brazilian representative to the effect 
that penal proceedings ‘shall not be taken against, and sentence not pronounced on, persons 
who were under sixteen years at the time the offence was committed’.
227
   
Thus, it appears difficult to conclude that States have agreed on a customary norm on 
the non-punishment of child soldiers.  It might be argued that the Diplomatic Conference 
took place decades ago and that views on this matter have developed.  However, 
contemporary instruments are also incoherent in respect of the minimum age at which 
children can participate in armed conflict.  According to article 8(2)(b)(xxxvi) of the Rome 
Statute, ‘conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years’ is a war crime in 
non-international (and international) armed conflicts.228 This suggests that 16-18 year olds can 
participate and be held liable for their actions in armed conflict.  However, the Optional 
Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict which States that non-State 
armed forces ‘should not, under any circumstances, recruit…persons under the age of 18 
years’.229 Further, the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone provides that the Court has 
jurisdiction over persons of 15 years of age.   Article 7(1) sets out provisions for a juvenile 
and restorative justice approach to the prosecution of the child soldier.230  Another view might 
be that international humanitarian law and international criminal law do not explicitly 
prohibit the prosecution of child soldiers.   
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3.6.4 Other post-conflict situations  
 
In designing post-conflict mechanisms, the negotiators would also look at other post-conflict 
situations.  The most relevant for the purposes of post-conflict Colombia would be Sierra 
Leone.  There are important parallels in terms of the use of child soldiers, their participation 
in a non-international armed conflict, and the establishment of a special ‘post-conflict 
criminal court’.   
More than 48,000 of the soldiers involved in the armed conflict were children 
(defined as under-18s in international law).231 Unlike other post-conflict situations, article 7 of 
the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) did provide the court with 
jurisdiction over child soldiers over 15 years of age.232  This is an important aspect of the 
history and practice of child soldier accountability in transitional criminal justice.  However, 
the chief prosecutor decided that child soldiers in Sierra Leone were not ‘persons who bear 
the greatest responsibility’ for the international crimes committed during the armed conflict 
in that country.233  He, therefore, refused to indict any child soldier perpetrators.  This was 
despite the view from the UN that declared that those ‘most responsible’ did not exclude 
those between the ages of 15 and 18.234  The UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan Stated that 
although it was ‘inconceivable that children could be in a political or military leadership 
position […] the gravity and seriousness of the crimes they have allegedly committed would 
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allow for their inclusion within the jurisdiction of the Court.’235  Annan alluded to serious 
calls for child soldier accountability from within Sierra Leone.  He stated that ‘the 
Government of Sierra Leone and representatives of Sierra Leone civil society clearly wish to 
see a process of judicial accountability’.236  Also, according to these voices, ‘the people of 
Sierra Leone would not look kindly upon a court which failed to bring to justice children who 
committed crimes of that nature and spared them the judicial process of accountability’.237  
This shows that the law on child soldier accountability straddles international and local 
processes and principles.  The Colombian peace agreement clearly states that child soldiers 
may be responsible for international crimes.238  It leaves the decision as to whether to grant an 
amnesty to child soldiers to a special unit in the ‘Special Jurisdiction for Peace’.239   
In terms of punishment, the peace agreement between the Government of Sierra 
Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone States that child soldier 
perpetrators would be spared incarceration.240  Article XXX of the peace agreement States 
that the special needs of child soldiers would be dealt with by the ‘international community’, 
through the Office of the ‘UN Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict, 
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 Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, 7 July 1999, (Lome 





UNICEF and other agencies’.241 This reinforces a view that international standards needed to 
be taken into account and that child soldier accountability was not simply a matter for the 
local community.  Importantly, in Sierra Leone, international NGOs were against 
prosecution.242  In their view, it put the success of their rehabilitation programmes at risk.  For 
this reason, and despite provisions that set out safeguards for juvenile justice, the Secretary-
General’s Report stated that ‘ultimately, it will be for the Prosecutor’ to decide whether 
action should be taken against any child soldier.  In the end, there were no prosecutions of 
under-18s.  
3.6.5 The Peace Agreement between FARC-EP and Colombian Government 
 
The above normative parameters have been used in Colombia to design a transitional 
criminal justice regime that complies with international legal norms in relation to child 
soldiers.  The peace agreement states that the relevant law, for the purposes of transitional 
criminal justice is a mixture of domestic and international law.243  Thus, the post-conflict law 
regime in any post-conflict State is a mixture of different legal categories.  In explicitly 
affirming this fact, the peace agreement encourages an interpretive approach to the 
identification and implementation of the relevant legal rules.  This means that it supports an 
interpretation of the law which looks at the whole picture and distils the relevant rules from a 
number of different sources.  In this respect, Orend’s suggestion for a new Protocol on child 
soldier accountability would simply be part of the picture of the relevant rules.  As this 
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section has argued, the current framework is not broken and provides a flexible system for the 
interpretation in different scenarios.  Importantly, this has slowly built up a practice which 
States can turn to for guidance.   
In Colombia, the agreement states that for the purposes of the Special Jurisdiction for 
Peace, ‘the legal frames of reference are principally international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law’.244  However, the same paragraph states that the transitional 
criminal justice mechanisms will adopt their resolutions or sentences and base themselves on 
‘the Colombian Penal Code and/or international human rights law, international humanitarian 
law and international criminal law’.245  Thus, post-conflict law must be interpreted in order to 
decide whether it requires, permits, or prohibits the prosecution of child soldier perpetrators 
in specific circumstances.  The decisions to prosecute child soldiers or not will depend on the 
interpretation that is given to the several rules that are applicable.   
A new Special Tribunal for Peace will be set up to hear individual cases.  If an 
individual wants to access these (more lenient) sentences, they must come forward, plead 
guilty, provide a full account of the events that occurred, and undertake to make reparations 
to the victims of their actions.  An individual, found guilty of serious crimes, may receive a 
sentence of up to eight years deprivation of liberty.  This form of ‘limited justice’ aims at 
satisfying the requirements of peace (the rebels laying down their weapons) and the 
requirements of justice (satisfying the rights of victims to the truth and accountability).  It has 
been possible to design these transitional criminal justice mechanisms without a new 
Additional Protocol on transitional justice.  Instead, those involved in designing the 
                                                                        
244
 Part 5, Point 19 of the ‘Final Agreement for the End of Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Long Lasting Peace’, (hereafter the 
Peace Agreement) signed on 24 November 2016 and ratified by Congress 1 December 2016.  The full text of the peace agreement is 
available at:  http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/procesos-y-conversaciones/Documentos%20compartidos/24-11-
2016NuevoAcuerdoFinal.pdf. (I will use my translations from Spanish to English throughout).   
245
 Part 5, Point 19 of the ‘Final Agreement for the End of Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Long Lasting Peace’, (hereafter the 
Peace Agreement) signed on 24 November 2016 and ratified by Congress 1 December 2016.  The full text of the peace agreement is 
available at:  http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/procesos-y-conversaciones/Documentos%20compartidos/24-11-





mechanisms have drawn from other post-conflict experiences and domestic law on juvenile 
justice.  All of the foregoing suggests that those negotiating or implementing transitional 
criminal justice mechanisms as they relate to children have some normative guidance from 
which to interpret the requirements of the law.  However, the resulting peace agreement must 
be interpreted and implemented.  In this regard, an interpretive approach is necessary to make 
the argument in favour or against indictment and prosecution in specific cases.   
The facts will differ in accordance with every situation.  In some cases, child soldiers 
may have been in a leadership position or committed a series of repeated serious crimes.  In 
this case, the law might be interpreted to require child soldiers to enter the transitional 
criminal justice mechanism, explain themselves and provide reparations to the communities 
that they have damaged.  Importantly, this might have instrumental benefits from the 
perspective of their reintegration and the possibilities of community reconciliation.  However, 
the peace agreement does not oblige the chief prosecutor to do so.  In deciding whether to 
bring prosecutions the Prosecutor has a wide range of legal sources to choose from in order to 
explain and justify the approach chosen.  It may be that Colombia refrains from prosecuting 
children.  In which case, the current framework will provide the legal basis for doing so.  As 
mentioned, current practice militates against the prosecution of children.   
In these circumstances, a new set of jus post bellum rules would reduce the flexibility 
of the current system in providing prescriptive rules for States to follow (notwithstanding the 
difficulties in agreeing those rules).  In the difficult post-conflict period, States are unlikely to 
want to reduce their options.  The Colombian peace agreement makes repeated references to 
the applicable law.  It sets out the law which is most relevant.  Thus, the current system is 
workable and encourages an interpretive approach to post-conflict law.  A demonstration of 
how an interpretive approach provides some answers to a specific case of the criminal 





rejection of this approach in favour of prescriptive rules on how States ought to deal with the 
question.     
3.7 Concluding remarks on Orend’s proposals 
 
This chapter has introduced and evaluated argued Orend’s proposals for a new jus post 
bellum.  The main thrust of the evaluation has been that although Orend may be right that the 
law of armed conflict does not provide specific rules on the criminal responsibility of 
children in post-conflict societies, there are enough rules for practitioners designing post-
conflict mechanisms to work something out.  Thus, a whole new area of law that prescribes 
new rules to follow is not necessary.   
Furthermore, the sheer variety in child soldiering experiences militates against a ‘one-
size-fits-all approach’.  As such, a new set of hard rules would be undesirable.  This is further 
reinforced by the fact that States disagree about when children become adults.  In these 
circumstances, a new set of rules would be very difficult for States to agree on.  Finally, a 
new Protocol on transitional criminal justice would need to specify how it fits into the 
architecture of the law of armed conflict.  Orend’s proposal does not elaborate on how this 
would be done.  However, the difficulties in specifying the beginning or end of any non-
international armed conflict suggests that this area of the law ought to be left alone in favour 
of a different approach to identifying post-conflict rules.  Sometimes, the appropriate way 
forward is for a United Nation Security Council to step in.  In other situations, an interpretive 
approach which combines reliance on international human rights law, international 
humanitarian law and international criminal law may be possible.  This thesis argues that 
Orend’s proposal ought to be rejected in favour of a more dynamic conception of the jus post 





A final remark on Orend’s suggestion may be to re-imagine the same as a ‘soft law’ 
instrument for ‘post-intervention reconstruction’.246  The term ‘soft law’ is slightly 
misleading.  Shelton states that it simply refers to ‘non-binding political instruments such as 
declarations, resolutions, and programs of action…’247 However, as Ellis argues; there are 
three ways of understanding ‘soft law’: 
 
…binding legal norms that are vague and open-ended and therefore (arguably) neither justiciable 
nor enforceable; non-binding norms, such as political or moral obligations, adopted by states; and 




For Orend’s purposes, it is the second of the three conceptualizations that is most relevant.  
Rather than arguing for a new Additional Protocol that would radically change the law of 
armed conflict, it may be possible for Orend to ‘scale back’ his proposal and push for a new 
‘soft law’ on the jus post bellum relevant to post-intervention reconstruction.  A set of post-
conflict norms may be gathered in a document and put to militarily powerful States that tend 
to intervene in the affairs of other weaker States.  The idea may be to agree to a minimum 
level of human rights protection and accountability by having States agree to a number of 
principles which (although non-binding) carry with them a political or moral expectation of 
compliance.  This seems like a sensible half-way point (between purely-moral and fully-legal 
norms).  Yet, a number of issues arise. 
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 Firstly, and especially relevant to the question of this thesis, Orend is silent on child 
soldiers and their accountability.  It may be possible to draw an inference from Orend’s 
Kantian approach and draft a set of norms relevant to child soldier perpetrators.  However, as 
demonstrated, Orend is slightly inconsistent with his Kantian approach, eschewing it for 
instrumentalism when it is convenient and useful.249 Moreover, States disagree on 
fundamental issues to do with the conception of the ‘child’, i.e. when a child becomes an 
adult.  Therefore, a soft law instrument, in relation to child soldier perpetrators, may be either 
very difficult to agree on, or, so vague as to lack any real normative bite (even in purely 
political terms).  This does not mean, however, that it would be useless.  It may bite in some 
situations and may promote a view of child soldier accountability that, over time, generates 
consensus, even over very difficult issues such as the minimum age of responsibility.   
Another problem is that an agreement on children already exists in the form of the 
Beijing Rules.250 As discussed, this soft-law instrument already deals with the minimum 
requirements for the prosecution of children.  Of course, the Beijing Rules were not drafted 
and agreed with post-conflict situations in mind.  However, as discussed in relation to other 
rules above, States may be able to use these as normative parameters and a general guide in 
seeking to design post-conflict mechanisms relevant to child soldier perpetrators.  This is, 
effectively, what a ‘soft’ jus post bellum would aim to do in any event.  Thus, the arguments 
made in relation to the ‘hard’ jus post bellum might be equally applicable to the ‘soft’ jus post 
bellum.  Specifically, it appears unnecessary to agree on new (soft) norms when some 
relevant norms already exist.  It also appears very difficult to imagine States agreeing on 
fundamental issues of applicability, in terms of when a child or adolescent is mature enough 
for their actions to attract criminal responsibility.  Finally, post-conflict societies must deal 
with the issue of child soldier perpetrators in a way that suits the overall aims of the 
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transition.  This means that post-conflict child soldier accountability will be a different issue 
in different places.   
While these are good arguments, nevertheless, a softer instrument could at least make 
explicit the agreed starting points for any subsequent interpretation of post-conflict law.  It 
would be useful for post-conflict actors to have a specific document that contained the 
relevant norms or principles to be applied to the specific question.  These may be very vague 
and abstract.  However, this does not mean they would be useless. For example, in relation to 
the thorny issue of the minimum age of criminal responsibility, the jus post bellum may 
suggest that a more lenient approach be taken in relation to child soldiers without explicitly 
saying what age this requires.  Even in States where the minimum age of criminal 
responsibility was very low, a principle that requires a more lenient approach in transitional 
contexts would ensure the raising of the minimum age of criminal responsibility.  This might 
also be designed and promulgated to take precedence over previous instruments that do not 
deal with transitions, such as the Beijing Rules.   
Of course, as soft law, States would be able to side-step the norms when they needed 
to.  The existence of the instrument, however, may mean that States would have to explain 
why they were doing so, and this, in and of itself, would be useful in terms of the 
development of State practice in post-conflict contexts.  However, a soft law jus post bellum 
on child soldier accountability would not necessarily draw from Orend’s proposals.  Orend 
has not developed a Kantian theory on child soldier accountability and this is a significant 
and difficult area for more research.  Instead, the idea of a jus post bellum which helps post-
conflict actors to interpret the law (rather than simply mandate the applicable rules) is the 
best way forward for the concept.   
The following section introduces a conception of the jus post bellum which favours a 





demonstrate how a jus post bellum centred on principles may help actors to decide what 











The previous chapter evaluated whether the jus post bellum ought to be seen as a new 
Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions.  It discussed the proposition in relation to 
whether a new Protocol on the issue of child soldiers and transitional criminal justice would 
be a necessary, possible and desirable development.  It found that there were several 
obstacles to the proposal.  A new jus post bellum Protocol would be unnecessary.  The 
current legal structure provides States with some normative parameters.  These can be used to 
interpret the law in a way that allows for a situation-specific design of transitional justice 
mechanisms.  The flexibility of the current system is one of its strengths and so the creation 
of a new set of prescriptive rules would also be undesirable.  Any gains derived from an 
increase in legal certainty would be offset by important losses that stem from the difficulties 
in prescribing particular substantive outcomes in difficult transitional negotiations.  In 
essence, prescriptive rules of transitional criminal justice may make it more difficult to attain 
ceasefires and design peace agreements.   
In any event, in the field of transitional criminal justice and the accountability of child 
soldiers, it would be very difficult for States to agree on the applicable rules.  This is owing to 
the variety of opinions among States in terms of the minimum age of criminal responsibility.  
But even within States, there would be disagreements over the nature and aims of punishment 





area of the law of armed conflict and, at the same time, refrain from dealing with a number of 
other, very controversial, post-conflict issues.   
Furthermore, many difficulties accompany the creation of a new Protocol on 
transitional criminal justice in terms of legal applicability.  The uncertainties in fixing a ‘post’ 
moment in armed conflicts are unlikely to disappear in relation to other areas (i.e. the use of 
force and detention).  In this regard, negotiations are unlikely to be simple.  There is no 
indication that States have the will or interest in designing new legal rules in this area.  In 
fact, in a number of different areas, States are moving towards forms of ‘soft law’ or ‘best 
practices’ in terms of regulation.1  In relation to child soldier accountability, the ‘Beijing 
Rules’ are a good example.  There is a ‘trend towards deformalization’ and this is best 
reflected in the conceptualization of post-conflict law as new lex rather than ‘law’ as properly 
understood.2 Finally, contemporary international relations are preoccupied with a number of 
issues which will stretch the capacities of important actors in the negotiation of new rules in 
the field of armed conflict.  The European Union is concerned with the Brexit negotiations.  
The USA, Russia and China are not aligned in relation to difficult issues such as Syria and 
North Korea.  In this climate, the negotiation of a new post-conflict Protocol in the law of 
armed conflict seems very unlikely.  
Given the overall situation, a new conceptualization of the jus post bellum is needed.  
Otherwise, the concept itself, and the academic attention devoted to it, ought to be called into 
question.  This chapter introduces and analyses a more recent version of the jus post bellum.  
Gallen has argued that the jus post bellum is much more than ‘a strict temporal end-of-
conflict period in international law’.3 Instead, Gallen advocates a more ‘dynamic’ 
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conceptualization of the jus post bellum that seeks to avoid the problems in identifying the 
end of armed conflict.4  For Gallen, a Dworkinian version of the jus post bellum provides the 
best possible avenue for the development of the concept as a matter of international law.  
This is owing to the fact that Gallen sees the central problem of post-conflict law as one of 
‘complex interpretation and evaluation’.5  In response, a Dworkinian jus post bellum 
framework introduces the concept of integrity into the arena of post-conflict law.  Dworkin’s 
theory (interpretivism) presents a way of thinking, or a methodology, for asserting 
propositions of law.  Anthea Roberts and others have shown (albeit only in relation to 
customary international law) that this can be a fruitful way of thinking about international law 
and legal practice.  In this respect, it is possible to think about post-conflict law according to 
an interpretive lens.  But the normative aspect of Dworkin’s theory (integrity) may be more 
problematic.  Whether and how Gallen may be right in assuming that a Dworkinian version 
of the jus post bellum is useful is the central question of the next three chapters.     
This chapter introduces and explains Gallen’s theory of jus post bellum.  Gallen’s 
theory is directed specifically at post-intervention societies.  Therefore, for the purposes of 
the current thesis it has to be developed. The central issue is what it means to insist on 
integrity in post-conflict law.  Integrity developed as a theory to deal with the issue of stare 
decisis in common law countries. Among other things, Dworkin argued that interpretations of 
the law were required to be coherent with those earlier decisions which came previously.  But 
in the jus post bellum, integrity appears to point in different directions.   
On the one hand, post-conflict law is an ‘inward-looking’ question of national law.  In 
this respect, integrity could mean that the interpretations of law proposed by post-conflict 
actors have to be coherent with other interpretations of law made by other actors in the same 
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post-conflict situation.  This is Gallen’s view.  He argues that interpretations of post-conflict 
law in transitional criminal justice must be coherent in principle with the other interpretations 
of the law in relation to, for example, security sector reform, development or other 
peacebuilding activities.  Gallen does not focus on whether interpretations of post-conflict 
law ought to be coherent with those of other post-conflict situations, i.e. whether transitional 
criminal justice in Colombia must be coherent with transitional criminal justice in Sierra 
Leone.  His overall concern is organizational coherence in law and policy in single post-
intervention societies. 
On the other hand, thinking about integrity and post-conflict law raises an ‘outward-
looking’ dimension.  The jus post bellum as integrity may suggest that a set of international 
norms are developing into post-conflict law for all post-conflict societies.  Many jus post 
bellum theorists have identified a set of ‘crystallizing’ international norms.  But it is not yet 
clear what an interpretation of post-conflict law must be coherent with for the purposes of ‘an 
international jus post bellum’.   
The international legal order is a decentralized order.  There is no central decision-
maker (such as a constitutional court) which can provide the authoritative interpretations of 
law with which States must find coherence.  Thus, it may be thought that, as a matter of law, 
there is can be no legal obligation for post-conflict actors in Colombia to seek coherence with 
the interpretations of law in other post-conflict situations.  It may be argued that these are 
simply different legal systems.  However, to the extent that each society is interpreting and 
applying international law (to post-conflict issues) there is a legal duty to seek coherence with 
previous interpretations of international law.  To ignore previous interpretations of 
international law may be tantamount to rejecting its binding nature.  At the very least, if a 
different interpretation is needed, the State involved must explain its divergence from other 





that this divergence has to be explained and the result must be coherent in principle with 
other post-conflict situations.  Thinking and acting in this way, post-conflict actors would be 
developing the contours and accepting the normative constraints of the jus post bellum as 
integrity. There may be doubts about this conceptual approach.  Dworkin himself was 
uncertain about whether his theory was useful in understanding the nature of law in the post-
conflict context.6  Nevertheless, the pursuit of integrity across post-conflict societies may be 
useful.  It can contribute to the identification and development of a set of post-conflict norms 
by reminding States of the international dimension of their post-conflict activities.   
Whether this approach adds value to those involved in the practice of post-conflict 
law will depend on the analysis in relation to a specific issue.  In this regard, the central 
questions in this thesis is whether and how a Dworkinian jus post bellum helps post-conflict 
actors to identify the law of transitional criminal justice in relation to the criminal 
accountability of child soldier perpetrators.  Importantly, this chapter will not provide a direct 
response to Gallen’s theory.  Gallen is concerned with a slightly different question relating to 
the coordination of different peacebuilding actors within a post-intervention State.  This 
chapter modifies Gallen’s theory and prepares the ground for its application in chapter 5.  
Chapter 6 raises some important objections to this version of the jus post bellum.  Chapter 7 
situates the jus post bellum as integrity in international legal scholarship.  Chapter 8 sets out 
future possible directions for the jus post bellum and it makes some concluding remarks. 
Section 4.2 introduces and analyses Gallen’s interpretation of the jus post bellum as 
integrity.  Section 4.3 begins to reconstruct a new Dworkinian approach to the jus post 
bellum.  Section 4.4 deals with an important ‘threshold objection’ to Dworkin’s theory.  
Section 4.5 presents an example of post-conflict decision-making in Colombia as the opposite 
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of integrity.  Section 4.7 makes some concluding comments and prepares the ground for the 
application of the jus post bellum in relation to a case-study in chapter 5.  
 
4.2 Gallen’s theory of the jus post bellum 
 
Gallen’s is concerned with the moral legitimacy of post-intervention law and policy.7 He 
accepts that the jus post bellum cannot be considered a new development in terms of positive 
international law and develops a ‘dynamic’ conceptualization that focuses on the jus post 
bellum as an overarching framework of principles.  The main benefit to this view is that 
‘post-conflict’ law and policy often occurs during armed conflict (as in Colombia).8 Thus, its 
interpretation and application cannot be linked to a specific ‘end point’ in armed conflict.  
Modern conflict may be too ‘stop-start’ for that to be possible.  As a set of principles that 
apply during and after conflict (and according to Gallen maybe even before) the jus post 
bellum may better fit the realities of modern transitions.9 
However, Gallen also has a particular kind of post-intervention transition in mind.  He 
identifies a lack of coordination between different post-intervention actors as the main 
problem in terms of the moral legitimacy of transitions from conflict to peace.  In his view, 
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an overarching interpretive framework, a jus post bellum, could ‘emphasize their mutually 
supporting relationship and interdependent goals’.10  In Gallen’s words, 
…the distinctive value of jus post bellum should be in recognizing that the various norms, 
regulations, and practices relevant to transitions are inter-dependent and mutually re-enforcing 
and as a result can be evaluated and interpreted in a unified fashion.
11
 
Gallen is, thus, proposing a new language of overarching principles that different post-
conflict actors should refer to when interpreting post-conflict law and policy.  In this way, the 
fragmentation of the field can be unified under a single core set of principles. 
The approach Gallen adopts is Dworkinian.  He identifies the complexity of post-
intervention law and policy as the central problem and provides Dworkin’s theory of law as a 
possible solution.  Gallen analyses the problem and presents three main factors that lead to 
the complexity of post-conflict law.  In simple terms:  there are a number of legal actors, a 
number of different applicable legal regimes and each transitional society is different.   
Despite this general approach, Gallen mainly discusses post-intervention societies and 
the lack of coherence between the legal utterances of different actors.  This results in 
indeterminacy and fragmentation in post-conflict law and policy and a potentially incoherent 
approach to law during transitions.  Dworkin’s theory of integrity urges coherence in 
interpretation.  For this reason, Gallen thinks that constructing a coherent jus post bellum that 
applies within post-conflict societies may benefit from a Dworkinian lens.  The following 
sections (4.2.1 – 4.2.3) discuss and evaluate Gallen’s analysis and provide an explanation of 
how these issues of fragmentation arise in the Colombian context.  This prepares the ground 
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for Gallen’s ideas in relation to integrity in sections 4.2.5 – 4.2.7.  Finally, section 4.3 
onwards reconstruct Gallen’s theory into a more comprehensive and global approach to the 
jus post bellum.   
4.2.1. International Law and Policy 
 
There are a wide range of areas of international law and policy that are relevant to transitions.  
Gallen argues that some areas such as transitional justice, peace agreements, peacebuilding 
and State building are directed at the ‘narrow factual circumstances of transition’.
12
  At the 
same time other areas are ‘universal in application’ insofar as they apply to ‘consolidated 
democracies’ as well as countries in transition, i.e. refugee and migration law, 
constitutionalism, and the development of a country’s economy’.
13
 The applicable legal 
framework in this situation is, therefore, a mixture of legal categories reflecting different 
‘value preferences’ emerging from policy goals in different fields.  To take just three 
examples, security sector reform aims at ‘the enhancement of effective and accountable 
security for the State and its peoples…’
14
 Transitional justice focuses on the legacy of mass 
abuse and atrocity either in transitions from conflict to peace or authoritarian rule to 
democratic rule.
15
 Finally, the creation of new human rights institutions will aim at the 
enhancement of the human rights.
16
  
To these three examples could be added many more such as, economic policies for the 
revitalization of the labour market, humanitarian aid restructuring and other development 
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 Gallen’s point is that goals such as ‘security’, ‘justice’, ‘human rights’, ‘economic 
growth’, ‘development’ or ‘democracy’ represent ‘competing spheres of authority’ that raise 
the need to make strategic choices between them.
18
  
 In Colombia, a cursory look over the ‘General Agreement to End the Conflict and 
Build a Stable and Lasting Peace’ (hereafter ‘General Agreement’), speaks to the possibility 
of legal fragmentation.
19
  In the first place, fragmentation appears as a result of the signing of 
separate substantive agreements.  These range over land reform, the integration of former 
rebels into the political process, the resolution of illegal drug cultivation and the special 
justice tribunal for victims.  These agreements reflect specific value goals such as land reform 
and restitution, the protection of private land holdings, and a better and more consolidated 
democracy.  The special goal of transitional criminal justice encompasses the desire for 
justice for victims of the conflict and the reconciliation and reintegration of former 
combatants in furtherance of a sustainable peace.  Fragmentation in value goals creates the 
possibilities of legal conflicts arising insofar as the peace agreements provide a road-map to 
peace.  For instance, ‘peace’ depends on the reintegration of former FARC-EP rebels into 
society and democratic politics, but ‘justice’ depends on the accountability of perpetrators of 
human rights violations and war crimes in view of the demands of an estimated 8 million 
registered victims of the conflict.
20
 Gallen, generally, claims that the jus post bellum as 
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integrity helps to resolve these types of conflicts by appealing to the shared goals of the 
relevant political actors in transitions.   
4.2.2 Legal Foundations for the Engagement of International Actors 
 
Gallen identifies the ‘legal foundations for the engagement of international actors’ as another 
level of complexity in identifying the jus post bellum.21  Gallen points out that the legal 
foundations for international participation ‘make a legal or moral difference to their 
engagements’.22 The first dimension of complexity (rule-fragmentation) interacts with the 
second dimension of complexity on international actors.  However, it is clear that Gallen is 
only considering post-intervention issues.  He argues,  
 
substantive international rules, norms and principles must therefore cover a variety of factual and 
legal circumstances, from full occupation by a belligerent State, through to a variety of Security 
Council authorizations, through to the legitimate consent of an affected population to the presence 




For instance, international human rights norms may be displaced by other (superior) rules, 
such as, resolutions of the UN Security Council.  In Colombia, international participation in 
the transition appears to have been limited to certain States participating in the peace process 
(i.e. Venezuela, Cuba, and Norway).  However, Point 6 of the ‘General Agreement’ makes 
explicit provision for international cooperation in the implementation phase of the 
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agreement.24  In a joint communiqué, the parties to the Colombian peace talks have 
announced that they have invited a UN/CELAC (the Community of Latin American and 
Caribbean States) special unarmed political mission to monitor the ceasefire and the 
demobilization of the FARC-EP.25  Although the details are not yet clear, international 
cooperation is based on the consent of the Colombian State (and the FARC-EP as part of the 
peace process).  However, the presence of these political observers will be authorized by UN 
Security Council Resolution 2261 (2016) and this provides important immunities in relation 
to the rights and obligations of these actors in Colombia. 
Nonetheless, there will be an absence of a more extensive military or political 
presence in Colombia.  Therefore, it might be thought that this area of ‘complexity’ will be 
less problematic in Colombia than in other post bellum situations.26 However, a broad 
conception of ‘international actors’ which goes beyond the paradigm of peace and security 
would include international financial institutions such as the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and other regional economic actors which may be involved such as the 
European Union.  The legal foundations upon which these actors are involved in the 
Colombian transition must be considered as part of the legal complexity of identifying the jus 
post bellum.  In this way, the jus post bellum ought to transcend the traditional separation 
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between matters of international law relating to peace and security and matters of 
international economic law.27  
The most relevant actor in this respect may be the International Criminal Court (ICC).  
The ICC has been investigating Colombia since 2004.  However, the ICC has no jurisdiction 
over children suspected of the commission of international crimes (defined as under 18s).  
Therefore, the more likely international pressures will come from advocates against the 
prosecution of child soldiers.  A similar situation to that which emerged in Sierra Leone could 
be envisaged.  In that post-conflict State, the SCSL had the jurisdiction over child soldiers.  
However, individuals, such as UNICEF’s Joanna Van Gerpen, argued that the prosecution of 
child soldiers would amount to re-victimizing them and that, therefore, they ought not to be 
prosecuted.28 This may have affected the decision to instill a two-tiered approach whereby the 
Court could prosecute child soldiers but the decision was left to the prosecutor.   
4.2.3 The Context of the Transitional Society  
 
The final dimension of complexity in interpreting the jus post bellum is the transitional 
society itself.  This is not just because the domestic law of the State in transition will be part 
of any jus post bellum legal framework.  Transitions must deal with a paradox.  On the one 
hand, there is an overarching aim to transform behaviour and attitudes of the conflict society 
towards internationally recognized norms.  On the other hand, several international law and 
policy fields are fixed on the idea of local ownership.29  The dilemma is that although 
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‘[p]olicies in each field express the desirability of local ownership’ they do not have a 
‘common framework for its understanding in different disciplines’.30  Further, Hansen points 
to significant dilemmas exist in identifying local owners and balancing this desire with a 
realistic assessment of local capabilities.31 There is a tension in ‘establishing the rule of law’ 
and ‘increasing the participation and control of local owners.’32 There is also a tension 
between ‘aims and means’.33 International actors are concerned with implementing a reform 
agenda which adheres to internationally recognized norms, such as democracy, and the rule 
of law.  However, the means by which they interact with the local transitional society 
demonstrates that often ‘international accountability is non-existent’.34 These two dilemmas 
are reproduced in each field, whether that is political reform, economics, security, etc.  
Faced with these dilemmas, Gallen argues that the role of the jus post bellum is to 
offer an ‘adequate conception of the relationship between international and national actors’.35  
However, it is possible to go further.  The question of local ownership is not merely a 
national-international paradigm but it might also have to apply across national-regional and 
regional-local dimensions.  In transitional societies, such as Colombia, the issue of ‘locality’ 
must be seen as bound up with the issues of minority group rights.  In Colombia, the peace 
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agreements so far have made extensive reference to under-represented racial and ethnic 
groups, (i.e. raizales, palenqueros, afrocolombianos and other diverse indigenous groups).  
Therefore, the issue of local ownership in the jus post bellum should be adapted to fit the 
internal dynamics of the local context, i.e. the relationship between ethnic and racial 
groupings within the Colombian State and its regions.     
4.2.4 Summary  
 
This review of the fragmentation of law in post bellum practice has prepared the ground for 
an explanation of how integrity may be useful in the law of transitions.  For Gallen, all the 
different areas of law and policy which apply in transitions proceed towards a coherent goal - 
the re-establishment of the rule of law and the rebuilding of civic trust.  Thus, Gallen 
constructs a theory of integrity in the jus post bellum on an analysis of post-conflict law that 
points to an empirical reality: interdependence of separate activities.
  
Gallen argues that if 
only actors could see how their activities were interdependent, they could use a unified frame 
of reference for the interpretation and application of law and policy after interventions (a new 
jus post bellum).  The point is that each field of practice in transitions ‘purports to contribute 
to the restoration of civic trust and the rule of law as contributions to the reconstitution of a 
sovereign political community.’
36 
 He argues that if we acknowledge ‘organizing principles’ 
which are ‘deeper than the substantive law and policies’ shows a commitment to the practice 
of integrity in post-conflict law.
37
  Integrity, in this sense, provides post-conflict actors with a 
mind-set and a language which can help them to trust in the post-conflict political 
community.  
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4.2.5 Interdepdence in Transitions  
 
Integrity in post-conflict law, for Gallen, arises because all transitions share two conditions.  
He describes as:  
…intense demands and expectations for the achievements of public goods in political community 
[and] minimal bureaucratic capacity and legitimacy to achieve such goods, due to a breakdown of 
civic trust and the rule of law, relative to the prior commission of gross violations of human 
rights.38   
The ‘fact’ that all transitions share these conditions (for Gallen) means that the responses to 
these conditions (from a number of different actors) are capable of being explained and 
interpreted under a unified framework – the jus post bellum as integrity.   
However, this formulation of the ‘shared conditions’ of all transitional societies 
makes it clear that Gallen is only really considering post-intervention law and policy.  In 
Colombia, there may be an intense demand for the achievement of public goods but these do 
not necessarily arise as a result of the armed conflict.  Rather, Colombia, as a developing 
nation, is still struggling to find equality of opportunity for its citizens and exhibits a largely 
unequal division of wealth.  The problems are economic, political and social but they are not 
necessarily the result of the armed conflict in the way Gallen suggests.  In fact, many 
societies, whether post-conflict or not, continue to exhibit these kinds of demands.   
Further, there may be, at times, a crippling bureaucracy in Colombia.  A snapshot is 
provided from the perspective of criminal justice in section 4.5.  However, this is not 
necessarily owing to the effects of armed conflict.  Instead, again, the issues predate the 
armed conflict and must be linked to the development of Colombia in its entirety.    
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Thus, one problem with Gallen’s theory, (for the purposes of the thesis question) is 
that it does not really aim at the Colombian situation.  Its analytical focus is simply elsewhere 
(i.e. Iraq, Kosovo, and Timor-Leste, perhaps).  The conditions he presents are not self-evident 
‘facts’ of all post-conflict societies.  Gallen, indeed, admits that he has reverse-engineered the 
conditions ‘by analogy to the circumstances of politics and justice that describe conditions in 
consolidated democracies’.39 Here again, however, this approach probably simplifies the issue 
as various democracies continue to struggle with a number of domestic demands for public 
goods.  Consolidated democracies do not necessarily eschew bureaucracy; and the capacity to 
deliver evenly public goods is not necessarily always linked to economic development.  It 
may be better to simply agree that all transitional societies must pass through ‘a new 
constitutional moment’ where the renegotiation of the distribution of public goods takes 
centre stage.  This focus on a constitutional moment is also more easily linked to a 
Dworkinian approach, given Dworkin’s traditional focus on constitutional law and 
interpretation.  As will be discussed later, the principle of integrity, for it to be able to work in 
post-conflict societies, requires that a community of principle exists in the relevant post-
conflict state.  The notion that a peace agreement is a new constitutional moment, at the very 
least, provides evidence that a new moment of agreement has arrived in a divided state.  Once 
a certain amount of agreement has been achieved in a divided society, in theory, the 
community of principle required for the notion of integrity may take hold.  This will be 
explained in more detail in due course.  
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4.2.6 Civic Trust and the Rule of Law 
 
Gallen’s analysis focuses on the structural consequences of gross human rights violations: the 
breakdown of civic trust and the destruction of the rule of law.  Once more, however, this is 
only partly relevant to the Colombian situation.  Colombia has never ceased to exist (as a 
functioning democracy) despite many years of armed conflict.  Instead, it has managed to 
stay unified despite an ongoing rebellion, which may be seen as evidence of a very strong 
national identity (if not a shared political and economic ideology).  Thus, the notion that civic 
trust has broken down and the rule of law has ceased to function is, once more, linked more 
closely to situations which are post-intervention, as in Iraq, Kosovo, and Timor-Leste. 
 Nevertheless, to persist for a moment with Gallen’s argument, he thinks that the fact 
that there has been a breakdown in civic trust and the rule of law provides post-conflict actors 
with a purpose to their activities, namely the re-establishment of these social institutions.  
Here Gallen examines the aims of a number of disparate post-conflict activities and 
demonstrates that they are all aiming at re-establishing civic trust and the rule of law.  He 
discusses briefly transitional justice, peacebuilding, security-sector reform and development 
and explains how they can all be described as aiming at rebuilding civic trust and the rule of 
law.  Even though these areas may all mean different things by these terms, Gallen argues 
that ‘the nature of both these concepts, as social norms, makes it clear that contributions from 
the areas identified are inter-dependent and thus should be interpreted through a shared 
framework’.40 This is probably not clear enough to do the work that Gallen wants these 
concepts to do.  If the areas do mean different things in the way they are used by different 
post-conflict actors, then the whole notion of a shared framework breaks down.  Never mind 
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the fact that different societies are unlikely to share an understanding of what is ‘civic’ or 
even the ‘rule of law’.  Further, it is not clear why the activities all contribute to a different 
‘shared’ aim, a general guarantee of non-repetition, for example.  Gallen does not really take 
much time to develop these ideas.  He simply draws a general line between the activities and 
the putatively shared aim in order to reach the necessity, and requirement, of a shared 
interpretive framework.  However, there is a sense that that which must be proved, a unified 
interpretive framework aiming at integrity, has been presupposed. 
Thus, the notion of a shared framework for the interpretation of post-intervention law 
and policy probably needs to be reconstructed on firmer ground.  Again, one way of doing 
this, is thinking about the notion of a transition as a constitutional moment.  The different 
areas are then linked less by specific conditions that can be proved to exist in each society but 
by the more general fact of that the end of conflict, the acceptance of peace, is a 
constitutional moment of renegotiation.  The link between peace agreement (and peace 
treaty) and constitutionalization is an interesting one.  In international law, the Charter of the 
UN has often been discussed as a constitutional document that arose at the end of the Second 
World War.41  It can be read as the result of a renegotiation of the constitution of the 
international community.  Although this view is not unproblematic, it has the benefits of 
simplicity.  Inevitably, at the end of conflict, a number of actors must accept a new start, 
under new rules, as the result of peace.  Therefore, the jus post bellum as integrity, as a 
theoretical concept, can attach to this empirical fact of transition and develop from there.      
Focusing on all transitions as constitutional moments is a better foundation for the jus 
post bellum as integrity.  This approach better accommodates the Dworkinian approach to 
post-conflict law and society which Gallen advocates.  This section ends by discussing the 
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three principles that, for Gallen, form the backbone of the jus post bellum as an interpretive 
framework that aims to integrity. 
4.2.7 Gallen’s Principles 
 
Drawing on the earlier work of Kristen Boon and Jean L. Cohen, Gallen focuses on 
accountability, proportionality and stewardship as the relevant interpretive principles for 
post-conflict law.
42 
 Gallen surveys a number of post-intervention societies and argues that 
these principles support and explain why the law and policy in these situations is morally 
(and therefore legally) legitimate. These principles need not be discussed in detail.  Suffice it 
to say that recourse to these principles is reflected in much international practice.43  However, 
as a preliminary point, it seems clear that many other principles could be added to Gallen’s 
list.  
Firstly, from a philosophical perspective, Larry May has argued that the normative 
foundation for the jus post bellum ought to be the Aristotelian principle of meionexia (justice 
as taking less than what you are owed).
44 
 It captures the idea that in order for a stable future, 
all sides to the conflict ought to compromise to some extent.  In relation to transitional 
criminal justice, the principle may be interpreted in different ways.  On the one hand, those 
who require justice may see a 16 year old FARC-EP rebel soldier to be sufficiently mature to 
understand the nature of their actions.  In this respect, the decision to prosecute international 
crimes such as murder, or rape, seems to follow from a simple requirement of justice.  
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However, the principle of meionexia could temper this normative requirement in the light of 
other important aims of post-conflict society.  Thus, the need for reconciliation or 
reintegration of former combatants could be reinforced by the limited applicability of justice.  
Meionexia, therefore, can inform the interpretation of other, more specific, jus post bellum 
principles.   
Secondly, on a Dworkinian approach, the relevant principles emerge from a study of 
the relevant practice.  Therefore other principles could include reconciliation, retribution, 
reparation, rebuilding, restitution and proportionality.  In addition, it may be argued that the 
most important principle in respect of post-conflict practice is founded on the principle of 
non-repetition.
45
   It is not clear why any and all of these principles could not also form part 
of the Dworkinian jus post bellum.  Post-conflict is founded on a number of principles 
beyond those that Gallen mentions.    
In choosing accountability, proportionality and stewardship, therefore, Gallen’s jus post 
bellum framework is designed to evaluate and justify the behaviour of international actors in 
governing States in post-intervention transitions.  In this regard, his framework is designed to 
help these international actors in identifying post-intervention law as it applies to their 
activities.  Gallen argues that his theory requires practitioners to interpret legal norms 
according to the overarching purpose of post-intervention transitions:  the rebuilding of the 
rule of law and fostering civic trust.
46 
He argues that these aims can be pursued through the 
application of the principle of integrity.  For Gallen, only by pursuing integrity can the 
political and moral obligations of post-conflict law be legitimate to individuals in post-
conflict societies.  In his own words, 
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The task of the jus post bellum as integrity is to therefore offer a description of the existing 
international law, policy, and theory as applied to given transitions and seek to justify this practice 
by reference to its value goals in a unified or coherent fashion.
47
 
Thus, integrity is provided by Gallen as ‘guidance to those who have the special 
responsibility to interpret legal norms on behalf of the polity in question’.48  Integrity, in the 
sense of coherence in law and legal policy, may provide individuals in transitional societies 
with a reason to believe in the post-conflict reconstruction.   
A failure to implement the peace agreement in a way that respects the principle of 
integrity could damage the legitimacy of the post-conflict movement.  Of course, after 
conflict, there may be disagreement about some of the aims or goals of the transition.  In 
Colombia, for example, the end of the armed conflict with the FARC-EP is one of many 
goals of the conflict.  Other goals include the redistribution of wealth, and the eradication of 
cocaine crops.  Thus, it may not be easy to agree on how law ought to be interpreted.  
Nevertheless, integrity, on Gallen’s account, urges officials to justify legal decisions 
according to principles which can justify the post-conflict legal system as a whole.  
4.3 Reconstructing the jus post bellum as integrity:  The basics of Dworkin’s Theory 
 
Ronald Dworkin’s theory asserts that the indeterminacy of law can be resolved by appealing 
to legal principles that aim at integrity.  This section introduces the aspect of Dworkin’s legal 
theory known as law as integrity.  It emerged in opposition to two well-established theories of 
law known as ‘conventionalism’ and ‘pragmatism’.49  Dworkin argues that law as integrity 
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provides a better explanatory theory of how judges actually decide hard cases.  He also 
proposes law as integrity as a better normative theory of how judges ought to decide hard 
cases.  His overall point is that the more ‘integrity’ is produced in an interpretation of law, the 
better this is from the perspective of justifying the coercive practice of a legal order as a 
whole.50   
The central differences between these approaches are made evident in ‘hard cases’ 
where the law is unclear or uncertain.  Dworkin distinguishes between ‘empirical’ and 
‘theoretical’ disagreements but only the latter is relevant here.51 These are disagreements 
about the grounds of law, about the kinds of propositions that can be made to make a 
proposition of law valid.  In the context of post-conflict law, they are disagreements about the 
correct approach to the fragmentation of legal categories.  As explained in chapter 3 (in 
relation to transitional criminal justice) a number of different legal categories regulate a 
specific issue.  Theoretical disagreements become evident in relation to specific cases.  This 
is owing to the fact that there are different possible interpretations of what the law is in 
relation to the issue at hand.  Dworkin’s point is that the interpretation of what the law is in 
relation to any issue must be coherent with what the law should be according to the principle 
of integrity. 
This chapter argues that the situation of child soldier accountability in post-conflict 
Colombia is a ‘hard case’ in the Dworkinian sense.  This is owing to the lack of determinate 
rules on whether a child soldier perpetrator of international crimes must be prosecuted in the 
forthcoming Special Tribunal for Peace.  As mentioned, in relation to situations involving 
minors ‘accused or convicted’ of crimes ‘not subject to amnesty or pardon’ (international 
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crimes) there is evidence of that the parties disagreed in the negotiation of the peace 
agreement.  The only specific mention of the situation in the peace process is Joint 
Communiqué #70 which was then incorporated into the 2016 Amnesty Law.  This simply 
states that the situations of child soldiers (aged 14-18) suspected of committing crimes which 
cannot be amnestied ‘will be studied at a later stage’.
52
  The point of a Dworkinian jus post 
bellum is that this kind of question can be answered in a particular way that requires a focus 
on integrity.  This section clarifies the theoretical aspects of law as integrity and its proposed 
solution to the interpretation of law in ‘hard cases’.  It does this by distinguishing law as 
integrity from to other approaches to the nature of law and legal reasoning discussed by 
Dworkin: conventionalism and pragmatism.   
4.3.1 Conventionalism53 
 
Conventionalism, in Dworkin’s view, ‘restricts the law of a community to the explicit 
extension of its legal conventions like legislation and precedent’.54  The conventionalist view 
is usually attributed to H.L.A. Hart and other ‘legal positivists’.55  They converge on a central 
proposition.  This is, that deciding whether any law is valid, and whether it forms part of any 
legal system, depends on its sources and not its merits.56  This means that whether a law is a 
good law or a bad law is not relevant to its validity as law.  John Gardner explains the 
positivist view succinctly,  
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…a norm is valid as a norm of that system in virtue of the fact that at some relevant time and 
place some relevant agent or agents announced it, practiced it, invoked it, enforced it, endorsed it, 
or otherwise engaged with it.
57
 
This view posits that law is a simple, backwards-looking, fact-checking procedure.  The law 
is derived from acts of ‘officials’.58  It does not matter that the law in question is a bad law 
that officials should not have engaged with.  Neither do excellent norms become law by 
virtue of their desirability.59  Law is law by virtue of its being posited, or practiced, or 
recognized by an official or institution of the State.   
This view of law promotes legal certainty.  It does this by providing an objective 
methodology by which to identify what the law requires and permits: the search for an 
empirical source.  Conventionalism has been very influential in modern international law.  It 
is recognized in Article 38 (1) (c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.60  The 
Statute recognizes three primary sources of international legal obligation.  These are 
international treaties, customary law and general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations (see section 2.1.2).  All of these sources are rules announced, practiced, invoked, 
enforced or endorsed by the relevant agents, in this case, States.  Chapter 2 set out some of 
the benefits of this system in the context of normative pluralism among States.  In a situation 
where States legitimately disagree on what would be a ‘good’ law, the conventionalist 
approach assures that only those rules to which States have agreed are ‘the law’.   
 Dworkin is not convinced that conventionalism provides a good descriptive or 
normative theory of law.  The problem for Dworkin arises when there are novel situations for 
which an easily identifiable rule is unavailable.  In the context of this thesis, the rule on 
                                                                        
57 John Gardner, ‘Legal Positivism - 5 1/2 Myths’, 46 American Journal of Jurisprudence 1 (2001) 199, 200. 
58
 I use ‘officials’ to cover a great range of actors in the legal system such as legislators, judges, lawyers, etc. 
59
 John Gardner, ‘Legal Positivism - 5 1/2 Myths’, 46 American Journal of Jurisprudence 1 (2001) 199, 200. 
60
 Article 38 (1) (c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, UN Charter, chapter XIV, (signed 26 June 1945, adopted 24 October 





whether child soldiers ought to be prosecuted for international crimes is an example.  The 
issue is not that there is no law at all dealing with the issue.  The problem is that there are 
several legal categories that may be relevant.  Thus, there may be a disagreement between 
interpreters about the proper interpretation of post-conflict law on the issue.   
The Hartian/conventionalist response to ‘hard cases’ is that judges must use their 
discretion to decide the dispute.  This ‘discretion’ is understood by conventionalists as a 
‘strong’ discretion.  As Dworkin says, this suggests that they must ‘find some wholly 
forward-looking ground of decision’.61  In relation to the criminal accountability of child 
soldiers in Colombia, conventionalism provides no concrete answer.  No specific rule can be 
found on the issue.  This is owing to the fact that the end of armed conflict provides a new 
situation for which there is neither specific precedent nor legislation.  There are no social 
sources of law that can be pointed to as dispositive of the issue in a specific case.  Therefore, 
according to the conventionalist view, whether a child should be prosecuted for serious 
crimes has to be decided according to some forward-looking grounds.  However, this is 
problematic for Dworkin because it undermines the constraining feature of conventionalism 
which is that it urges judges to focus on empirical legal ‘sources’, such as legislation, official 
practice and precedent, in identifying the law.  In a hard case, such as that of child soldier 
accountability, conventionalism appears to lose its distinctive nature.  It advocates 
unconstrained judicial discretion.  Dworkin argued that conventionalism, therefore, failed to 
explain what judges actually do in these kinds of hard cases.  In his view, judges looked to 
principles to justify their interpretations.62  The principles emerged from previous legal 
practice.  Thus, in a ‘hard case’, there were no ‘gaps’ in the law.  The law simply became a 
question of identifying the right principles that could explain and justify a line of previous 
similar decisions.  These principles could then help to formulate the law for the new and 
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specific case at issue.  Fundamentally, Dworkin thought that if judges did not rely on 
conventionalism in hard cases then there must be something more to law and legal practice.  
In Dworkin’s language, the result is that the theory of conventionalism does not ‘fit’ the 
reality of legal practice.  It fails as an explanatory theory and, therefore, ought to be rejected 
as a normative theory:  judges ought to go beyond conventionalism in identifying the law in 
hard cases.    
 In the context of Colombia, the question is whether a lack of specific post-conflict 
legal rules on child soldier perpetrators is only a matter of prosecutorial discretion.  A 
Dworkinian approach would reject the idea that it was.  It would also reject the view that the 
question was indeterminate.  For Dworkin, even if the ‘positive’ law is unclear, the legal 
principles that justify the positive law can be identified.  These principles must then be used 
to interpret the law in a way that makes the decision coherent with the previous decisions in 
the same area.  Chapter 5 presents an example and evaluation of how this might be applied in 
a specific case in transitional criminal justice.  Chapter 6 will then look at two specific 
problems with the Dworkinian version of the jus post bellum.   
4.3.2 Pragmatism 
 
Dworkin also distinguishes law as integrity from ‘pragmatism’.  Pragmatism is at the other 
extreme from conventionalism.  It rejects the idea that judges are constrained by any previous 
rules in deciding hard cases.  Instead, pragmatists think that ‘judges do and should make 
whatever decisions seem to them best for the community’s future’.63  Matters of consistency 
with the past are simply not as important as reaching the best decision for the community in 
any given case.  For Dworkin, a pragmatist ‘denies that past political decisions in themselves 
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provide any justification for either using of withholding the State’s coercive power’.64  Thus, 
in Colombia, a judge or prosecutor may simply reject the idea that he is constrained by law in 
deciding whether a child soldier perpetrator ought to be prosecuted for international crimes.65  
He would instead think about what the best outcome would be in terms of the post-conflict 
community.   
Perhaps, with an eye on the peace process and the fragility of the transition, a 
prosecutor could decide not to prosecute any child soldiers.  It is the substance of the 
interpretation that matters not whether it can be reconciled with past practice.  But, crucially, 
pragmatism is silent about which interpretations of the law are ‘best’ for the community.  As 
an account of law, it leaves the decision to judges who decide unconstrained and according to 
their best judgment.  Thus, one judge may think that the best decision is that which is 
economically-speaking ‘most-efficient’.  So, a judge in Colombia might think that 
prosecuting child soldiers would be inefficient in a variety of ways.  The construction of a 
parallel juvenile justice system might be thought to place a burden on already stretched 
resources.  Alternatively, a judge could think that child soldiers are an important resource in 
and of themselves in terms of rebuilding the post-conflict State.   But another approach that 
favours retribution on moral grounds might lean towards prosecution in order to vindicate the 
‘moral order’.66  On a pragmatic account of law and legal reasoning, neither approach would 
necessarily consider legal or institutional history as crucial to the identification of what the 
law is.  A pragmatist would simply decide according to subjective political preferences.  
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4.3.3 Interpretivism  
 
Dworkin thought that conventionalism and pragmatism were interpretations of law and that 
they were deficient.  He argued that they missed a crucial aspect of adjudication which is that 
judges (and other actors in a legal system) find themselves engaged a process of ‘constructive 
interpretation’.67  Judges are engaged in an argumentative practice which required an 
‘interpretive attitude’ on their part.68  This he defined as ‘imposing purpose on an object or 
practice in order to make of it the best possible example of the form or genre to which it is 
taken to belong’.69  Dworkin thought that judges constructed interpretations by combining 
elements of conventionalism and pragmatism.  On the one hand, they were constrained by the 
law.  Interpretations of the law had to be a part of the historical and institutional legal 
practice.  As Dworkin stated, the ‘history or shape of a practice or object constrains the 
available interpretations of it.’70   On the other hand, difficult cases arose where an 
interpretation had to be more than a mere pointing at past legal rules.  There was a creative 
aspect to the law embodied in the theory of pragmatism which conventionalism missed.  
Thus, an aspect of the legal decision-making was rooted in backwards-looking empiricism.  
Another was forward-looking justification.  For Dworkin, this provided a better explanatory 
theory of law.  He called this descriptive aspect of his theory ‘interpretivism’.   
 In analytical terms, Dworkin distinguishes three stages in the process of 
interpretivism.  The first stage is the ‘pre-interpretive’.  This stage requires the very practice 
which calls to be interpreted to be identified by the participants.  Interpreters identify the ‘raw 
data’ (rules, principles, conventions, practices) which fall to be interpreted.  In the common 
law system that Dworkin was studying, this was a relatively simple task that required a judge 
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to identify the rules and decisions relevant to the case.  Dworkin accepts that this is not a 
mechanical task.  There is an element of interpretation involved in deciding which rules are 
relevant or which practice is sufficient.71  However, Dworkin argues that there must be a 
threshold below which the interpreter is no longer interpreting a previous practice but rather 
commencing anew.   
 At the second ‘interpretive’ stage, Dworkin introduces the idea of ‘fit’.  Dworkin 
argues that at this stage several interpretations of the law may be possible.  However, 
interpreters select (and ought to select) that interpretation which best fits the previous 
practice.  The idea of integrity emerges here because those interpretations which best fit the 
previous practice are considered prima facie more desirable.  At the post-interpretive stage, 
Dworkin introduces the idea of ‘justification’ or ‘substance’.  The post-interpretive stage 
requires interpreters to consider what the legal practice is really about and how the decision 
adopted sets forth the meaning of the law for future behaviour.  In this respect, any 
interpretation of the law must be justified according to some standards external to the law.  In 
Dworkin’s legal theory, the relevant principles were the political/moral principles of the 
relevant community.   
Chapter 6 will deal in detail with two problems with applying this framework to post-
conflict law.  Suffice it to say here that the jus post bellum as integrity may look for 
interpretive coherence in two directions, a) downwards or internally, towards the community 
in transition, and/or b) outwards and externally, towards a notion of ‘international 
community’. 
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A prosecutor or judge may look ‘inwards’ and think about the law in Colombia and 
the principles that best justify these rules.72  A judge or prosecutor would fall below the 
required threshold if they did not consider the sources of law in Colombia, including those 
rules of international law which are applicable.  They might also identify cases in juvenile 
justice from Colombia as part of the history of the practice.  On Dworkin’s account, a 
prosecutor deciding whether to indict a particular child soldier for war crimes may also 
ignore certain rules and practices.  For example, a prosecutor could consider whether the 
Catholic Church has a view but they may also consider this as irrelevant to the issue.  In the 
interpretive stage, the prosecutor may need to think about the principles that emerge from the 
practice of law in Colombia and, especially, those that best explain and justify the peace 
agreement.  In terms of Dworkin’s theory, this is relatively unproblematic.  A conception of 
the jus post bellum as integrity would require that the interpretations of law are explained and 
justified by the principles which best explain the post-conflict Colombian legal order.   
In parallel, the jus post bellum as integrity also suggests that there is an international 
dimension to post-conflict law with which a prosecutor’s interpretations must be coherent.  
This is as a result of international law being directly applicable in post-conflict Colombia.  
The notion of ‘a jus post bellum’ suggests that the principles that emerge from the application 
of international law in other transitions in other post-conflict societies may be relevant to the 
Colombian situation.  Thus, the prosecutor may decide that the correct interpretation of post-
conflict law in Colombia may incorporate the principles of an ‘international community’.  On 
a Dworkinian reading, the relevant actors cannot ignore the interpretations of international 
law made in other situations.  Therefore, insofar as they are interpreting international law in 
Colombia, they may need to identify previous post-conflict practice from other post-conflict 
States and must seek interpretive coherence with the way that international law is applied in 
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these cases.  In relation to the specific issue at hand, child soldier accountability, the 
experience of other post-conflict States could provide the prosecutor with a number of 
principles to be used in the interpretation of the law.  Depending on how the prosecutor 
understands ‘international practice’ they may also look to those international organizations 
(NGOs, IGOs) that deal with child soldier issues, i.e. the Secretary-General’s Annual Report 
on Children and Armed Conflict (A/72/361).73 Therefore, the jus post bellum as integrity 
affects the interpretation of post-conflict law insofar as it requires interpretive coherence in 
relation to international law.   
As MacIntyre has argued, moral, social and political concepts are contingent on the 
particular characteristics of societies and their perception of history.74  In this respect, the 
prosecutor or judge appears to have a choice in terms of which principles are most relevant, 
or best explain and justify the legal order in post-conflict Colombia.  Once these are 
identified, Dworkin argues that there is a correct balancing of the analytical concepts of ‘fit’ 
and ‘substance’.  Analytically, ‘fit’ is a question of how well an interpretation is coherent 
with what has come before, i.e. previous legal practice.  As Dworkin argued, the facts of legal 
history limit the role of any judge’s personal convictions of justice in decisions-making.75  
Thus, the dimension of ‘fit’ supports the view that there is an element of conventionalism (as 
described by Dworkin) in identifying the law.  For post-conflict law, this includes 
international law.  If an interpretation does not ‘fit’ previous legal practice an interpreter may 
be challenged as not engaging in the previous practice in any meaningful way.  This made it 
prima facie a ‘bad’ interpretation.  Secondly, the ‘substance’ is a question of how desirable 
an interpretation is in view of the principles of the particular political community.  This 
dimension supports the view that there is an element of ‘pragmatism’ in the identification of 
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the law.  Judges find different principles that support their interpretation of the law in the 
particular case.  These are drawn from a certain political morality that is reflected in the 
‘community personified’.76  If a decision is supported by the principles of the community (in 
the sense that it shows that community in its best light) then this is a ‘good’ interpretation.  If 
an interpretation cannot be justified by the community’s principles then the converse would 
be true.  These two dimensions have to be balanced against one another according to the 
principle of integrity.  This provides a basis for Dworkin’s normative position.  The ‘best’ 
interpretations are those which best have the most ‘integrity’. 
4.3.4 ‘Integrity’ 
 
The foregoing explains and analyses how and why Dworkin thought that law and legal 
reasoning is an interpretive practice.  In normative terms, interpretations of the law had to 
balance the elements of ‘fit’ and ‘justification’ as best as possible.  But importantly, the 
relationship between the dimensions of ‘fit’ and ‘substance’ is itself subject to interpretation.  
As Dworkin says, ‘the different aspects or dimensions of a judge’s working approach…are in 
the last analysis all responsive to his political judgment.  His convictions about fit, as these 
appear either in his working threshold requirement or analytically later in competition with 
substance, are political not mechanical’.
77
 This means that the lack of ‘fit’ of any particular 
interpretation might be overcome by the desirability of its ‘substance’.  In this sense, ‘fit’ is 
not an external element in the decision-maker’s approach.  The dimension of ‘fit’ is also 
subject to matters of ‘substance’ and conviction.  Thus, as will be explained later, Fish’s 
argument that Dworkin presents a ‘straw-man’ version of conventionalism is not quite true.  
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Dworkin fully accepts that interpretation is ‘all there is’.  The difference is that Dworkin 
alleges that there is a normative, self-contained and self-standing principle of integrity, that 
can be used ‘outside of the system’ to coach judges on how they ought to proceed.
 78
   He 
argues, 
Law as integrity denies that statements of law are either the backward-looking factual reports of 
conventionalism or the forward-looking instrumental programs of pragmatism.  It insists that legal 
claims are interpretive judgments and therefore combine backward- and forward-looking 
elements; they interpret contemporary legal practice seen as an unfolding political narrative.
79
 
This means that, in practice, law as integrity requires an interpreter to identify the law ‘on the 
assumption that [it] was created by a single author’.
80
  This author is the ‘community 
personified – expressing a coherent conception of justice and fairness’.81    
By way of analogy, Dworkin imagines a group of novelists writing a ‘chain novel’.  
Each novelist in the chain ‘interprets the chapter he has been given in order to write a new 
chapter’.
82
  Dworkin argued that ‘[e]ach has the job of writing his chapter so as to make the 
novel being constructed the best it can be, and the complexity of this task models the 
complexity of deciding a hard case under law as integrity’.83   
For novelists, ‘best’ could be defined in terms of aesthetics, plot, credibility and 
themes.  Thus, the very matter of ‘best’ is itself a matter of interpretation.  However, on 
Dworkin’s account the best interpretation is that which gives the novel the most integrity.  
That means novelists ought to interpret the work of previous writers in the chain-novel in a 
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way that showed the entire novel itself in its best light.  Thus, a previous writer might have 
decided that the novel was a sci-fi novel that centred on a male protagonist with super-
hearing.  Dworkin though that integrity required that in these circumstances, the subsequent 
writers are constrained in what they can now say about the protagonist.  In order to show the 
novel in its best light, certain aspects of the character would need to be reflected in the new 
interpretation.   
The analogy in terms of law relates to how judges can decide novel hard cases that 
come before them.  In the context of transitional criminal justice, integrity requires that a 
prosecutor or a judge chooses an interpretation of the law that provides the correct balance 
between ‘fit’ with past practice and ‘justification’ according to the moral and political 
principles of the relevant community.  This is law as integrity.  It requires that difficult cases 
are decided according to a scheme of principles.  This provides individuals in a State with the 
best reasons to accept the coercive power of law and legal practice because it treats them with 
equal concern and respect.  This is the case even, and especially, in instances of disagreement 
about what the law actually is. 
Integrity is about interpretive consistency on matters of principle.  Dworkin argues 
that law as integrity ‘requires a judge to test his interpretation of any part of the great network 
of political structures and decisions of his community by asking whether it could form part of 
a coherent political theory justifying the network as a whole’.
84
 For Dworkin, integrity ought 
to be the aim of a legal system because it is the best way of justifying the coercive force of 
law over individual freedom.  It is also the best way to demonstrate that law is concerned 
with the equal treatment of individuals.  This is a question of what John Tasoulias calls 
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 Law is ultimately subject to the desirability of the principles 
of political morality that it protects.   
In the context of transitional criminal justice, an easy transposition of the chain novel 
analogy is difficult.  The difficulty arises owing to the domestic/international dimensions of 
post-conflict law.   On the one hand, different transitional justice societies apply different 
(domestic) legal systems.  However, the same international legal norms may apply (it 
depends on the obligations that the State has accepted).  If so, then there is also a legal 
requirement that legal actors in post-conflict Colombia choose interpretations of international 
law which are coherent with those applied in international practice, for example, in post-
conflict Sierra Leone. This issue is dealt with in more detail later.  Suffice it to say that a 
post-conflict actor is a part of more than one legal system.  They may be required to look to 
other post-conflict situations for interpretive support.  To return to the literary analogy, a 
writer in a chain novel is not required to make their interpretation of the novel coherent with 
a completely different novel.  However, they are insofar as the different novels are part of a 
shared ‘universe’ or ongoing story.  It is arguable that post-conflict law, as a matter of 
international practice, is such an ongoing story.  In this respect, post-conflict actors in 
Colombia must continue the story of post-conflict law as it relates to child soldier 
accountability.  What this actually means in practice will depend on the individual 
interpreters.  However, they must find principled reasons for any decisions they make about 
the right interpretation of international law. 
To return to Gallen’s argument, post-conflict actors must be ‘internally’ coherent, i.e. 
with other post-conflict activities.  Therefore, a post-conflict actor working in transitional 
justice ought to try to interpret post-conflict law in a way that is coherent with those working 
in rule of law reform or security sector reform in the same post-conflict State.  The jus post 
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bellum as integrity could simply mean this.  However, insofar as it draws from international 
legal norms, it also means that those working in transitional justice should try to make their 
interpretations of the law coherent with other transitional justice situations.  The very concept 
of the jus post bellum as integrity, therefore, may help post-conflict actors to be aware of the 
various dimensions of post-conflict law.  This may help their interpretation of post-conflict 
law in their own transition.  The problems in this regard will be fully thought through in 
chapter 5 which applies this approach to a specific issue of child soldier accountability.  




The foregoing has provided an account of law as integrity in the abstract although some 
attempt has been made to demonstrate how the ideas are relevant to the law of transitional 
criminal justice in Colombia.  In order to construct a Dworkinian jus post bellum, four points 
are clear.  Firstly, interpretivism is a methodology of interpretation.  It urges interpreters of 
the law to ask questions of themselves and, therefore, it can be seen as describing and 
proposing an ‘attitude’.  It is relevant to discover the law in hard cases and, therefore, it ought 
to be considered as prima facie relevant wherever theoretical disagreements arise in any legal 
system.  Secondly, law as integrity is presented as a better explanation and justification of 
law and legal reasoning than conventionalism and pragmatism.  In fact, it mixes both 
approaches and accepts that neither conventionalism nor pragmatism tells the whole story of 
legal interpretation.  Thirdly, law as integrity is presented as a theory of how judges do and 
ought to decide hard cases.  It appears that judges must be at the centre point in any notion of 
the jus post bellum as integrity.  However, Dworkin accepts that other actors, such as 





the principles of the community ought to explain and justify the applicable law.  This raises a 
few problems insofar as post-conflict societies, such as Colombia, which may lack a notion of 
‘community’ which is comparable to Dworkin’s concern with Anglo-American legal 
systems.  However, all transitions all pass through a ‘constitutional moment’ which turns 
divided societies into (perhaps temporarily) unified communities.  The idea of a 
‘constitutional moment’ helps to bring transitions together under the same conceptual 
framework and provides support for the Dworkinian requirements in relation to a community 
of principle.  Finally, the domestic/international dimensions of post-conflict law mean that 
post-conflict actors must be aware of the legal norms they are interpreting.  Insofar as 
domestic actors in Colombia are interpreting and applying Colombian law, then there will be 
no need to look for coherence across different transitional societies.  However, as soon as the 
relevant actors are looking at international legal norms that apply to the issue, then they 
cannot, on a Dworkinian reading, ignore international practice and the way international 
norms have been applied in other post-conflict societies.  Indeed, they need to make sure their 
interpretations of the relevant rules are consistent in principle with those interpretations made 
of the rules in other post-conflict situations.  To the contrary, international law would lack 
integrity and its moral or political legitimacy would suffer. 
 
4.4 Threshold objection: Theoretical disagreements in post-conflict Law 
 
There is an important threshold objection to Dworkin’s theory which must be dealt with at 
the outset.  Dworkin’s theory of law as integrity is designed to respond to what Dworkin 
called ‘theoretical disagreements on the grounds of law’.86  For Dworkin, legal positivism 
had not adequately responded to the existence or possibility of these theoretical 
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disagreements.  Thus, his theory of interpretivism was offered as a better explanation of law 
and legal reasoning.   
Brian Leiter has raised doubts about Dworkin’s strategy.87 Law’s Empire constructs 
interpretivism around the concept of theoretical disagreements.  But this ignores the brute fact 
that the majority of law and legal reasoning in any legal system demonstrates theoretical 
agreement on the grounds of law.  If Leiter is right, then there is little point in continuing 
with a Dworkinian jus post bellum because ‘law as integrity’ would simply fail to capture the 
reality of law and legal reasoning.  It would be rejected as deficient as an explanatory theory 
in the same way that Dworkin rejects conventionalism and pragmatism. 
Leiter has argued, ‘the main reason the legal system of a modern society does not 
collapse under the weight of disputes is precisely that most cases that are presented to lawyers 
never go any further than the lawyer’s office’.88  The implication is that the law which 
regulates most disputes is well-known and agreed upon.  Furthermore, ‘most cases that 
lawyers take do not result in formal litigation’ and ‘most cases that proceed to litigation settle 
by the end of discovery’.89 Of those that proceed to trial and verdict, most cases do not get 
appealed and ‘most cases that get appealed do not get appealed to the highest court, i.e., to 
the court where theoretical disagreements are quite likely rampant.’90 Leiter’s criticism takes 
aim at Dworkin’s insistence that interpretivism provides a valid theory of the nature of law 
and legal obligation.  For Leiter, a theory that purports to explain the nature of law ought to 
reflect as much of legal practice as possible.  He argues that this is legal positivism.  
Dworkin’s theory appears to avoid the vast majority of law and legal practice. 
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It is true, that Dworkin ignores the vast majority of law and legal practice and focuses 
on salient issues that arise in appeal courts.  But it is a simple fact that even though the 
majority of international law might demonstrate agreement on the grounds of law, transitions 
do demonstrate theoretical disagreements on the grounds of law.  Post-conflict law can be 
considered to produce disagreements because it is uniquely contingent on the particularities 
of each transition.  This includes the nature of the (sometimes ongoing) conflict and the 
political compromises reflected in the resulting peace agreement.  Thus, integrity might be 
useful in elucidating the process of interpretation and providing a normative theory on how 
the parties ought to interpret the law.   
As explained in relation to the issue of child soldier accountability, there may be 
many different ways of interpreting the law on the issue.  The international rules that must be 
interpreted are easy enough to locate in empirical terms.  The most relevant for transitional 
criminal justice are international human rights law, international humanitarian law and 
international criminal law.  But the particular synthesis that results from the sum of the legal 
provisions in any particular transition is open to myriad interpretations.  For example, in 
transitional criminal justice, there is an uncertain middle ground between blanket amnesty 
and full criminal accountability wherein States might achieve relatively acceptable 
transitional justice.  On the one hand, the post-Cold War normative environment reflects a 
trend towards justice for victims and survivors.  On the other hand, there is a need to secure 
the fragile constitutional settlement reflected in the peace deal itself.  In these circumstances, 
peace negotiations during transitions can throw up theoretical disagreements on matters of 
post-conflict law when negotiating parties disagree on the political goals of the transitional 
justice measures and indeed the transition itself.91 It is necessary to accept that post-conflict 
law may not be fully explained by a reliance on strict legal positivism.  Among other 
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things, the turn towards soft law and best practices in a variety of areas suggests that States 
themselves are more interested in effective regulation rather than formalism.     
To summarise, the external challenge to a jus post bellum founded on Dworkin’s 
theory may be tempered by a simple adjustment.  In Law’s Empire, Dworkin presented law as 
integrity as a (better) alternative to legal positivism.  However, in post-conflict law, law as 
integrity is not necessarily an overall challenge to international legal positivism.  In 
transitional situations legal positivism is important at the first pre-interpretive stage.  The 
actual ‘raw data’ to be interpreted by negotiating parties must be international legal rules 
founded on State consent.  Thus, legal positivism limits the actual practice involved in 
transitions that falls to be interpreted.  Subsequently, the interpretive stage allows a measure 
of value to enter the system as negotiators wrestle with the dimensions of ‘fit’ and 
‘substance’.  The jus post bellum as an interpretive framework is then a normative theory of 
post-conflict law.  It is a theory which urges parties to think about how the principle of 
integrity affects the interpretation of the applicable law.   
 
4.5 The opposite of integrity in post-conflict law 
 
This chapter ends with an example of how Colombia has failed to follow the principles of 
integrity in the interpretation of post-conflict law.  In a number of recent cases in Colombia, 
trials have been suspended pending the creation of the new Special Jurisdiction for Peace.92  
Defence lawyers have argued that the ordinary justice system is not competent to hear the 
cases against a number of military officers implicated in the ‘false positives’ scandal.93  The 
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scandal came to light in 2008 when 22 men from Soacha disappeared and were found dead 
hundreds of miles away in North Santander province.  The scandal involved the introduction 
of a ‘cash-for-kills’ policy.94  It awarded extra pay and rewards for combat kills but it resulted 
in poor or mentally ill civilians being murdered and passed-off as FARC-EP guerrillas.  In 
suspending the trials, judges have argued that there would be no point in continuing given 
that the cases would end-up in the Special Jurisdiction for Peace.95  Thus, they have failed to 
provide a principled case for the decision.  They have created a legal limbo for victims.  In 
fact, the judges suspending the trials simply cannot know whether the cases will go to the 
Special Jurisdiction for Peace.  It is the Special Jurisdiction itself (once it comes into 
existence) which will decide which cases it takes on.96  Further, the peace agreement 
stipulates that until the Special Jurisdiction for Peace is up and running, ongoing cases should 
continue as normal.97   
Thus, law as integrity provides a language with which to criticize the implementation 
of the post-conflict agreement.  One dimension of law as integrity in post-conflict situations 
involves judges making a principled case for their decisions which shows the legal system in 
its best light according to the principles upon which the Colombian State is founded.  The 
judges may have argued that the principle of reconciliation requires that all cases related to 
the armed conflict be transferred to the Special Jurisdiction for Peace.  This would not 
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necessarily save them from criticism.  It would misread the peace agreement and, in short, the 
false positives scandal is only tangentially linked to the armed conflict.  Those committing 
the killings were incentivised by money and rewards and these were not specifically linked to 
the armed conflict.  Nevertheless, the jus post bellum as integrity suggests that a principled 
argument ought to have been made. 
The reason for this is based on Dworkin’s view on the civic benefits of a legal system 
that follows integrity.  In his view, a system that makes arbitrary decisions on important 
matters of principle would be rejected by most people.  This is the case even if it was ‘fair’ in 
democratic terms.  He demonstrates the point by referring to ‘checkerboard’ statutes.98  For 
example, in the context of Colombian justice, imagine an approach is taken which decided 
the issue of child soldier accountability according to the views of the different regions of the 
Colombian State.  Thus, post-conflict justice could say that those States that voted against the 
peace agreement could prosecute demobilized FARC-EP child soldiers, but those that voted 
in favour of the agreement could not.  In Dworkin’s view, when ‘important matters of 
principle are at stake’ (such as child soldier accountability) the population would reject an 
approach that decided the issue in this way.  This is because in his view, ‘the collective 
decision must […] aim to settle on some coherent principle…’99  In relation to whether a 
child soldier ought to be prosecuted in Colombia, therefore, integrity requires that previous 
legal practice is studied and interpreted (pre-interpretive and interpretive stages).  
Subsequently, justifications for the decision must be made according to the principles of 
Colombian society.  Owing to the fact that Colombia is a post-conflict State, these principles 
should be those embodied and reflected in the peace agreement.  In this regard, the peace 
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agreement ought to be seen as the new constitutional agreement that can be used to set the 
future direction of the post-conflict State.   
4.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has introduced and explained Gallen’s theory of the jus post bellum which is 
based on a version of a Dworkinian legal theory.  It has argued that indeterminacy is a 
characteristic of post-conflict law.  Dworkin’s interpretivism was born out of a need to avoid 
either conventionalism or pragmatism as explanations of judicial decision-making in hard 
cases.  In his view, judges were constrained by past practice, legislation and precedent.  
However, when the conventions were absent or unclear, Dworkin did not think that judges 
simply made rules up.  This would be problematic in terms of the rule of law.   
Pro-active judicial legislation flirts with violating the legal principle of nulla poena 
sine lege.  Neither did Dworkin believe that judges eschewed legal principles in favour of 
their own political views.  The law was more than how judges felt on any particular issue on 
any particular day.  Thus, Dworkin attempts to provide an account of law which places 
judges in hard cases under the constraining power of legal principles.  The question that 
remains is whether a Dworkinian approach to law is ill-suited to the kinds of problems faced 
by post-conflict actors.    
Dworkin’s theory should be relevant to thinking about the correct approach to 
interpretation of post-conflict law.  This chapter has argued that integrity means providing a 
principled justification which aims at coherence in post-conflict law.  This may mean that 
interpretations must aim at purely ‘internal’ coherence with the law and practice of post-
conflict Colombia.  This is Gallen’s point.  But a more comprehensive view is that the 
‘external’ coherence in principle that might be sought with other post-conflict societies is also 





provided of a failure to produce integrity in the Colombian context.  Furthermore, it is 
important to realize that law as integrity is not only relevant to judges. Although in 
Dworkin’s theory the focus is on judges, the transitional criminal justice system in Colombia 
depends on a number of actors including the prosecutor.  Thus, the question of whether a 
child ought to be criminally responsible will only come before judges if a child soldier is 
indicted.  The final point relates to the principles of post-conflict justice which are relevant 
for post-conflict actors.  These principles have been discussed at length in the literature.  
They emerge from an interpretation of previous practice with a view to presenting the 
community legal order as a coherent whole.  The next chapter applies the theory to a specific 
crime committed by a child soldier who falls into the uncertain legal area.  They are aged 
between 14 and 18 and the crimes they have committed are serious.  The next chapter 






CHAPTER 5:  CASE STUDY:  APPLYING THE JUS POST BELLUM AS 
INTEGRITY IN POST-CONFLICT COLOMBIA 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter applies the jus post bellum as integrity to the identification of the law of 
transitional criminal justice in post-conflict Colombia.  It presents a hypothetical ‘hard case’ 
in transitional criminal justice which could potentially come before a prosecutor in post-
conflict Colombia.  This chapter then analyses the jus post bellum as integrity in order to see 
how a Dworkinian approach to the interpretation of post-conflict law might look.  Section 5.2 
provides some context and background information on the Colombian armed conflict and 
events in the peace process to date.  Section 5.3 sets out the hypothetical case.  Section 5.4 
applies the Dworkinian approach to the resolution of the legal question.  In following the 
Dworkinian methodology, it identifies two issues that are problematic from the perspective of 
the jus post bellum as integrity: (i) an internal challenge to ‘law as integrity’ and (ii) an 
external challenge that doubts the normative value of integrity for international law.  These 
challenges are elaborated in more detail in chapter 6.  Section 5.5 makes some concluding 
remarks on how the chief prosecutor in Colombia ought to decide the question in accordance 
with law as integrity. 
5.1.1 Preliminary Remarks 
 
There are a few preliminary points that need to be discussed so that the aims of the chapter 
are made clear.  First of all, this chapter is not intended to provide a direct response to 
Gallen’s theory.  It is not concerned with whether the post-intervention activities of a number 





bellum as integrity’.1  It only evaluates the usefulness of the jus post bellum as integrity in 
relation to a specific concrete issue: identifying the law of transitional criminal justice in 
relation to child soldiers in Colombia.  In this regard, it is committed to a particular view of 
‘usefulness’ which emphasizes the practical utility of the concept from a practitioner’s 
perspective.2  The overall aim is to understand whether the jus post bellum as integrity helps 
those persons tasked with identifying the law in post-conflict societies.  There are other ways 
to think about whether the jus post bellum concept is useful or not.  These are dealt with in 
more detail in chapter 7.   
Secondly, I have presented the issue of child soldier perpetrators as a ‘hard case’ in 
Dworkinian terms.  The justification for this is found in chapter 4.  A Dworkinian theory of 
the jus post bellum suggests that hard cases can be ‘solved’ by interpreting the law according 
to the principle of ‘integrity’.3  In Dworkin’s theory, an all-powerful super-judge (Hercules) 
is tasked with demonstrating how integrity guides interpreters towards the ‘best’ legal 
answer.4  But in post-conflict Colombia, the decision on child soldier accountability may not 
even come before a judge.  It is a matter for the Sala de Definición de Situaciones Jurídicas 
(Chamber for the Identification of Juridical Situations, hereafter ‘Identification Chamber’) 
which forms part of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace.5  The Identification Chamber is part of 
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the Sala de Amnistía o Indultos (Chamber for Amnesties and Pardons).6  In Colombia, the 
composition of this chamber is not yet finalised.  It is expected that a chief prosecutor will be 
appointed soon.  However, no individual has yet been appointed.7  A chief prosecutor may 
decide that no under-18s will be prosecuted in the Special Jurisdiction for Peace.8  In this 
instance, the judges will simply not need to decide anything.  The more important question to 
be decided, therefore, is whether or not a child soldier perpetrator ought to be prosecuted in 
the first place.  This chapter, therefore, focuses on the role of the chief prosecutor and 
evaluates whether the jus post bellum as integrity is a useful guide to the interpretation of 
post-conflict law in Colombia.  The jus post bellum as a Dworkinian concept, suggests that 
there is a right answer to the question that could come before the chief prosecutor.9    
It may be objected that focusing on the chief prosecutor is a misapplication of 
Dworkin’s theory.  After all, Dworkin was concerned with ‘judges in black robes’.10  
However, Dworkin also argued that a ‘more complete’ study of legal practice would include 
a number of legal officials including ‘legislators, policemen, [and] district attorneys’.11  If, as 
Dworkin argued, integrity is a principle in legislation and in adjudication, its relevance in the 
prosecutorial dimension ought not to be discarded.12 There are, of course, important 
differences between the roles of a chief prosecutor and a judge.  Problems and objections to 
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the application of Dworkin’s method to the prosecutor’s task will be considered in chapter 6.  
The key issue for the purposes of this chapter is that the prosecutor in post-conflict Colombia 
will be tasked with interpreting the law.   
Post-conflict law straddles domestic and international legal orders.  It is a 
combination of different international legal categories, i.e. international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law.  But these categories intersect with national law, i.e. the 1991 
Constitution of Colombia and the Colombian Penal Code.  Further, post-conflict law in one 
place may be shaped by conflict resolution strategies found in other post-conflict situations.  
These situations themselves sit uncertainly between international and domestic legal orders.  
This raises a challenge for the purposes of the application of Dworkin’s theory in the present 
context.  The principle of integrity emerges when a community commits to the resolution of 
disagreements according to a coherent framework of principles.  In the present case, however, 
there are two ‘legal communities’ (domestic and international).13  If the concept of integrity 
means different things in each legal order (domestic and international) then there may be a 
problem for the prosecutor in terms of applying the principle.   
If the prosecutor in post-conflict Colombia considers herself primarily as a local 
official, then the relevant framework of principles that need to explain and justify her 
interpretation of post-conflict law are drawn from the Colombian legal order.  She must find 
interpretations of the law which are coherent with the Colombian legal order.  On the other 
hand, if she understands herself as a State representative applying international law, then 
integrity suggests that her interpretation may need to be explained and justified by the 
principles of the international legal order.   
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In this respect, a chief prosecutor in a post-conflict situation is required to fulfil a 
‘split role’.14  She is operating simultaneously in local and international legal order.  This is 
the case for all State officials.  As Antonio Cassese argued, this ‘split role’ means that State 
officials ‘operate in a Dr Jakyll and Mr. Hyde manner, exhibiting a split personality [sic]’.15  
Thus, the jus post bellum as integrity, in order to be truly Dworkinian, may need to explain 
the rules of post-conflict law by reference to principles which explain and justify both legal 
orders.  This suggests that, for the purposes of post-conflict Colombia, national and 
international laws are considered as part of a hierarchical whole.16  This raises a number of 
debates in international law including the question of normative hierarchy in the international 
legal order, and the nature of ‘global law’ in the age of globalization.  However, on a 
Dworkinian reading this presents few problems.  Law as integrity is generally hostile to 
‘departments of law’.17  In relation to the domestic legal order, the division of law into 
contract, tort, administrative law, criminal law etc. is against the general spirit of integrity.  
This is because law as integrity asks judges and other interpreters of law to make it coherent 
as a whole.  Further, in Justice for Hedgehogs, Dworkin commits himself to a theory of value 
which is unified.  For present purposes, this simply means that Dworkin thought that the 
answers to legal and moral questions had to be coherent with one another.  Thus, he may not 
have found it difficult to argue that interpretations of national law and international law had 
to be coherent with each other.  Nevertheless, the fact that the domestic and international 
legal orders are understood by States as separate legal orders cannot be ignored.  This chapter 
does not deal with these issues.  These and other challenges are left to chapter 6.  It only sets 
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out what a Dworkinian approach to the child soldier accountability problem might look like 
in post-conflict Colombia.   
5.2 Historical Context: Colombia and Violence     
 
The interpretation of law does not occur in a vacuum.  Every interpretation of law takes place 
in a particular social and political context.  Therefore, the analysis of integrity will be 
improved by the provision of a necessarily brief and history of conflict in Colombia.18  These 
facts are set out as an attempt to acknowledge the interpretive background information that 
any post-conflict prosecutor will bring to the interpretation of the law.   
Colombia has a long history of violence.  The Spaniards found a modest indigenous 
population of around 3-4 million.  By the time of Colombia’s independence in 1810, this 
number was down to around 130,000.19  After independence, Simón Bolívar, the first 
president of Gran Colombia, tried to unify a vast territory that was controlled by Spain 
(covering contemporary Ecuador, Panamá, Venezuela and Colombia).  Bolívar was opposed 
by elites with particular and regional economic interests.  His defeat, and the end of the vision 
of a unified Gran Colombia, set on course a pattern of conflict that is unparalleled in Latin 
America.   
In the 19th century, Colombia was a country of ‘permanent war’.20  Following 
independence, there were ‘eight general civil wars, 14 local civil wars, countless small 
uprisings, two international wars with Ecuador and three coups d’état’.21 The bloodiest was 
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the Thousand Days War that resulted in over 100,000 deaths and the loss of Panamá.22 
Perhaps for these reasons, it is difficult to agree on the ‘beginning’ of the current conflict 
situation.  The last period of relative tranquillity was between the early 20th century and the 
1929 global economic depression.  In 1915, the memoirist, José María Quijano Wallis (1847 
– 1922) wrote, ‘[m]ay…all Colombians…not lose sight of and not to forget…the awful 
memory of our wars, so that the peace we have enjoyed during the last thirteen years might 
be prolonged indefinitely’.23  Unfortunately, peace did not last long.  Internal uprisings and 
violence resumed in the period following the 1929 depression.  This period of violence has 
continued until the present day.  The recent peace negotiations and the resulting ceasefires are 
reasons for optimism.  Recently, there is evidence that Colombians have become used to 
speaking about their country in post-conflict terms.24  The recent meeting between previously 
bitter enemies (the left-wing FARC-EP guerrilla and the right-wing AUC paramilitary) is a 
further symbol that all relevant parties are committed to a post-conflict Colombia.25  
However, there are also news reports that signal the emergence of spoilers and attempts to 
upset the peace process.26 
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The difficulty in finding a ‘starting point’ to the Colombian conflict is reflected in the 
difficulties in agreeing on why the conflict emerged.27  Wallis wrote in 1915 that Colombia’s 
history of violence was owing to political-economic reasons.  In his view, 
The lack of development of our national wealth and consequent impoverishment of our people has 
led the military caudillos, most of the time, to seek their livelihood and personal aggrandizement 
in the hazards of civil war, or in the intrigue and accommodations of politics.
28
 
In terms of ‘national wealth’, Colombia’s conflict has reflected divergent opinions on 
economic modes of development and, especially, the issue of land ownership.  In the 1920s, 
even during a period of relative stability, Colombia was characterised by peasant revolts and 
the opposition between organised labour and the oligarchic ruling class.  The issue then, as 
now, was ownership of important factors of production, such as land.   
Given that land ownership and redistribution is a prominent part of the peace 
agreement, the story of the current situation might be thought to begin at the end of the 
1920s.29  In this period, the Liberal Party, who had lost the ‘Thousand Days War’, was 
politically defeated and the Conservative Party led the government.   But the 1929 depression 
led to a change of fortunes for the Liberal Party and the emergence of Jorge Eliécer Gaitán as 
a popular ‘man of the people’ figure.  For the Conservative Party, radical caudillos such as 
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Laureano Gómez Castro started to incite violence against the Liberals Party and its 
supporters.30  This marks the slow beginning of a period of conflict known as ‘la Violencia’.31   
In response to the State-led oppression of the Liberal Party movement, on 7 February, 1948, 
Gaitán led a ‘Silent Demonstration’ out onto the streets of Bogotá.  Gaitán gave a ‘Prayer for 
Peace’ speech in front of the presidential palace, wherein he called for the President Mariano 
Ospina Pérez to ‘restore public tranquillity’ to the country.  Gaitán said, 
 
Prevent violence.  We seek the defence of human life, which is the least a people can ask for.  
Instead of this blind and uncontained force, we should make the most of the people’s capability to 
work for the benefit of Colombia’s progress.
32
 
The demonstrators stood and listened in total silence.  A few months later, on 9 April 1948, 
Gaitán was assassinated.  The reaction to his assassination, known as ‘el Bogotazo’, marks 
the beginning of la Violencia.  It is impossible to say how many people died during this 
period between 1948 and 1965.  Estimates range from 250,000 to 300,000.33  In terms of the 
scale of violence, and the reasons for it, la Violencia marks the beginning of the current 
conflict.34  In 1958, the violence ended with the Liberal and Conservative parties forming a 
Frente Nacional (‘National Front’) in the Declaration of Sitges.35 The leaders of these parties 
agreed to alternate the presidency so that socialist parties or candidates were excluded.  The 
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pact was overwhelmingly approved by Colombians in a plebiscite.36 The ‘Sitges pact’ led to 
the emergence of a number of guerrilla movements in the 1960s, including the Ejercito de 
Liberación Nacional (ELN) and the FARC-EP.  These groups began an insurgency against 
the State which then prompted a counterinsurgency movement.  A number of legal and illegal 
paramilitary organisations were formed which fought the FARC-EP, sometimes with State 
support, but at other times supported and financed by powerful economic interests.37  The 
conflict became complicated as different actors became involved.  In the 1980s, cocaine 
production and distribution raised extra income (i.e. US dollars) for all sides of the conflict.  
Different groups became interested in the drug trade but also in legal business interests such 
as mining and palm oil.38  These economic actors would employ paramilitary groups to 
defend their interests and to clear the land of civilians.  After the 1980s, it became difficult to 
separate organized crime activities from ‘legitimate’ rebellion.39 The predation of Colombia’s 
natural resources became as much a reason for the violence as any imagined political 
struggle.40  In the 1990s, a US initiative, ‘Plan Colombia’ ensured that the government 
received millions of dollars in aid.  This money was used by Colombia to fund the 
counterinsurgency which intensified.    
In the 2000s, the creation of the International Criminal Court had a significant impact 
on the armed conflict.41  It led to attempts in Colombia to provide justice for the millions of 
victims of the armed conflict.  Colombia has been under ICC investigation since 2004.42  In 
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2007, Colombia attempted to initiate a transitional justice programme to demobilize the right 
wing paramilitary armies (the AUC).43  Unfortunately, around the same time as the 
demobilization of the AUC (right-wing paramilitary groups), a ‘cash-for-kills’ policy was 
introduced by Defence Minister Camilo Ospina (during ex-President Alvaro Uribe’s 
presidency). This policy awarded extra pay ($1,500) for Colombian Army personnel in 
exchange for evidence of ‘positive combat kills’.44  The details of this policy and its 
disastrous results have been mentioned above (section 4.4).  Civilians were lured by offers of 
employment and driven for hundreds of miles into FARC-EP controlled areas. They were 
executed and dressed in FARC-EP combat uniforms and presented as ‘combat kills’.  
According to one study, which focuses on the links between US Aid and the so-called ‘false 
positives’ scandal, there were over 5,763 extra-judicial executions between 2000 and 2010.45  
The number may be higher.  Many senior commanders in Colombia’s military are implicated 
in this scheme.  There have already been some prosecutions.  Up to February 2016, the 
Colombian courts passed 817 convicting sentences against 961 members of the armed 
forces.46   
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5.2.2 Context and its relevance for the interpretation of post-conflict law 
 
This section has set out the context of the Colombian armed conflict.  The main reason is that 
a chief prosecutor could not decide the legal question in a political vacuum.  All 
interpretations of post-conflict law are subject to the local legal and political context.  Thus, 
any decision on child soldier accountability must take into account that Colombian children 
have been born and raised in a country which has been in a state of perpetual war.47  Context 
is also important insofar as this chapter (and this thesis) can provide policy recommendations 
for those involved in the implementation of transitional criminal justice measures outlined in 
the peace agreement.    
No child soldiers have been indicted for any crimes related to the ‘false positives’ 
scandal.  The Colombian Army does not deploy under-18s, pursuant to Law 548 of 1999.48  
Nevertheless, the history of armed violence and the number of child soldiers involved 
(especially in the FARC-EP) suggest that there will be many cases of child soldier 
perpetrators.  A recent study has identified that 47% of FARC-EP combatants were recruited 
as child soldiers.49  The peace agreement states that international crimes committed by child 
soldiers between 14 and 18 years of age will be studied at a later date.50  It also states that it is 
for the Special Jurisdiction for Peace to decide ‘whether those who were under 18 at the 
moment of the commission of international crimes incapable of amnesty will be exempted 
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from criminal prosecution’.51 The overall question for this thesis is whether the jus post 
bellum as integrity helps the chief prosecutor to identify the correct interpretation of the law 
in this specific situation.  The next hypothetical set of facts is, therefore, presented as a 
plausible situation.  It is supposed to illustrate a broader idea about how a Dworkinian 
approach may look.  It is not supposed to provide a mechanistic account of what is required 
of prosecutors in post-conflict situations dealing with this issue.  At some points, the 
argument will acknowledge weaknesses and objections.  It is not supposed to be an approach 
that solves all potential problems in the interpretation of post-conflict law.  Nevertheless, the 
argument is presented as a picture of a Dworkinian approach to interpretation in post-conflict 
law.  This sets the stage for two central critiques of this approach in chapter 6.  
5.3 Hypothetical case facts  
 
For ease of reference, this section sets out a set of facts involving a hypothetical child soldier 
(Juan) and a hypothetical chief prosecutor at the Chamber for Amnesties and Pardons 
(Ronalda).52    
 
Ronalda is faced with the following set of facts:   
 
On 1 January 2006, a 12 year old male called Juan volunteered to join the FARC-EP 
guerrilla.  His father had been kidnapped and murdered by members of the Colombian Army.  
Juan was from a poor rural area, and he had few socio-economic opportunities.   Many like 
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him had already joined the FARC-EP.  When the guerrillas arrived at his village, he urged his 
mother to let him join the group.  He planned to join the army and receive a salary that he 
could send back to his mother.  When she resisted he escaped and joined the FARC-EP ranks.  
Juan began working as a porter, and then he worked as a spy.  Finally, he was given a rifle 
and he became a child combatant in the FARC-EP.  Naturally, he felt a sense of belonging in 
the guerrilla camps and he was impressed by older members present in the armed group.  In 
2009, Juan was part of a small company of FARC-EP fighters who were ordered to attack 
and take control of a small rural village controlled by the Colombian Army.  Juan was 15.  
They were ordered to establish control over the cocaine manufacturing laboratory.  The 
village was defended by a number of armed forces personnel.  The FARC-EP outnumbered 
them and they were better armed.  The State armed forces were defeated and taken hostage.  
Juan took part in the conflict.  After establishing control, the FARC-EP rounded-up the 
surviving army personnel.  A FARC-EP commander ordered Juan to execute one of the 
soldiers.  Juan executed the detainees.  As the months passed, Juan executed several other 
detainees.  It became a matter of routine.  As he rose through the ranks he ordered other 
younger children to execute detainees.   
 
Juan was a child soldier from 2006 to 2012.   He killed dozens of detainees between 2009 and 
2012 (his age was 15 to 18).  After the recent FARC-EP demobilization process, Juan (now 
22) has turned in his weapon and he is committed to the peace process.  Under common 
Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions, detainees must be treated humanely and cannot legally 
be killed.53  Thus, there is enough evidence to suggest that Juan has committed a war crime 
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contrary to customary international humanitarian law and article 8 (2)(a) (i) of the Rome 
Statute (wilful killing of persons protected by the Geneva Conventions).54   
5.4. A Dworkinian Approach to Criminal Accountability in Colombia 
 
Ronalda must decide how to interpret the law of transitional criminal justice in Colombia as it 
relates to child soldier perpetrators.  This section analyses the method of interpretation as 
implied by the jus post bellum as integrity.  It identifies the rules from which an interpretation 
must be made.  It sets out the principles that best explain and justify the law.  It then applies 
these principles to Juan’s case.    
5.4.1 Ronalda’s method: review of interpretivism  
 
This section sets out a brief review of the interpretive method.  Interpretivism sets out a three-
stage process to the interpretation of law.  Ronalda’s first task is to compile the ‘raw data’ of 
the practice, i.e. that which is relevant for the law of transitional criminal justice.55  This 
means that she must accumulate the history of the law and legal practice from which an 
interpretation must be made.  In the analogy of the chain novel (see section 4.3.3) this part of 
the Dworkinian interpretive method is akin to the reading of the previous chapters of the 
‘chain novel’.56  From a Dworkinian viewpoint, Ronalda must regard herself ‘in deciding the 
new case before [her], as a partner in a complex chain enterprise’.57 Before a new writer in the 
chain can add their chapter they must read the chapters that have been written.  Thus, before 
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Ronalda in Colombia can interpret the law, she must read through the history of the practice. 
As will be seen, this ‘pre-interpretive step’ is difficult to separate from the interpretive stage.   
At the ‘interpretive stage’ Ronalda must interpret the law of transitional criminal justice.  She 
must identify those principles which best explain and justify the law.  Integrity requires that 
she ‘has a responsibility to advance the enterprise in hand rather than strike out in some new 
direction’.58  In terms of the jus post bellum as integrity, Ronalda must look at the law of 
transitional criminal justice and decide ‘what the point or theme of the practice so far, taken 
as a whole, really is.’59  Of course, in a situation where legal rules conflict, there may be more 
than one plausible interpretation of the ‘enterprise in hand’.  This is especially the case when 
the rules of two legal systems are involved (the Colombian and international legal orders).  
Integrity may mean that Ronalda has to find an interpretation of the relevant law that 
demonstrates coherence with the Colombian legal order.  This is Gallen’s suggestion.  
Integrity, however, could also mean that Ronalda should find coherence across national and 
international legal orders.  Insofar as Ronalda is applying international law, this is also a legal 
obligation.  A detailed discussion is left to chapter 6.  
Finally, at the ‘post-interpretive’ stage, the Dworkinian interpretive method turns to 
‘justification’.  Ronalda must decide what the principles that emerge from the practice mean 
when considered in Juan’s case.  She must integrate the different principles in order to 
provide a justification for the decision that she makes.   
Dworkin notes that in reality, interpretation is not as ‘deliberate’ and ‘structured’ as 
this analytical scheme suggests.60  He argues that it is more ‘a matter of “seeing” at once the 
dimensions of [the] practice, a purpose or aim in that practice, and the post-interpretive 
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consequences of that purpose’.61 However, for the purposes of evaluating the usefulness of 
the jus post bellum as integrity, it is useful to follow Dworkin’s analytical approach to 
interpretation in its three-stages.  In this respect, each stage represents a set of questions that 
Ronalda must ask herself.62  The next section applies this interpretive methodology to the law 
and practice of child soldier accountability in post-conflict law.    
5.4.2 The pre-interpretive stage 
 
Ronalda is tasked with deciding whether to prosecute Juan for the crimes he is suspected of 
having committed.  She begins by identifying all of the relevant law on the question of child 
soldier accountability.  Many of the relevant legal provisions have been set out in detail in 
section 3.6.  Ronalda sets out the following table as the relevant rules from which an 
interpretation of the law must be made: 
 
DOMESTIC LAW  INTERNATIONAL LAW  
The Colombian Peace Agreement63 
-Part 5. ‘Agreement on Victims’ 
-Amnesty Law. 
-Joint Communiqué #7064 
The Colombian Peace Agreement 
-Part 5. ‘Agreement on Victims’ 
-Amnesty Law. 
‘Justice and Peace Law’ (Law 975)65 
-Joint Communiqué #70 
                                                                        
61
 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, (Portland, Oregon, Hart Publishing:  2006) 67. 
62
 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, (Portland, Oregon, Hart Publishing:  2006) 239. 
63
 Final Agreement for the End of Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Long Lasting Peace’, (hereafter the Peace Agreement) 
signed on 24 November 2016 and ratified by Congress 1 December 2016.  The full text of the peace agreement is available at:  
http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/procesos-y-conversaciones/Documentos%20compartidos/24-11-2016NuevoAcuerdoFinal.pdf. 
64
 Joint Communiqué #70, Havana, Cuba, 15 May 2016, (Agreement on Minors) available at: 
http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/mesadeconversaciones/PDF/comunicado-conjunto-70-version-ingles-1-1463432344.pdf (last 
accessed 21 June 2017 
65
 Ley 975 de 2005, (25 July 2005), Official Diary, available online at:  https://www.cejil.org/sites/default/files/ley_975_de_2005_0.pdf 





The Colombian Constitution66 
-Article 22  
-Article 44 
-Article 95 
International Human Rights Law 
-UNCRC67 
-American Convention on Human Rights and 
case law of inter-American Court of Human 
Rights68 
The Colombian Penal Code69 
-Law 1098 of 8 November 2008 (especially 
Section II ‘System of Adolescent Criminal 
Responsibility (SACR). 
International Humanitarian Law  
-Article 3 Common to the Geneva 
Conventions 194970 
-Additional Protocol II to the Geneva 
Conventions71  (article 77) 
 International Criminal Law72 
-Jurisprudence of ICTY/ICTR 
 Law and practice of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone 
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-Article 773  
 Customary International Humanitarian Law 
-Rule 13674  
 Law and practice of other post-conflict 
tribunals (East Timor, Bosnia)75 
 Peace Agreement Practice76  
 
 
This is all that is required at the pre-interpretive stage.  Whether she refers to all of these 
sources of law or only some of them is a matter for the interpretive stage.  The weight that 
she affords to the different principles is also a matter for the interpretive stage.  This stage is 
simply a matter of ‘seeing’ the relevant rules.   
Yet, there is a problem with characterizing this stage as ‘pre-interpretive’.  This 
relates to whether this field of law is as easily identifiable as those with which Dworkin’s 
theory was concerned in Law’s Empire.  For example, there may be legitimate disagreement 
about some of these sources as part of the ‘raw data’ of the practice.  There may also be 
legitimate disagreement about whether transitional criminal justice is ‘a practice’ with ‘a 
history’ and whether it includes transitional processes in other post-conflict situations.  To 
some, these situations may clearly fall outside of the Colombian legal system.  As such, there 
would be no legal obligation to even consider these situations.  The charge would be that they 
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are not part of the same ‘chain novel’.  The most that this line of reasoning would admit is 
that a prosecutor may see these other situations as relevant and may look at these other 
situations as part of the history of transitional criminal justice.   
This is, however, an interpretive issue.  Thus, the ‘pre-interpretive’ stage in post-
conflict law is not easily separable from the interpretive.  These and other issues will be left 
to one side for now and discussed in more detail in chapter 6.   Suffice it to say that this thesis 
argues that insofar as all transitional justice situations are bounded by international law, 
whether treaty or custom, then domestic actors are under a duty to interpret the rules in a way 
that is faithful to their provenance.  In order to do this, domestic actors in Colombia, may be 
required to look at the way that other transitional criminal justice situations have interpreted 
the international rules on child soldiering.   
5.4.3 The interpretive stage 
 
Ronalda has identified the relevant law and it is now possible for her to enter the ‘interpretive 
stage’.  The interpretation of the rules requires Ronalda to identify those principles which 
best explain (‘fit’) and justify (‘substance’) the rules themselves.  Dworkinian post-conflict 
law is, therefore, a mixture of the rules and the principles which best explain and justify the 
rules in light of the community’s political morality.77  In this sense, the aim is to identify ‘a 
particular conception of community morality as decisive of legal issues’.78 Further, it urges 
that the closer they achieve a principled coherence between law and the political morality of a 
particular community the better they are interpreting the law.79  
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There are a few caveats that must be mentioned.  This stage does not consider important 
issues of evidence.  It also does not consider whether Juan has any legal defences available to 
him.  For the sake of simplicity and clarity of exposition, this chapter assumes that the 
evidence demonstrates that there is a very good case for a conviction and that issues of 
possible defences are no part of Ronalda’s interpretive task.  The only task for Ronalda is to 
interpret post-conflict law in order to decide whether she should prosecute Juan for his 
crimes.  Further, this chapter assumes that there are voices within Colombia that call for 
Juan’s prosecution.  The point is that this difficult decision cannot be avoided.  This 
assumption appears justified in view of the experiences of other post-conflict societies in 
reintegrating ex-child combatants.  For example, in post-conflict Sierra Leone, the 
reintegration of former child combatants was made difficult in that local communities did not 
always accept that those being reintegrated were blameless victims of the armed conflict.80    
Following the Dworkinian example, Ronalda sets out a number of possible 
interpretations of the law.81   
5.4.3.1 Five interpretations  
 
1. Post-conflict law requires that all child soldier perpetrators over the 
minimum age of criminal responsibility at the time of the alleged crimes 
must be prosecuted. 
2. Post-conflict law permits States to prosecute child soldier perpetrators 
over the minimum age of criminal responsibility. 
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3. Post-conflict law permits States to prosecute child soldier perpetrators 
over the minimum age of criminal responsibility but this is discouraged 
and reserved for those most responsible.  
4. Post conflict law permits States to prosecute child soldier perpetrators 
over 15 but this is discouraged and reserved for those most responsible.   
5. Post-conflict law prohibits all prosecutions of child soldier perpetrators.   
 
After setting out the possible interpretations, Ronalda turns to interpret the previous practice 
to see which of these interpretations best fits the practice.  In the interpretation of the 
previous law and practice, she discovers principles which best explain and justify that law 
and practice.  Not all of these interpretations are consistent with the principles of the practice 
and, therefore, the Dworkinian method requires that they be eliminated.   
Ronalda must find a place to start.  She must decide what part of the previous history 
of transitional criminal justice is most relevant.  She has identified a number of relevant rules 
both domestic and international.  She has also identified a number of post-conflict cases.  
According to Dworkin, Ronalda must make her judgments of ‘fit’ ‘expand out from the 
immediate case before [her] in a series of concentric circles’.82  This feature of Dworkin’s 
interpretive method stems from his concerns with the common-law doctrine of precedent.  In 
Dworkin’s theory, it is called the principle of local priority.  Ronalda decides to follow a 
similar approach.  However, the difficulty is that States have no previous experience of 
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5.4.3.2 Issues of ‘fit’:  the principles of maturity and responsibility 
 
The jus post bellum as integrity suggests that Ronalda could look at previous post-conflict 
situations which exhibit similar elements to the Colombian case. Ronalda finds that the case 
before her finds the most immediate parallel in post-conflict Sierra Leone.  She sees herself is 
in a similar position to that in which Chief Prosecutor David Crane found himself.  There are 
important parallels in terms of the use of child soldiers.  More than 48,000 of the soldiers 
involved in Sierra Leone were children.83 They participated in a non-international armed 
conflict.  The conflict ended in the signing of a peace agreement which led to the 
establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone.  In Colombia, thousands of children 
were involved in the conflict as part of non-State armed groups.  A peace agreement has been 
signed and this has led to the creation of a Special Jurisdiction for Peace, which includes a 
Special Tribunal for Peace.  Ronalda considers that, in so far as she needs to consider the 
post-conflict criminal accountability of children for international crimes, Sierra Leone has 
some useful precedential value with respect to the rules of international law on the issue. She 
may do so, owing to the fact that she wants the Colombian transitional justice situations to be 
coherent as a matter of international law with other transitional justice situations.   
Thus, she finds that article 7 of the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
(SCSL) provided the SCSL with jurisdiction over child soldier perpetrators over 15 years of 
age.84  However, the minimum age of criminal responsibility in Sierra Leone is 14.  The 
setting of 15 as the minimum age of criminal responsibility for the purposes of child soldier 
accountability, suggests that 14 year olds are too young to be prosecuted for the commission 
of international crimes.  This suggests that post-conflict accountability depends on reaching 
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15 years of age at the time of the commission of the international crimes.  Ronalda interprets 
this rule as giving rise to a principle of ‘global transitional justice’:  child soldier 
accountability is subject to a principle of maturity.   
It appears to Ronalda that interpretation (5) can be dismissed.  It prohibits all 
prosecutions of child soldier perpetrators.  It does not appear to ‘fit’ with history of child 
soldier accountability in Sierra Leone.  Ronalda, in following the Dworkinian method, is 
attempting to find coherence in the interpretation of international rules across jurisdictions, 
not only within Colombia.  For her, the case of Sierra Leone demonstrates that international 
law in post-conflict situations does not prohibit prosecutions for child soldiers.  It permits 
States to prosecute the commission of international crimes by under-18s.  Thus, as a matter of 
global transitional justice, interpretation (5) is incorrect. 
Interpretations (1), (2) and (3), therefore, also appear incorrect.   They make reference 
to the minimum age of criminal responsibility.  The minimum age of criminal responsibility 
in Sierra Leone is 14.  However, post-conflict criminal responsibility was raised to 15.  Of 
course, interpretations (1) (2) and (3) may be plausible but only if a post-conflict State has a 
minimum age of criminal responsibility over 15.  In Colombia, the minimum age of criminal 
responsibility if 14.  Therefore, because interpretations (1) (2) and (3) do not fit the practice 
in Sierra Leone, Ronalda believes that she needs a very good reason to consider them as the 
right interpretation.  In this respect, the issue of ‘fit’ can be outweighed by issues of 
‘justification’.   
However, before considering whether there are good reasons to consider the validity 
of these interpretations, Ronalda also finds that in Sierra Leone the chief prosecutor decided 





the international crimes committed during the armed conflict in that country.85  He, therefore, 
refused to indict any child soldier perpetrators.  Thus, there is a discrepancy between the law 
in the books and the law in action.  The prosecutor’s refusal to prosecute in Sierra Leone 
(despite being permitted to act) appears to give rise to a different principle: that transitional 
criminal justice is reserved for those most responsible for the commission of international 
crimes.       
Ronalda has identified two principles.  She thinks that post-conflict law on child 
soldier accountability is founded on the one hand on a principle of maturity.  In Sierra Leone, 
the relevant age was set at 15 which was a year above the minimum age of criminal 
responsibility in the State.  On the other hand, the refusal by the chief prosecutor to prosecute 
any child soldiers can be justified according to the principle of responsibility.  This suggests 
to her that the law on child soldier accountability is based on two interrelated principles.  The 
child must be mature enough to understand the consequences of his actions.  However, at the 
same time, the acts committed by the child must be serious enough for the child to be seen as 
one of those most responsible for the commission of international crimes.   
This is not to deny that there may be other reasons for the decisions not to prosecute 
in Sierra Leone.  The high number of child soldier perpetrators may have made things 
difficult in terms of funding issues.  Further, pressure from NGOs that control reintegration 
programmes can be a significant deciding factor.  International NGOs were against 
prosecution owing to their view that the prosecution of child soldiers would be detrimental to 
their efforts.  These and other issues may explain and justify post-conflict law in Sierra 
Leone.  However, for present purposes, Ronalda tries to find principles that can be used for 
the purposes of deciding the case before her.   
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Ronalda takes another look at the interpretations of the law with which she started.  The fact 
that the prosecutor in Sierra Leone did not prosecute any child soldiers seems to rule out 
interpretation (1) which requires prosecutions of child soldier perpetrators as a matter of 
post-conflict law.  This interpretation does not fit the practice of child soldier accountability 
and, in fact, is diametrically opposed to the precedent set in the closest comparable case. 
Interpretation (5) has already been rejected because the Statute of the SCSL, and the peace 
agreement in Colombia, do not support the view that the prosecution of child soldiers is 
prohibited as a matter of post-conflict law.  Further, there are many rules of international law 
which support the possibility that child soldier perpetrators can be prosecuted. 
Ronalda notes that international human rights law does not prohibit the prosecution of 
children.  Instead, it sets out rules for their protection in the event of prosecution.  For 
example, article 12 of the CRC States that, ‘the child shall be provided with the opportunity 
to be heard in any judicial […] proceedings’.86 Article 40 sets out a range of measures to 
protect children who are prosecuted including the right to be presumed innocent (art. 40 
(2)(b)(i)); the right to a fair trial (art. 40(2)(b)(iii) and the right not to be compelled to give 
testimony (art. 40 (2)(b)(iv)).87  Ronalda finds that all that is required as a matter of 
international human rights law is the ‘promotion’ of a set of laws directed toward the 
protection of children including ‘the establishment of a minimum age of criminal 
responsibility’.88     
Further, in relation to participation in armed conflict, Ronalda notes that international 
human rights law accepts the participation of under-18s.  Article 38(2) CRC asserts that 
States parties ‘shall take all feasible measures’ to ensure under-15s do not take part in armed 
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conflict.89  The particular language of this provision leaves open the participation of under-
15s open as a matter of human rights law.  Further support for this view is found in 
international humanitarian law which sets the minimum age of participation at 15.90 Also, 
international criminal law sets the limit on participation at 15.  Under article 8(2)(b)(xxxvi) of 
the Rome Statute, ‘conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years’ is a war 
crime in non-international (and international) armed conflicts.91  The implication is that those 
aged between 16 and 18 are able to participate in hostilities.  This view is further supported 
by the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY).  In Orić, the defence raised an argument to the effect that children could not be 
prosecuted for war crimes.  This was based on the view that the International Criminal Court 
has no jurisdiction over under-18s.  However, the Tribunal rejected the argument and asserted 
that ‘no such rule exists in conventional or customary international law’.92  Ronalda 
concludes that interpretation (5) simply cannot be supported.   
This is not to say that prosecutions of child soldiers can never be prohibited as a 
matter of post-conflict law.   The parties in Colombia may have decided that 14-18 year olds 
were to be considered as victims and could never be prosecuted.  This would be post-conflict 
law in Colombia and other post-conflict situations could consider whether this is an approach 
they want to follow in terms of the interpretation of international law on point.  Thus, it bears 
repeating, this thesis is not setting out to identify the global law on transitional justice as a 
matter of concrete reality.  It is only presenting what an interpretive approach that focuses on 
integrity could look like.   Coherence with other post-conflict scenarios is a part of such an 
interpretive process with respect to the international rules on the issue. 
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Ronalda decides that interpretations (2), (3) and (4) are the only ones left.  These 
interpretations ‘permit’ but neither ‘require’ nor ‘prohibit’ the prosecution of child soldier 
perpetrators.  They appear as the only possible interpretations.  Ronalda must decide which of 
these interpretations of the law is correct.  She decides to consider the extent to which they 
reflect the principles of responsibility and maturity.  There are two differences between these 
interpretations in this respect.  The first relates to whether prosecuting child soldier 
perpetrators is discouraged.  The second relates to the minimum age of criminal 
responsibility.  Interpretation (2) makes no mention of whether the practice is discouraged.  It 
merely sets out a permissive rule that is subject to a minimum age requirement.  Ronalda 
notes that interpretations (3) and (4) state that the practice is discouraged and they are also 
different in relation to their minimum age requirements. 
Ronalda thinks that each of the two principles identified are reflected in the three 
available interpretations.  However, they reflect different conceptualizations about how these 
principles ought to be integrated.  Interpretation (2) assumes that those over the minimum age 
of criminal responsibility in the post-conflict society can be prosecuted.  But it makes no 
reference to prosecutions being discouraged.  The principle of responsibility is bound up in 
the question of the minimum age.  As long as the perpetrators reach the minimum age, then a 
prosecution is permitted (but not required).  However, Ronalda wants to find coherence 
across transitional justice societies.  She doubts whether this is coherent with the approach in 
Sierra Leone which she assumes had separated out issues of maturity and responsibility.   
Interpretations (3) and (4) assert that prosecutions are to be discouraged.  In order to 
decide, Ronalda must, therefore, examine the practice to identify whether it gives rise to a 
principle that calls for restraint in transitional criminal justice as it relates to child soldiers. 
The most important part of the practice that indicates restraint is the chief prosecutor’s 





crimes.  As mentioned, interpretation (2) fails to separate this requirement from the principle 
of maturity.  Therefore, Ronalda decides that it must be rejected.  The principle of 
responsibility is not simply a matter of reaching the minimum age.  The law requires that the 
prosecutor consider the crimes that have been committed and the corresponding justice 
demands that arise from the commission of these crimes from victims.   
This leaves interpretations (3) and (4).  The difference between these interpretations 
relates to the minimum age of criminal responsibility.  Interpretation (3) makes reference to 
the minimum age of criminal responsibility.  Interpretation (4) sets 15 as the minimum age.   
In Sierra Leone, the minimum age was set at 15 despite the fact that the ordinary criminal 
justice system sets 14 as the minimum age.  This suggests that something important turned on 
setting the age at 15 in Sierra Leone.  Consistency would require that Ronalda identify 15 as 
the minimum age.  However, in order to be sure, she wants to extend her enquiry to see 
which of the two interpretations best resonates with the wider practice of post-conflict justice.  
She begins by looking at other relevant parts of the post-conflict process in Sierra Leone as it 
relates to child soldiers.   
She discovers that in post-conflict Sierra Leone, the UN Secretary-General, Kofi 
Annan Stated that although it was ‘inconceivable that children could be in a political or 
military leadership position […] the gravity and seriousness of the crimes they have allegedly 
committed would allow for their inclusion within the jurisdiction of the Court.’93  Annan 
alluded to serious calls for child soldier accountability from within Sierra Leone.  He stated 
that ‘the Government of Sierra Leone and representatives of Sierra Leone civil society clearly 
wish to see a process of judicial accountability’.94  Also, according to these voices, ‘the 
people of Sierra Leone would not look kindly upon a court which failed to bring to justice 
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children who committed crimes of that nature and spared them the judicial process of 
accountability’.95 Kofi Annan, therefore, declared that those ‘most responsible’ did not 
exclude those between the ages of 15 and 18.96  
Thus, Ronalda notes that setting the age at 15 was supported by the UN Secretary-
General.  She decides that this lends extra support to setting the age of 15 because it reflects a 
broader consensus among States about maturity at this age.  Of course, this is very selective.  
There is other evidence that can be adduced to deny any consensus by States on the question 
of legal maturity.  Therefore, she decides that the correct interpretation is (3).  She thinks this 
interpretation is the best way to continue the story of post-conflict law as it has been told by 
previous prosecutors in her position.  Post-conflict law does not require nor prohibit 
prosecutions.  It permits but discourages prosecutions for those children most responsible 
over the age of 15 at the time of the alleged offences. 
5.4.3.3 Balancing ‘fit’ with ‘justification’ 
  
Ronalda’s interpretation is based on two principles: the principle of maturity and the principle 
of responsibility.  These principles emerge from her interpretation of the law of child soldier 
accountability in Sierra Leone.  But following a Dworkinian approach, Ronalda may think 
that they should also explain and justify ‘the community’s’ legal order.  Ronalda notes that 
post-conflict law straddles two communities: the domestic community (Colombia) and the 
international community.97 Therefore, she tests whether these principles are coherent with an 
account of law and legal practice in domestic law and international law as it relates to 
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children.  In seeking coherence across national and international legal orders Ronalda is 
attempting to pursue the ‘unity of value’ described in Dworkin’s later work.98     
Ronalda first examines the peace agreement in Colombia to see if the principles that 
she has identified explain and justify the rules on children as agreed between the negotiating 
parties.  The agreement reiterates in several places that special attention and protection be 
afforded to children (defined as under-18s).99  The Preamble to the peace agreement asserts 
that the agreement affords special attention to ‘the rights of girls, boys and adolescents’.100  
There are repeated references throughout Part 5 of the agreement (on Victims) that ensure 
that the special needs of children are taken into account in the implementation of any 
transitional justice measures.  She also notes that the parties to the peace agreement have 
been commended by the UN Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed 
Conflict for making sure that the best interests of the child is a guiding principle of the peace 
agreement.101   
Ronalda then examines the rules of the Constitution of Colombia.  Article 44 protects 
children against forms of physical and moral violence.102  Further, the Constitution affirms in 
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article 44 that ‘the rights of children take precedence over the rights of others’.103  This 
suggests a principle that children require special protection.  Children are afforded special 
constitutional rights to ‘life, physical integrity, health and social security…to have a family 
and not be separated from it, [and] instruction and culture’.104  Further, article 45 of the 
Constitution extends the right to ‘protection and integral development’ to adolescents.105 
Ronalda examines the Colombian Penal Code.  The principle that children deserve 
special protection is reflected in the special measures of the Colombian Penal Code that set 
out a special system of juvenile justice.106  This system offers those aged between 14 and 18 a 
special system of juvenile justice designed to ensure that the Colombian criminal justice 
system complies with international human rights norms.  For example, article 140 of the 
System for Adolescent Criminal Responsibility asserts that ‘in cases of normative conflict 
between the provisions in this law and those of other laws, and for all interpretive purposes, 
the judicial authorities must always privilege the superior interests of the child’.107 
Ronalda then decides to consider previous attempts at transitional justice in Colombia.  
She looks at ‘Justice and Peace Law’ (Law 975) which encouraged the demobilization and 
reintegration of the paramilitary AUC forces in 2005.  The law provided that access to the 
amnesties involved in that law were subject to the relevant armed groups handing over to the 
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Colombian authorities all child soldiers recruited into the armed group.108  Failure to do so 
would render the relevant group unable to access the relevant amnesties.  Finally, Ronalda 
considers that children are prohibited from being recruited (voluntarily or compulsorily) into 
the Colombian army until they reach the age of 18 according to Law 548 of 1999.109   
At this stage, Ronalda notes that the domestic legal order in Colombia, insofar as it 
relates to child protection, does not fit with her interpretation of post-conflict law.  The 
domestic legal order tends to protect under-18s.  She thinks that this reflects a principle that 
under-18s attract special consideration and protection.  There is a tension, therefore, in setting 
the minimum age for prosecutions at 15.  Her interpretation of the principle of maturity 
appears not to explain and justify the rest of the domestic legal order which appears to favour 
18 as the relevant age.  Of course, this may, in turn, be explained by reference to principle.  
She may decide that there is a principle which states that the age of maturity depends on the 
issue in question.  A child at 16 may be permitted to smoke, at 18 marry but be tried for a 
criminal offence at 10.  Thus, she may decide that her interpretation is not deficient.  
Nevertheless, a line of reasoning must be taken.  Ronalda decides that Colombian law usually 
sets 18 for the age of maturity and that this is in conflict with her setting the age of 
prosecution at 15. 
In order to decide how the principle of maturity should be understood, Ronalda looks 
at the international legal order.  Ronalda, as a Dworkinian prosecutor, is attempting to find 
coherence across different systems and categories in considering transitional justice from a 
global perspective.  She is unconstrained by legal ‘departments’ and thinks that 
interpretations of Colombian post-conflict law must be coherent with the interpretations of 
international law in other transitional situations.  The peace agreement states that the law of 
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transitional criminal justice in Colombia is based on domestic and international law.  Further, 
in relation to their criminal accountability, the 2016 Amnesty Law attached to the peace 
agreement states that it is up to Ronalda to ‘decide whether those who were under 18 at the 
moment of the commission of international crimes incapable of amnesty, will be exempted 
from criminal prosecution, in conformity with the principles adopted by the UN in this field 
(my translation and emphasis)’.110  The reference to the UN is important.  Ronalda interprets 
this as a provision which indicates that she must seek to integrate the principles which justify 
her interpretation and the relevant rules of the international legal order as they relate to child 
soldiers.  She sees a parallel between her interpretation and the rules of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone.  Article XXX of the Sierra Leone peace agreement states that the special needs 
of child soldiers would be dealt with by the ‘international community’, through the Office of 
the ‘UN Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict, UNICEF and other 
agencies’.111 Of course, there may be other ways to explain and justify the reference to the 
UN in the peace agreements.  Parties to a non-international armed conflict often turn to a 
neutral third party to broker the deal that is made.   
Ronalda asks whether her interpretation fits with the international legal order.  If it 
does, then the principle of maturity as it is reflected in domestic and international legal orders 
would appear to be in conflict.  This may mean that, as a Dworkinian, she would then need to 
find a way of overcoming the conflict according to principle.  She may need to find a higher 
principle that justifies the apparent inconsistency.  It is a personal concern on the part of 
Ronalda to make her interpretation coherent with other transitional justice situations.  If her 
interpretation does not ‘fit’ the international legal order, she could then doubt her 
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interpretation of the law.  She may then need to adjust her interpretation so that it explains 
and justifies the domestic and international legal orders.  She finds that her interpretation 
cannot be right on a Dworkinian approach if it conflicts with both orders.   
Ronalda turns first to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).  This sets 
out a number of rules which can be justified by the principle that under-18s attract special 
protection. Article 3 of the Convention affirms the most important rule: that ‘in all actions 
concerning children…the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.’112    She 
the notes other relevant rights: the right to non-discrimination (art. 2); the right to life, 
survival and development (art. 6); the right to be heard (art. 12) and dignity (art. 40(1) which 
includes ‘promoting the child’s reintegration and the child assuming a constructive role in 
society’.113 These rules appear to reflect a principle that 18 is the relevant age of maturity. 
Ronalda then decides to check other international norms on the issue.  She considers 
the ‘Beijing Rules’ (see section 3.6.2).114  Although these rules are not ‘binding’ on Colombia 
in a formal sense, Ronalda interprets these rules as indicative of an emerging norm that 
under-18s require special protection in all matters.  Her view is supported in the signing by 
Colombia of the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict 
(OPAC) which declares that non-State armed forces ‘should not, under any circumstances, 
recruit…persons under the age of 18 years’.115 The emerging rule that she identifies is also 
supported by a great number of international NGOs that form the ‘straight-18’ movement.116 
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Ronalda also notes that neither the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) nor the International Criminal Tribunals Rwanda (ICTR) had jurisdiction over 
persons less than 18 years of age.  She considers whether other post-conflict courts permitted 
the prosecution of under-18s.  She notes that the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia (ECCC) were set up for the purposes of trying the ‘senior leaders of Democratic 
Kampuchea’ and ‘those who were most responsible for the crimes and serious violations’ 
during the period from 1975 to 1979.117  Although the language of the Statute does not 
discard the possibility that child soldiers will be prosecuted each of the five persons 
prosecuted so far have been senior leaders of the Khmer Rouge.118  Ronalda surmises that it is 
highly unlikely that child soldiers will be brought to trial.   She thinks this information is 
persuasive from the perspective of principles of ‘international transitional justice’.119  
So far, the review of the principle of maturity in the international legal order appears 
to favour 18 as the age of maturity.  This suggests that Ronalda’s interpretation is wrong.  
She considers whether to change her interpretation of the law.  It now appears that in order to 
explain and justify the domestic and international legal orders, her interpretation of the 
principle of maturity ought to reflect 18 as the appropriate age.  Her interpretation of post-
conflict law appeared suitable when she only considered post-conflict Sierra Leone.  
However, a principle of maturity that sets 15 as the minimum age of criminal responsibility 
cannot be said to explain a number of relevant rules from domestic and international law.  
These rules reflect a principle of maturity that sets 18 as the relevant age for protection.  The 
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point is that Ronalda’s interpretation no longer adequately explains and justifies the political 
morality of domestic and international communities.       
Ronalda decides to explore further.  She considers that there may be a difference 
between a general principle of maturity and the principle of maturity as it arises in transitions.  
In order to discover whether this is the case she looks at a number of other post-conflict 
situations.  She notes that the Bosnian War Crimes Chamber has jurisdiction over individuals 
who have attained the age of 14.120  In East Timor, the Special Panel for Serious Crimes has 
jurisdiction over 12 year olds.121  As cases of post-conflict law, she notes that the principle of 
maturity in these cases strongly contrasts with the general principle of maturity as reflected in 
the international legal order.   
However, Ronalda notes that in Bosnia and East Timor, there have been (almost) no 
prosecutions.  Only one child has been prosecuted, albeit, not for war crimes.122  Therefore, 
Ronalda reaches two conclusions.  The first is that the principle of maturity is subject to 
different understandings in different post-conflict societies.  The second is that there appears 
to be a general disparity between a legal power to prosecute and a reticence to use that power.  
In each of the cases that she has considered, Sierra Leone, Bosnia and East Timor, the 
principle of maturity appears to have been interpreted differently by those who negotiated the 
Statutes for the post-conflict courts and those tasked with prosecuting.  The same pattern 
appears in the Colombian peace agreement which asserts that the prosecutor will decide on 
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the issue of criminal accountability of child soldier perpetrators between the ages of 14 and 
18.123   
Ronalda thinks there is something important about the discrepancy between the law as 
it appears in the statutes in post-conflict courts, and the general refusal of prosecutors to 
prosecute children.  She thinks that this is not reflected in her interpretation of the law.  It is 
something other than the principles of maturity and responsibility.  She must find a way of 
reconciling her interpretation with the principles which best justify the rules of the domestic 
and international legal orders.  The principle of maturity has been interpreted in different 
ways in different contexts.  Some rules in each order reflect the fact that maturity is attained 
at 15.  Other rules reflect the principle that maturity is only attained at 18.  Ronalda thinks 
this tells her something important about the principles upon which post-conflict law is based.   
Ronalda interprets the foregoing as evidence that another principle which was missing from 
her earlier analysis:  the principle of local ownership over the issue of child soldier 
accountability.  Ronalda thinks that this principle explains and justifies the diversity in 
approaches.  Of course, there may myriad other reasons.  Chief among these is the fact that 
different post-conflict societies are subject to different domestic legal regimes.  However, in 
attempting to distil a coherent picture of ‘post-conflict law’ Ronalda assumes that there is a 
principled reason.  For the purposes of this chapter, these other reasons for the discrepancy 
are left to one side.  
5.4.3.4 The principle of local ownership 
 
Ronalda declares that local ownership means that transitions from conflict to peace must 
respond to the needs of local populations.  This could mean that post-conflict law in 
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Colombia needs to be interpreted according to the needs of Colombians.  This principle 
justifies the domestic legal order insofar as the peace process is primarily for the benefit of 
Colombian citizens.  It must respond to their needs in the same way that the Colombian legal 
order is directed at their rights and responsibilities.  However, Ronalda also tries to extend the 
Dworkinian reading so that this new principle also explains and justifies the international 
legal order.   
Ronalda looks for support for this new principle.  She finds that it is also reflected in 
the central rule upon which the entire international legal order is founded: the principle of 
sovereign equality.124 The principle of sovereign equality is further reflected in article 2(7) 
which states that ‘nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the UN to intervene 
in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State.’125  Ronalda 
concludes that the principle of local ownership in transitions is a reflection of a more general 
principle that represents the foundation of the international society of States.126   
Ronalda has identified three principles that explain and justify the law of transitional 
criminal justice in relation to child soldier perpetrators.  The principle of maturity is reflected 
in the requirement that a minimum age of criminal responsibility is set.  Every post-conflict 
situation reflects this principle in rules that do not allow the prohibition of child soldier 
perpetrators below a certain age.  However, there is also a further principle of responsibility 
which reflects the fact that, for the most part, prosecutors have not used the permission to 
prosecute.  This is because, as children, post-conflict prosecutors have not thought that they 
represent those most responsible for the commission of atrocities.  Thus, Ronalda sees this as 
meaning that the principle of maturity is tempered by a principle of responsibility.  This is 
                                                                        
124 
UN Charter, (signed 24 October 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, art. 2(1). 
125
 UN Charter, (signed 24 October 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, art. 2(7). 
126
 On the concept of international society see Andrew Hurrel, ‘Vattel: Pluralism and its Limits’ in Ian Clark and Iver B. Neumann (eds.) 
Classical Theories of International Relations (London, Macmillan Press Ltd: 1999) 233; Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society – A Study of 





supported by the fact that international law generally sets 18 as the minimum age of 
protection for children.  Any divergence from this approach, though permitted, appears to be 
discouraged.  In terms of the minimum age of criminal responsibilities, and the fact that 
prosecutors have not generally prosecuted child soldiers, Ronalda has found that the principle 
of local ownership must also be added to the post-conflict interpretive framework.  Every 
post-conflict situation will give rise to different post-conflict constitutional settlements.  For 
this reason, the decision to prosecute or not is ultimately one for the post-conflict society 
itself.  This principle reflects the fact of an international system of States that respect each 
other’s sovereignty over domestic matters. 
Ronalda must think on how these principles are reflected in her interpretations of the 
law.  She is aware of the need to balance the three principles.  She needs to choose an 
interpretation of the law which can integrate the three different principles:  the principle of 
maturity, the principle of responsibility, and the principle of local ownership.   Ronalda also 
notes that, in a general way, the need for a balanced and integrated approach gives rise to a 
new principle: the principle of proportionality. 
5.4.3.5 The principle of proportionality 
 
Before turning to consider the case at hand, Ronalda thinks she should attempt to integrate 
and balance the principles together.  She identifies a trend towards accountability in post-
conflict justice.  She notes that peace agreements can no longer ensure impunity for 
previously ‘at-war’ military elites.127  The emergence of an international criminal court, and 
international humanitarian law, prescribe a duty to punish international crimes committed by 
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those who participate in armed conflict.128  At the same time, she notes that the practice of 
post-conflict amnesties is also permitted (see section 3.2.1).  In Spain, Mozambique, El 
Salvador and Colombia, amnesties are a conflict resolution tool which provides security for 
cease-fires and the end of armed conflicts.  Thus, Ronalda notes the development of a 
middle-course in transitional justice which interprets ‘accountability’ in a way that allows 
former fighters to lay down their weapons.   
In attempting to steer a middle-path between accountability and amnesty, Ronalda 
identifies a principle of proportionality in post-conflict law.  Ronalda notes that in Colombia, 
the ‘Justice and Peace Law’ (Law 975) provided an example of a proportional response to the 
requirements of justice and peace.129  In an attempt to demobilize the paramilitary AUC 
forces, the Colombian law asserted that its aims were to ‘facilitate the peace process’ and the 
‘reintegration of individuals’ as well as to ‘guarantee the rights of victims to truth, justice and 
reparations’.  Thus, in exchange for coming forward and confessing their crimes, individuals 
were able to access ‘alternative punishments’ which indicated a deprivation of liberty of 
between 5 and 8 years.130  This proportional approach to transitional justice is reflected in the 
present peace agreement rules.  The Colombian peace agreement constructs an elaborate and 
innovative system that provides for a system of ‘limited justice’.  It encourages fighters to 
demobilize and confess to their crimes in exchange for a lenient sentence with limited 
deprivation of liberty.  Ronalda interprets this approach as giving rise to a principle that post-
conflict law must be proportional between the demands of peace and the demands of justice.  
Of course, this need not be expressed as a principle of post-conflict law.  It is also very much 
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a practical necessity.  The very point of transitions may be damaged by a rigid adherence to 
criminal justice.  Thus, as May has argued, transitions tend to give rise to situations where 
achieving anything is only possible if everyone accepts that they need to compromise.  
Nevertheless, in expressing this as a principle, Ronalda hopes that it will be useful in 
resolving Juan’s case.   
Ronalda sees the principle of proportionality reflected in the rules on juvenile justice 
in Colombia. The requirements for criminal justice are balanced with the requirements of 
child protection.  For example, the System for Adolescent Criminal Responsibility (SACR) is 
based on pursuing three inter-related aims:  restorative justice, truth, and reparations for the 
wrong committed.131  This indicates that the system is based on a proportional response to the 
crime and punishment.  For this reason, under-18s in Colombia subject to the SACR are tried 
in private in order to avoid ‘psychological damage to the child’ and any deprivation of liberty 
is founded on the need to re-educate and achieve ‘pedagogic’ aims.132   
Ronalda notes that the principle of proportionality is also reflected in rules of the 
international legal order.  Proportionality is an ubiquitous standard in the doctrinal approach 
to legal reasoning that suggests it is a general principle of law and, therefore, a rule of 
international law by virtue of article 38 (1) (c) of the Statute of the ICJ.133  From the 
perspective of criminal justice, Ronalda interprets the principle as requiring that the power of 
the State is exercised ‘in a way which is suitable to achieve the purpose intended’.134 Further 
it ought not to ‘impose burdens or cause [disproportionate] harm to other legitimate 
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interests’.135  This principle of proportionality is also reflected in the use of restorative justice 
measures such as truth and reconciliation commissions as a way of providing for truth, justice 
and accountability.136  The peace agreement in Colombia also provides for a new truth and 
reconciliation commission indicating a commitment to restorative justice.137  The alternative 
punishments in Colombia are subject to the individuals telling the truth about what happened 
and their involvement in the atrocities committed.  This approach is thought to partly satisfy 
the rights of victims to justice in a context where full criminal retribution may not be feasible 
for a number of reasons.138 
5.4.3.6 Integration: the overarching principle of peace 
 
The principle of peace seeks to balance the principle that States have the right to decide how 
to proceed in post-conflict situations with the principles of maturity and responsibility 
identified earlier.  This principle explains and justifies a great part of the law and practice of 
domestic and international legal orders as they relate to children.  It represents an approach to 
child soldier accountability based on the principle of proportionality.  It explains and justifies 
her interpretation of post-conflict law.  It is also reflected in the domestic law of Colombia 
and the international legal orders.139  Ronalda now looks for a principle which justifies her 
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approach to post-conflict law, domestic law and international law.   This principle will 
necessarily be very abstract.  She decides that her interpretation of the law, the peace 
agreement, the domestic and international legal orders are best explained and justified by the 
principle of peace.  
She wonders whether the principle of peace fits with the post-conflict legal order.  
Ronalda interprets the peace agreement as the signal that Colombia intends to construct a 
‘community of principle’ and move away from open political conflict.  This is a sign that it 
endorses the principle of peace.  Ronalda interprets the peace agreement, therefore, as a break 
with the past.  It represents a commitment to compromise.  She sees it as a commitment to 
working through political differences according to a scheme of coherent principles.  This 
ensures that every citizen is afforded ‘equal concern’.140  The peace agreement is, therefore, a 
blueprint for the future development of the new political community.  The ‘Introduction’ to 
the peace agreement declares that the agreement aims to ‘open a new chapter’ in Colombia’s 
history.141 It invites ‘all parties, social and political movements and all live forces in the 
country’ to agree to a ‘National Political Agreement’ which is tasked with implementing 
peace in Colombia.142  The fact that the agreement was adopted, therefore, reflects a 
commitment on the part of the government and the FARC-EP to peace rather than armed 
conflict.  The very existence of the peace agreement, therefore, is interpreted as Ronalda as 
demonstrating a commitment to a principle of peace.    
This principle ‘fits’ other rules in domestic law.  It is reflected in certain provisions of 
the Colombian constitution.  Article 22 of the Constitution sets out the following rule:  ‘Peace 
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is a right and a duty with which compliance is mandatory’.143  Article 95 (6) of the 
Constitution states that every citizen must ‘strive toward achieving and maintaining peace’.144  
Further, and in relation to children, article 44 of the Constitution protects children against ‘all 
forms of…physical and moral violence’.145   
Finally, the principle of peace is reflected in certain rules of the international legal 
order.  Ronalda looks at the UN Charter (UN Charter).  In article 1, the Charter sets out the 
purposes of the organization which are to ‘maintain international peace and security’.146 
Article 4 of the Charter asserts that membership is open to ‘peace-loving’ States. Ronalda, 
therefore, concludes that the peace agreement, the Constitution of Colombia and the UN 
Charter are all founded on a principle of peace.  Ronalda concludes that this principle 
explains and justifies her approach to child soldier accountability.  It explains and justifies 
each of the three principles identified earlier in her analysis.  Further, on Dworkin’s account, 
a community of principle is also a pre-requisite to the emergence of the principle of integrity.  
Dworkin argues that ‘people are members of a genuine political community only when they 
accept that they are governed by common principles’ and that people in this kind of 
community,  
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…each accept political integrity as a distinct political ideal and [treat] the general acceptance of 




5.4.3.7 Summary of interpretive stage  
 
Ronalda has followed an approach that self-consciously looks for principles that justify the 
post-conflict law on child soldier accountability.  Her approach has allowed her to identify 
the following principles which she takes to be the foundation of a ‘global law of transitional 
justice’ as it relates to child soldier accountability. 
i) The principle of maturity 
ii) The principle of responsibility 
iii) The principle of local ownership  
iv) The principle of proportionality 
v) The principle of peace 
 
These principles are taken as the foundation upon which post-conflict law in Colombia is 
constructed.  They provide a view of the Colombian legal order that reflects a commitment to 
a community that is based on principles.  They are also reflected in rules of the international 
legal order.   
In identifying those principles supported by rules in each legal order, Ronalda has 
attempted to implement the peace agreement which states that the rules of domestic and 
international law are relevant.  In this regard, she has performed a split role in constantly 
considering how her interpretation of the rules in the domestic order fit with her interpretation 
of the rules in the international order and vice-versa.   On a Dworkinian account, Ronalda 
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seeks to find a compromise between these different principles in a way that makes the post-
conflict system as a whole appear coherent.  Ronalda strikes the following compromise 
between the principles in the interpretation of the post-conflict law in Colombia:    
Post-conflict law permits the prosecution of child soldier perpetrators.  However, the prosecution 
of children will almost never be justified and is reserved for those most responsible for the 
commission of international crimes.   
Ronalda decides to ‘flesh out’ the requirements of this principle as it applies in Colombia.   
 
1. Post-conflict law in Colombia permits the prosecution of child soldiers who are at 
least 15 years of age at the time of the commission of international crimes. 
2. The prosecution of 15 – 18 year olds must be pursued as a last resort and only in 
relation to child soldiers in leadership positions and/or those ‘most responsible’ for 
the commission of international crimes. 
3. The prosecution of 15 – 18 year olds is subject to trials in private and through a 
separate juvenile justice court which ensures safeguards for child soldier defendants. 
4. If found guilty, the punishments for 15 – 18 year olds other forms of deprivation of 
liberty are permitted but they must be proportional to the re-integrative and 
rehabilitative aims and respond to the best interests of the child. 
5. If found guilty, punishments for international crimes committed between 15 and 18 
years of age will be proportionate as between the rights of victims to justice and 
reparation and the mitigating factors involving the young age of the offenders. 






6. For lesser offenders, full participation and confession in the Colombian Truth and 
Reconciliation commission is sufficient for the purposes of satisfying the rights of 
victims to justice and attracting post-conflict amnesties. 
5.4.4 The post-interpretive stage 
 
Ronalda has interpreted the law and practice of transitional criminal justice.  She must now 
apply the principles to decide Juan’s case.148  This is what Dworkin calls the ‘reforming’ 
stage.149  It requires Ronalda to think about the consequences of her interpretation.  She must 
decide what her interpretation means for Juan’s case.  According to Dworkin, this stage 
requires Ronalda to think substantively about which principles actually do show the practice 
of post-conflict law in Colombia in its best light.   Consistency would seem to require that the 
Ronalda refrain from prosecution.  In Dworkinian terms, integrity is linked to consistency in 
principle.  Integrity demands more.  It allows Ronalda to depart from past decisions in order 
to be faithful to ‘principles conceived as more fundamental to the scheme as a whole’.150   
The facts show that Juan volunteered to join the FARC-EP at a young age.  However, 
they also provide details about his motivation at this time.  There are a number of reasons for 
why he joined.  He was motivated by the desire to improve the economic position of his 
mother.   He was motivated by the desire to follow others in his situation that had gone before 
him into the FARC-EP.  He was motivated out of a desire for revenge for his father’s death.  
He was motivated out of a desire to leave his own socio-economic poverty.  All of these 
reasons must be considered in assessing Juan’s willingness to join a rebel group.  There is no 
single reason that Juan joined the guerrilla. However, Ronalda considers that it cannot be 
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easily assumed that a life in the guerrilla was what he wanted.  It may be that there was little 
alternative and this is a problem in terms of Juan’s moral agency.  This must be taken into 
account when considering Juan’s crimes and the principle of responsibility.  
He committed war crimes while he was between the ages of 15 and 18.  Ronalda 
reflects that whether he is to be prosecuted for these crimes or not is a question of looking at 
whether Juan was one of those ‘most responsible’ for crimes committed.  Ronalda notes that 
Juan’s incorporation into the FARC-EP is problematic owing to his educational and socio-
economic circumstances.  The only issue that raises a question of responsibility is his 
participation as a ‘leader’ when he was older.   The crimes he committed at 15 appear to fall 
below the threshold required in terms of responsibility. The evidence shows that he was a 
young member of the rebel forces.  However, as he grew older, he came to order executions 
as he rose through the ranks.  The question for Ronalda, therefore, is what the principle of 
responsibility requires in this context.  It might be that the nature and number of his crimes as 
a leader suggests that there is scope for prosecuting Juan for these later crimes.  In ordering 
other recruits to commit war crimes, he may have crossed the threshold of responsibility.  
However, this view must be tempered by the fact that Juan would have been in the rebel 
forces for over three years at this point.  He may have been socialized into the roles assigned 
to him.  As a spy, and a porter, he would have complied with orders from superior command.  
As a leader of a number of younger recruits, he would also have felt obliged to comply.  
Therefore, even if ‘a’ leader of some, this need not necessarily set him out as ‘most 
responsible’ for the crimes.  The leaders of the FARC-EP command, Juan’s superiors, those 
in charge of strategy and tactics may be ‘most responsible’ for the purposes of the law.   
In considering Juan’s case, Ronalda notes that neither Juan, nor his family, has ever 
known peace.  She notes that post-conflict law is based on a principle of peace.  Thus, any 





sense, transitional criminal justice is aimed at ‘peace’ and must be instrumental to that end.  
Thus, Ronalda must also consider whether Juan’s prosecution would likely affect his ability 
to reintegrate.  A proportional approach to punishment requires that accountability is 
tempered by the principle of peace.  Ronalda thinks that although Juan was young he has 
committed crimes that cannot attract amnesties.  In deciding to prosecute Juan, Ronalda 
hopes that he will fully atone and confess his crimes in order to access the regime of 
alternative sanctions.151  This reduces any sentence that he may attract to a maximum of eight 
years.152  The appropriate sanction, however, must be proportional.  The sentence is likely to 
be far less given the various extenuating circumstances.  Thus, the main aim in prosecuting 
Juan need not be retribution.  It may be that it is the easiest way for Juan to reintegrate with 
the communities he left as a 12 year old. 
However, prosecution also brings special consequences.  If Juan reneges on the peace 
agreement, he will be open to the ordinary criminal justice system.  Juan is no longer a child.  
His prosecution need not be subject to safeguards.  The requirements in relation to a special 
juvenile justice system no longer apply to him so Ronalda decides to investigate and 
prosecute Juan in the Special Tribunal for Peace.  This allows Juan an opportunity to access 
the alternative sentences as set out in the peace agreement.  The law asserts that restorative 
justice methods ought to be preferred as these are most conducive to reconciliation and the 
establishment of peace.153   
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5.4.5 Summary of post-interpretive stage   
 
Ronalda has decided that post-conflict law requires her to prosecute Juan in the Special 
Jurisdiction for Peace.  This is because it allows for a limited form of justice and the best 
opportunity for peace.  It provides victims with a full account of what occurred to their 
partners and loved ones.  It fosters a culture of openness and accountability in post-conflict 
Colombia.  Above all, the limited form of justice allows for a rejection of impunity for 
international crimes while at the same time supporting the joint commitment by military 
elites in the government and the FARC-EP to peace.    
5.5 Conclusion 
 
This hypothetical exercise demonstrates what an approach to the jus post bellum as integrity 
could look like in a concrete case.  As a methodology, it may be useful to try to interpret the 
law as based on principles.  Integrity may urge post-conflict actors to consider certain 
questions at every stage of the interpretive process.  It may urge an interpreter to ask herself 
how her interpretation of the law explains and justifies other rules of the legal order.  It also 
may suggest an approach that requires an interpreter to ask herself whether the system as a 
whole can be justified by reference to the specific approach taken.  Thus, an approach based 
on integrity could try to ‘unify’ the values and purposes of the legal system under a single 
analytical methodology.  In this example, this method was also extended to cover coherence 
across national and international legal orders.  As explained, a Dworkinian approach means 
that there is a legal obligation to find coherence within Colombia and, insofar as international 
law is concerned, across post-conflict societies.  The discussion, therefore, raises several 
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questions.   These may affect the overall decision on the usefulness of the jus post bellum as 
integrity.   
The first doubt takes the shape of an ‘internal objection’.154  This is the idea that 
integrity must also be interpreted and, therefore, that it cannot ‘guide’ interpretations in the 
way which is implied by a Dworkinian jus post bellum.  This chapter has applied the jus post 
bellum in order to see the shape of the interpretive exercise.  However, at every stage of the 
discussion, Ronalda was tasked with interpreting what integrity required.  This objection 
suggests that Ronalda’s approach would always necessarily comply with the jus post bellum 
as integrity because she would always assume her interpretation would be the best in terms of 
the interpretive community of which she is a part.155 This objection emerges out of Stanley 
Fish’s criticism of Dworkin’s theory of interpretation.  Whether Fish’s critique is successful 
is evaluated in the next chapter.  As will be seen, the position advocated in this thesis is a 
purely Dworkinian line that rejects Fish’s critique. 
The second objection is ‘external’.  It argues that whatever the merits of Dworkin’s 
theory as a matter of domestic law, it is unsuited to post-conflict law.  Ronalda’s presentation 
of a coherent account of domestic and international law is necessarily selective.  It 
presupposes that there is an international community which has a political morality against 
which her interpretations can be tested.  The jus post bellum as integrity asks Ronalda to 
imagine that she can balance domestic and international legal orders in a way that makes 
them appear coherent from the perspective of a universal political morality.  If either of these 
objections is valid, then the usefulness of the jus post bellum as integrity must be doubted.  In 
this regard, this thesis will have shown that two very different theories of the jus post bellum 
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are unhelpful from the perspective of identifying post-conflict law.  This would lead to the 
conclusion that the concept of the jus post bellum is not useful and that the attention it has 





CHAPTER 6:  INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL OBJECTIONS TO THE JUS POST 




The previous chapter applied the jus post bellum as integrity to a hypothetical concrete case 
that could arise in post-conflict Colombia.  The point was to discover what a Dworkinian 
approach to the interpretation of post-conflict law may look like.  Ronalda’s interpretation of 
the law and practice relevant to child soldier perpetrators identified a number of principles.  
These principles were selected as the best explanation of and justification for the rules on 
child soldier perpetration in domestic and international legal orders.  For Ronalda, these 
principles are as much a part of ‘post-conflict law’ as the posited rules of Colombian law, the 
provisions of the peace agreement, and the relevant international treaties on human rights and 
humanitarian law.  Therefore, the principles could be used to interpret the requirements of 
post-conflict law in view of Juan’s case.  In this way, the jus post bellum as integrity 
demonstrated a path out of rule-fragmentation.1 It provided a way to interpret the various 
rules that showed the law to be coherent with a conception of political morality that honours 
the domestic and international legal orders.  However, it would be premature to conclude that 
the way Ronalda carried out her task proves that the law on child soldier perpetrators can be 
identified by the jus post bellum as integrity.  This chapter focuses on two objections to the 
jus post bellum as integrity which the previous chapter hinted at but did not discuss in any 
detail.  It evaluates these objections in order to come to a conclusion about the usefulness of 
the jus post bellum as integrity.   
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The first is an ‘internal objection’.2  It is internal because it challenges the validity of 
Dworkin’s theory of ‘law as integrity’ per se.  It is based on Fish’s objection to the role that 
the concept of integrity plays in legal interpretation.  For Fish, Dworkin is wrong in arguing 
that integrity can ‘guide’ interpretations of law.  Therefore, this internal objection argues that 
the jus post bellum as integrity cannot help Ronalda to identify the law.  Section 6.2 evaluates 
the internal objection.  It argues that although Fish’s arguments are a serious challenge to 
Dworkin’s thesis, the idea that power is the sole arbiter of ‘correct’ interpretations of law is 
not accurate, nor desirable in normative terms.  
The second is an ‘external objection’.  It is external because it does not challenge 
Dworkin’s theory of ‘law as integrity’ but only the extent to which it can be useful in terms of 
identifying post-conflict law.  As explained, post-conflict law is a mixture of two legal 
orders.  Dworkin’s theory links particular interpretations of the law to the political morality 
of a community.  Thus, this objection focuses on what is presupposed by the jus post bellum 
as integrity: an international ‘community of principle’.  Section 6.3 evaluates the external 
objection.  Section 6.4 makes some concluding remarks on the practical usefulness of the jus 
post bellum as integrity.   
6.2. Internal objection:  The role of integrity in interpretations of law 
 
This section discusses the debate between Dworkin and Fish on the nature of legal 
interpretation.  It then evaluates the consequences of this debate for the jus post bellum as 
integrity and Ronalda’s approach in chapter 5.   
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Dworkin and Fish agreed that law is an interpretive concept.3  They agree that what the law is 
in relation to any issue is not simply explained by reference to a set of posited rules (see 
chapter 4).  Instead, they argue that propositions of law are always interpretations of the 
community’s legal practice.  For this reason, they also agree that interpretations of law 
necessarily reflect the political and moral principles of ‘an interpretive community’.4  
However, this is where the differences between Dworkin and Fish emerge.  By ‘interpretive 
community’, Fish means ‘those who share interpretive strategies […] for writing texts, for 
constituting their properties [my emphasis]’.5  The reference to ‘writing’ is important.  In 
relation to law, Fish means that a number of strategies are shared by people who interpret the 
law.  These may be strategies shared by judges, lawyers, and prosecutors.  These strategies 
‘exist prior to the act of reading and therefore determine the shape of what is read rather than 
[…] the other way around [my emphasis]’.6  The difference between Fish and Dworkin is the 
extent to which legal interpretation does depend on looking at things ‘the other way around’.  
That is, the extent to which what is read constrains the strategies.  This thesis argues that in 
law what is read does, to an important extent, constrain the strategies of interpretation.  The 
principle of integrity, therefore, is capable of constraining the possible interpretation of the 
law.   
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6.2.1 Integrity as a constraint 
 
The element of constraint in interpretation can be explained by reference to the ‘chain novel’ 
analogy that Dworkin utilized (see section 4.3.4).  Dworkin explained that the first person in 
the chain novel enterprise is less constrained than those further down the line of the chain 
novel.7  The first person has a more creative task.  This is because they have more choice 
about the point and purposes of the novel.  But subsequent interpreters are less creative and 
more interpretive because more decisions have been made about the point and purposes of the 
novel.8  In time, it becomes very difficult to change direction too much (in terms of plot, 
character or genre, for example) without damaging the integrity of the novel as a piece of 
writing.  Therefore, the writers of the later chapters are obliged to make the best sense of the 
novel by ensuring that their chapter is coherent with what has come before.  In this way, the 
chain novel ‘thickens’ as time goes on and there is a decrease in possible interpretations of 
the novel.   
Dworkin argued that this imagery works as an explanation for and a justification for 
law.  He discussed the law on emotional damages in tort.9  This thesis evaluates this account 
of law in relation to the jus post bellum and child soldier accountability.  It evaluates whether 
the jus post bellum as integrity means that, as time goes on, the potential interpretations of the 
law on child soldier accountability narrow.  Ronalda decided that pursuing integrity meant 
that she was limited in how she could interpret the law on child soldier accountability.  For 
her, integrity meant that she should try to find an interpretation of the law which is coherent 
in principle with how children are treated in domestic law more generally.  Presumably, 
whatever decision she makes on child soldier accountability would impact future judges in 
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Colombian and constrain the decisions they can make.  Integrity, after all, holds within legal 
communities.  Ronalda must assume that her decision will be part of a chain of ‘innumerable 
decisions, structures, conventions, and practices’ that reflect principles which explain and 
justify Colombia’s political morality.10 The point is that over time, it may become easier to 
identify the ‘right answer’ in relation to questions of child soldier accountability because of 
previous decisions.  This is because it becomes easier to see the ‘point or value’ of the law on 
child soldier accountability as the history of the practice lengthens and repeated iterations are 
identified.11  However, Ronalda also attempted to find coherence with other post-conflict 
situations, i.e. with the way Sierra Leone and other post-conflict societies dealt with the same 
issues of international law.   
Ronalda followed this methodology in the previous chapter.  The upshot of this 
account of law is that integrity provides an overarching principle against which 
interpretations must be assessed.12  Those interpretations of the law which exhibit more 
integrity are better than those which exhibit less.  This can be explained by reference to every 
stage in the interpretive process.   However, as mentioned, what integrity means in post-
conflict law is itself a matter of interpretation.  This raises doubts about whether it can 
constrain interpretations of law.    
6.2.1.1 Stages of constraint 
 
Integrity emerges when interpreters identify the relevant rules to be interpreted at the pre-
interpretive stage.  For example, Ronalda made a list of a number of possible sources for the 
relevant law.  Her initial selection tried to adhere to the kind of case that she is considering.  
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A case on child soldier accountability means that she has to identify rules relevant to this 
issue.  She would not have considered the rules on property law, for example.  There is a set 
of rules beyond which Ronalda would not stray.  This is because, in Dworkinian terms, a 
‘great deal of consensus’ is needed for the interpretive attitude to ‘flourish’.13  This means that 
there is a threshold level below which the relevant interpretive community would not accept 
that Ronalda was interpreting the law on child soldier accountability.  However, unlike 
domestic tort law or constitutional issues with which Dworkin was concerned, the ‘practice’ 
of transitional criminal justice is much harder to define.  It is, therefore, a matter of 
interpretation from the very beginning, whether Ronalda considers other post-conflict 
situations as ‘part of the history of the practice’.   
Integrity then constrains interpreters at the interpretive stage.  In the first place, the 
previous chapter explained how Ronalda would assign different weights to the different rules 
and sources of law.  One way Dworkin explains this happens is according to the principle of 
‘local priority’.14  This means that those cases most like the present case are considered more 
important from the perspective of interpretation.  This is because integrity demands that very 
similar cases be treated in similar ways.   
Ronalda, therefore, identified the principles which emerge from the most similar 
cases.  However, the most similar in terms of post-conflict child soldier accountability may 
depend on different variables.  Integrity does not suggest which variables are most important.  
In the example, Ronalda chose post-conflict Sierra Leone as providing the best precedential 
value in terms of child soldier accountability.  However, she may have chosen the AUC 
demobilization process following the 2005 Justice and Peace Law.  Integrity, working 
through the principle of local priority, is supposed to constrain Ronalda’s approach at this 
second stage.  It is supposed to urge that Ronalda approach the question of child soldier 
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accountability as if she were deciding a case at the common law.  However, the method does 
not translate easily to the context of post-conflict justice.  The practice is not so well-defined 
as to offer a constraining line of precedent.  Much depends on what she thinks the practice is.  
This was hinted at in terms of her dual role as a domestic and international legal actor.  Of 
course, once this initial decision is taken, it is possible to demonstrate how a pursuit of 
integrity may proceed.  Yet, this initial decision, whether transitional criminal justice is the 
practice, or whether it is primarily a question of child soldier accountability, or again, 
whether this is a question of Colombian criminal law is crucial.   
It is not clear how integrity helps to decide this initial question.  After all, Dworkin 
does say that his method is about ‘seeing’ a practice and interpreting the same.  But once a 
decision is made about what an interpretation must be coherent with then a line of precedent 
may be identified and integrity may be able to constrain interpretations.  In the current 
scenario there is consensus, in the relevant interpretive community, that transitional justice is 
a field of practice that includes the interpretation and application of legal rules.  Therefore, 
the decision by Ronalda to look at other transitional justice situations is not controversial 
from the perspective of international law.  Further, an interpretation which departs from 
previous practice is also possible.  This is so long as it is justified by reference to a principle 
which is desirable from the perspective of the community’s legal order.  The ‘justification’ 
dimension must outweigh the dimension of ‘fit’.  Ronalda decided that her task was to make 
her interpretation coherent with other post-conflict situations.  But her decision to prosecute 
Juan departed from the approach of other child soldier accountability situations such as Sierra 
Leone.  She presented this as a principled departure and, therefore, acceptable even if it 
departs from previous practice in Sierra Leone.  In this respect, integrity is an attitude that 





It would admittedly be difficult for other Colombian judges to depart from Ronalda’s 
interpretation of the question.  However, integrity, even in departing from the requirement of 
‘fit’, reasserts itself in the dimension of ‘justification’.  Thus, in the local context, integrity 
demands that once Ronalda has decided whether or not to prosecute child soldiers, others 
should need very good reasons (dimension of justification) not to follow suit.   
Finally, at the post-interpretive stage, integrity requires that the principles which 
support the justification for the decision in the specific case echo those which justify the 
entire legal order.  That interpretation is best which can show most of the system as coherent.  
Again, the initial question of ‘what must be coherent with what’ arises here.  Ronalda may 
argue that her decision to prosecute Juan exhibits a desire for truth-telling and accountability 
and a respect for the victims of the Colombian armed conflict.  She may think this means that 
these values (accountability, truth and justice for victims of international crimes) are 
foundational principles of the domestic order.15  They emerge from Colombian legal practice, 
including the peace agreement, and they justify Ronalda’s interpretation in the light of the 
how the community’s legal order is best understood.   
This interpretation allows Juan’s guilty plea and confession to be exchanged for a 
‘limited punishment’ which reflects the need to secure the transition from conflict to peace in 
Colombia.  In this respect, neither Juan nor his victims receive everything that they require 
from their own perspectives of justice.16  However, a commitment to integrity in legal 
interpretation reflects a commitment to justification of decisions according to a community’s 
accepted principles.  This reinforces the confidence that Juan, Juan’s victims and others can 
have in the post-conflict legal order. 
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6.2.2 Fish’s Critique 
 
For Fish, the Dworkinian account of interpretation is wrong in one important respect: the 
constraining role of integrity.   Fish argues that history does not ‘weigh’ more heavily on 
subsequent interpreters in legal interpretation.17  Instead, he turns this argument on its head 
and says that the very act of interpretation recreates that history.  As explained in relation to 
interpretive communities, it is the community’s accepted strategies that ‘write’ the texts.  For 
Fish, it makes no sense for Dworkin to propose an interpretive theory of law and a principle 
which constrains interpretations (the principle of integrity).  For Fish, law is only interpretive.   
Nothing in ‘the law’ constrains the relevant interpreters.18  The only constraints for Fish are 
political constraints.19   
Thus, for Fish, Ronalda’s interpretation can be more or less convincing or persuasive, 
but it makes no sense to say that it is ‘correct’ as a matter of law.  Rather when Dworkin says 
that an interpretation is ‘correct’ as a matter of law, this is ‘rhetoric’.  There is no right 
answer.  The way Ronalda interprets the law is only subject to the political constraints of the 
‘interpretive community’.20  The result of Fish’s critique is that all appeals to principle are 
rhetorical.  There simply are no principles that constrain the practice of interpretation beyond 
those which will be accepted as persuasive.21 Politics and power are the only reasons for 
relying on principles or arguments for coherence.  Fish argues that it is the process by which 
interpretations are accepted that matters.  The fact that certain interpretations are not 
acceptable does not mean that the law excludes the interpretation.  It only means that ‘there is 
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as yet no elaborated interpretive procedure for producing that text’.22  Therefore, as 
contingencies change, so possible interpretations of law change. 
In relation to the jus post bellum, Fish’s critique begins to ‘bite’ at the pre-interpretive 
stage.  For Dworkin, pre-interpretation is simply case of ‘seeing’ those rules which are 
relevant and part of the practice.  At the ‘pre-interpretive stage’, Ronalda made a list of all the 
relevant legal materials.  Dworkin argues that the interpretive community constrains the 
possible rules Ronalda can select because otherwise they would not accept that she was 
‘interpreting’ but rather ‘inventing’ a new practice.  Fish, again, looks at this issue the other 
way around.  For Fish, this stage of ‘seeing’ the most relevant rules is interpretive in the 
sense that the practice is created by Ronalda’s interpretation.23  Therefore, the extent to which 
the interpreter is ‘inventing’ or ‘interpreting’ is itself a matter of interpretation.  For Fish, 
nothing in the history of law and practice of child soldier accountability constrains Ronalda 
from selecting any range of legal materials.  There simply is no history until she interprets it.  
For example, she may have looked at the approach to juvenile justice in the domestic law of 
other Latin American countries.  This would have depended on her interpretive community 
accepting that this was relevant from the perspective of the question she has to deal with.  
This contradicts Dworkin’s account because Dworkin presumes that there is an independent 
history of a practice.     
However, some practices are easier to identify than others.  In this case, to think about 
‘post-conflict child soldier accountability’ as an existing practice in Dworkinian terms is an 
interpretation of that practice.  For Fish, it is only at the point of interpretation that the 
practice can be said to exist in any meaningful sense of the term.  On Fish’s account, Ronalda 
is not constrained by a previous actually existing history.  Rather the facts of the previous 
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history are a product of her interpretation.  This is what Fish means by interpretive 
communities ‘writing the text’: Ronalda writes ‘the law and practice of child soldier 
accountability’ by the act of looking at the relevant legal materials and previous experiences.  
For Fish, new interpretations recreate history at every turn.  In short, there is no history, no 
‘raw data’, which exists independently of the act of interpretation.  Ronalda can interpret her 
task as requiring an interpretation that demonstrates coherence across different post-conflict 
societies.  For Fish, the ‘correctness’ in this interpretation depends on how persuasive it is in 
the relevant interpretive communities.  Ronalda’s interpretation depends on how many in 
Colombian legal community agree with her interpretation.  Fish argues that there are no rules 
which can constrain her interpretation of the law.   
However, Fish’s argument begs the question of how and why an interpretive 
community would find a particular interpretation persuasive.  One plausible answer is that it 
is more faithful to the history of the practice.  Dworkin’s integrity is a ‘rule’ which 
disciplines the possible interpretations interpreters can make because it presupposes that the 
community is engaged in a practice.  This is how we, as legal actors, self-describe our craft, 
i.e. as international lawyers, or criminal lawyers, etc.  Thus, integrity is a rule that emerges 
from our interpretive communities.  But, in relation to these kinds of rules Fish has argued,  
If the rules are to function […] to “constrain the interpreter” – they themselves must be available 
or “readable” independently of interpretation […] they must directly declare their own 
significance to any observer, no matter what his perspective.
24
 
If they do not then Fish argues that they would ‘constrain individual interpreters 
differently’.25  This may be so.  Dworkin concedes Fish’s point but argues that it is not a 
problem as long as any interpreter ‘confirms and reinforces the principled character of [the] 
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association by striving, in spite of the disagreement, to reach his own opinion’.26 Thus, even if 
different prosecutors can interpret integrity differently, as Dworkin accepts, the point is that 
they agree to aim for principled coherence.  They accept the objective character of law in 
terms of its uniform and equal applicability to citizens.  Thus, they depart from a shared 
understanding that they are lawyers and not Professors of English Literature.  This is 
important.  Therefore, Dworkin’s view of a rule of interpretation can be discussed as urging a 
particular attitude which is a part of judging cases at law.  In seeking to make sure that the 
law decides (and not the judge) a humble approach that seeks principled coherence is the best 
way forwards given the fact that there are disagreements about how the law ought to be 
interpreted.  These disagreements, however, do not extend so far as to deny that there is any 
law, as a practice or concept, at all.     
Even this softer image of the constraining rule would be insufficient for Fish.  Fish 
argues that the interpretive attitude, insofar as this is the foundation of the constraint, is a 
product of the strategies that the interpretive community adopts.  This, in turn, is a result of 
the power relationships in these communities.   Therefore, there is a fundamental 
disagreement between Fish and Dworkin on the extent to which there are rules for 
interpretation which constrain interpreters.    
These two views appear irreconcilable.  Dworkin asserts that a commitment to 
integrity constrains and guides Ronalda’s interpretation of the law.  His justification stems 
from a view of political community that suggests that the best response to disagreements on 
matters of principle is a commitment to find principled coherence in interpretations of the 
law.  Fish thinks integrity cannot ‘sit outside’ the interpretive scheme and that appeals to 
‘principles’ are rhetorical.  They are part of a political power game.  Fish argues that integrity 
is just as much a part of interpretation as anything else and, therefore, the extent to which it 
                                                                        
26





does guide (or does not guide) Ronalda’s interpretation of post-conflict law is a matter of 
politics and power.   
In terms of the jus post bellum as integrity, the question is whether it can help to 
identify interpretations of post-conflict law in relation to the issue of child soldier 
accountability.  On Fish’s account, the answer is no, because the interpreter will naturally 
believe their interpretation is ‘best’ and that it adheres to the principle of integrity.  Ronalda 
may have chosen to focus on different principles or interpreted what the principles mean in a 
different way.  Further, whatever interpretation she chose would necessarily be capable of 
being described as based on a set of principles which she thinks best fits and justifies the 
relevant practice (in this sense, child soldier accountability).  So, Ronalda can choose to 
prosecute, not prosecute, or take another course (such as compulsory participation in a truth 
and reconciliation commission), and all the while argue that she is complying with the jus 
post bellum as integrity.  For Fish, integrity is not capable of stabilizing the interpretive 
activity.27   
On a Dworkinian reading, the answer is ‘yes’.28  Post-conflict law is messy insofar as 
it involves a number of different legal categories and there are strong political imperatives 
that may displace a rigid adherence to law in finding practical solutions to the problems.29  In 
this messy legal and political context, there is no single interpretation of integrity.  For 
example, Gallen’s interpretation is the easiest to imagine as practically useful.  Thus, it may 
be that integrity urges Ronalda to be aware of a legal duty to interpret the law on child soldier 
accountability in a way that makes it coherent with a wider scheme of principles that justify 
the law in post-conflict Colombia.  The more difficult approach may ask for coherence across 
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interpretations of transitional criminal justice in different post-conflict societies.  In chapter 5, 
Ronalda thought that this was also what integrity meant.  This was because she identified 
‘transitional criminal justice’ as a practice with a global history insofar as it incorporates rules 
of international law.  In terms of whether the jus post bellum is helpful, therefore, there are 
two points to make.  It may be helpful in that it provides a methodology (interpretivism) to 
apply to the issues at hand.  It may also be helpful in providing an overarching normative 
principle (integrity) as guidance.  To accept that Colombian post-conflict legal actors are 
engaged in a global practice (called transitional criminal justice) implies that they accept their 
participation in the interpretation of international law relevant to transitions.  This may be 
termed the jus post bellum as integrity.  It may also be given other names (i.e. the lex 
pacificatoria).  The point is the same.  A global practice that involves international law is 
affects the question of child solider accountability and post-conflict actors have a legal duty 
to find the best interpretation of that practice and apply the law to the domestic issues at hand. 
   
6.2.3 Can Fish and Dworkin be reconciled? 
 
This thesis argues that Dworkin’s view of the interpretation of law is more persuasive in 
descriptive and normative terms than Fish’s interpretation.  However, there also exists the 
possibility of reconciling their arguments.  For example, Judith Schelly has argued that Fish 
and Dworkin are both partly right.30  For Schelly, their positions represent ‘two sides of the 
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same coin’.31  She argues that, ‘each side is an antidote to the real moral dangers of the 
other’.32 For Schelly, 
An appreciation of each is essential to a sophisticated understanding of legal hermeneutics.  On 
the one hand, Dworkin envisions […] a ‘judge’ model of legal interpretation, in which an 
adjudicator seeks the ‘best’ (most coherent and integrated) reading of a case guided by a context 
of contingent premises and principles […] Fish offers a ‘lawyer model’ of legal interpretation, in 
which discrete arguments constitute legal practice, and ‘forceful and polemic urging of particular 
points of view is the means […] by which the truth is established.
33
 
Of the two accounts, Fish’s account seems easier to interpret as a ‘moral danger’.  It seems to 
suggest that everything in interpretation is reducible to power.  The more powerful an 
interpreter, the more likely their interpretation is seen as ‘correct’.  Thus, Ronalda may notice 
that in other Latin American countries, juvenile justice appears to discriminate between 
children depending on political allegiance.  Children from families that are supporters of 
socialist and liberal parties tend to be prosecuted.  Children from families that support 
conservative parties tend not to be prosecuted.  Fish argues that the only constraints on her 
following this line of reasoning are political.  For Fish, if the political situation in post-
conflict Colombia permits an interpretation of child soldier accountability that discriminates 
as between child soldiers according to their political allegiance then that would be an 
acceptable interpretation of the relevant law.    
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But Dworkin would be able to disagree with that (very undesirable) interpretation of 
post-conflict law.  A law that allowed arbitrary and unprincipled distinctions to be made on 
child soldier accountability would violate the principle of integrity.34  Dworkin’s theory 
provides a language with which to illustrate this point.  The interpretation would not reflect 
enough of the Colombian legal order to be correct as an interpretation.  It would violate much 
of human rights law and the 1991 Constitution of Colombia.  It makes no sense for Fish to 
deny that there is a history of the legal practice that constrains the interpreter in this sense.  It 
may be that the rules of the legal system are the result of political accommodation.  It may 
also be that lawyers, arguing in front of judges, as they interpret their practice, to some 
extent, re-write it.  However, if a rule becomes a rule of law, the interpretation of those rules 
cannot re-write the history in a way that makes a mockery of the entire system.  It may be that 
politics infiltrates the legal system at every stage.  To the extent that this is seen as an 
unwarranted infiltration into the system is proof that an objective legal practice exists.  Thus, 
as mentioned in section 4.5, in relation to the false positives cases, an approach that lacks 
integrity is likely to attract criticism not because ‘enough powerful actors disagree’ but 
because a community accepts that it is wrong in law.35  This includes identifying the view of 
the political morality of the community.  Integrity is founded on the principle of equality as 
between members of a community of principle.36  It arises out of a personal obligation that 
‘commands that no one be left out, that we are all in politics together for better or worse, that 
no one may be sacrificed, like wounded on the battlefield, to the crusade of justice for all’.37  
Of course, there will be disagreements between the members of the community.  However, 
the disagreements about the correct interpretation of the law do not imply that there is no law.  
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Accepting that there is a lack of clarity in a legal position, is not a denial of the legal system 
and a reduction of the system to politics.  Fish’s arguments simply claim too much.  In 
relation to the ‘emerging’ notion of ‘global transitional criminal justice’ there is a history of a 
practice, beginning in the 1980s in Latin America, against which dimensions of ‘fit’ are 
tested and, therefore, a crucial point in the interpretive process.  Therefore, Ronalda assumes 
that there is a history of a practice which extends beyond post-conflict Colombia.  She 
accepts that international law forms part of this practice because previous transitional 
societies have referred to international law in designing and managing their post-conflict 
mechanisms.  Therefore, she may also assume that legal events in Sierra Leone, insofar as 
they relate to the rules and principles of international law, reflect principles of an 
international community with which her interpretations of international law must be coherent.   
Schelly attempts to steer a mid-way between Fish’s radical subjectivism (all 
interpretation are equally valid subject to their persuasive force) and Dworkin’s objectivism 
(the history of the practice or community morality constrains interpretations).  For Schelly, 
the ‘lawyer-model’ explains the fact that lawyers must make whatever arguments they can to 
win the case for their clients.  When they do, then legal practice is changed, the ‘truth’ is 
created or invented by the specific arguments put forward.  The ‘judge-model’ is concerned 
with providing convincing reasons why the law, and not the judge, decides the specific case 
in a particular way.  The judge-model is based on a view of judges as humble servants of the 
law.  It engenders a respect for the judicial function, the principles of legal certainty, and 
predictability in legal systems.  It also reflects a view that everyone in the community is 
subject to scheme of coherent principles which everyone accepts.  Therefore, law cannot be 
merely a question of power.  This would mean that law would lose its commitment to the 
‘equal concern and respect’ of individuals.  Thus, in the jus post bellum, the decision to 





It must be justified according to the law in order to give expression to Colombia as a 
community of principle.  Thus, for Schelly, the rival accounts of legal interpretation are a 
function of the roles on which they are focused.  Dworkin developed his views in the context 
of judicial interpretation in American constitutional law.  His interests in literary 
interpretation were secondary to his primary aim of demonstrating how judges decide and 
ought to decide difficult cases: according to a particular moral reading of the law which takes 
the community’s principles as constitutive of the legal order.   Fish’s background in literary 
criticism defends against a view of ‘the text’ which constrains the imagination of the critic.  
In this regard, Dworkin’s arguments about the possible interpretations of an Agatha Christie 
novel are easily dismantled by Fish.38   
For Schelly concludes that there is a middle ground.  Context is important.  This 
means that there may be a text in some situations but not in others.  Different actors may 
display different interpretive strategies depending on what they are aiming to achieve.  The 
nature of legal interpretation is dependent on those tasked with interpreting.  Thus, the 
argument that there is only one way to characterize interpretation (legal or otherwise) is very 
ambitious.  The reality may be more muddled.  Sometimes, legal officials may act more like 
judges and seek to justify their interpretation on the basis of their integrity.  At other times, 
legal officials may reject integrity for pragmatism, or the search for an innovative response to 
novel problems.  Thus, Schelly concludes, that neither Dworkin not Fish’s account is likely to 
tell the whole story about such a complex practice.  But this thesis argues that for the 
purposes of the jus post bellum, Dworkin’s arguments are more convincing.  Even when 
innovative solutions are required, this does not mean that lawyers abandon the text.  Instead, 
Dworkin argues that the issue of ‘fit’ is balanced with ‘justification’.  This allows the political 
morality of the community to re-shape the direction of the interpretive practice.  It allows a 
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post-interpretive result to differ and move away from previously accepted interpretations.  
The capacity for innovation and change is present in Dworkin’s theory.  It is not blind 
consistency.  Thus, in the present case, as mentioned, much depends on the choices Ronalda 
makes about the practice itself.  In chapter 5, her motivation has been to decide Juan’s case in 
a way that can be explained and justified in relation to a global approach to transitional 
criminal justice.  It was an approach that presupposes that there is a ‘unity’ in questions of 
value that cut across the legal systems of States.  It posits an objective and universal moral 
truth about coherence in value according to Dworkin’s theory.  In Dworkinian theory, this is 
a moral obligation that she accepts as part of her interpretive attitude.  A different prosecutor 
with different motivations may have rejected any notion of a comparative approach across 
different transitional societies.  They may argue that there is no obligation in law and no 
‘global transitional justice law’ that binds Colombian legal actors in a direct way as a judge 
(Hercules) in a common law system would be bound.  However, international law does 
constrain post-conflict actors.  Thus, even as a domestic legal actor, i.e. as the chief 
prosecutor in the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, Ronalda is constrained insofar as her 
decision in Juan’s case cannot violate the 1991 Constitution of Colombia and the relevant 
provisions of domestic and international law which apply.  She is also constrained by the 
peace agreement and the rules that are relevant to amnesty and accountability.  She is also 
constrained by the vigilance of the ICC and Colombia’s international obligations with respect 
to international criminal law.    
In normative terms, and given the fragility and highly politicized nature of post-
conflict States, including Colombia, the principles that best explain and justify her decision 
ought to be drawn from the peace agreement and from previous peace agreement practice in 
other post-conflict States.  These documents, more than any other, are capable of representing 





Ronalda fits closer to the ‘judge’ model than the ‘lawyer’ model in Schelly’s analysis.  Thus, 
contra Schelly, this thesis argues that the jus post bellum as integrity is capable of 
withstanding Fish’s critique.  Fish’s critique simply states that Ronalda will be pursuing 
integrity regardless of the way she decides the issue because she will have interpreted 
integrity to fit with her decision.  This is too easy.  It empties language of all its objective 
force.  The fact that power influences the interpretation of the law may be important.  
However, this does not mean that there is no law and no legal practice.  As a member of a 
legal community, Ronalda’s interpretation of post-conflict law in Colombia cannot violate the 
peace agreement without attracting criticism as being wrong according to law, international 
or domestic.  Further, non-lawyers, engaged in the practical aspects of conflict resolution 
would also be able to criticize Ronalda’s decision on the basis of the agreement and previous 
practice.  There is, of course, a difficulty in that Ronalda attempts to mix coherence in two 
directions.  The first is coherence with the Colombian legal order.  She looks for principles 
that she can apply to the child violence case before her.  The other is the international legal 
order.  Here she decides that other post-conflict situations are important for her to consider 
and that she ought to look to make her interpretation fit those situations.   
In both situations, integrity is useful in terms of ‘coaching’.  If all post-conflict actors 
in all post-conflict societies attempted to find an approach to the law that resonated in other 
post-conflict situations this may produce a coherent set of principles.  In this respect, 
Ronalda’s attempt to make her decision coherent with other transitional criminal justice 
decisions is a policy choice.  It colours her interpretation of the law even when she has to 
decide what to consider and what not to consider.  However, insofar as international law is 
concerned, there is also a legal requirement to ensure that the rules are applied in the way that 
the community has applied them.  To do otherwise, say for example, in the field of command 





would then need to justify their divergence in some principled way.  In this respect, the 
decision to prosecute Juan and incorporate his case in the Special Jurisdiction for Peace may 
be controversial.  However, it is difficult to argue that it violates the principle of integrity.  
Ronalda’s reasoning clearly values accountability and the effects this can have on 
reconciliation, peacebuilding and as its deterrent effect.      
 6.2.4 Schelly’s ‘middle way’ and Bell’s constructivism  
 
This thesis adopts a Dworkinian approach to the interpretation of post-conflict law.  But it 
also accepts that there are interesting parallels between Schelly’s ‘middle way’ argument and 
Bell’s analysis of post-conflict law as the lex pacificatoria.  Bell’s work is based around the 
emergence of a transnational law that applies to transitions.  Thus, it merits discussion in 
relation to this section of the thesis and it is relevant to the question of whether the principle 
of integrity helps post-conflict actors. 
To recap, for Schelly, Dworkin and Fish are engaged in a dialogue, both sides of 
which contribute to (a more plausible) ‘truth’ about law and legal reasoning.  Schelly thinks 
that Fish is partly right in that the interpretation constitutes ‘the text’.  Thus, legal actors do 
not ‘choose’ interpretations but instead they necessarily identify their interpretation as ‘best’.  
But she also argues that Dworkin is partly right in that the text measures what is possible by 
providing interpreters with normative parameters.   
For Bell, post-conflict law is also the result of ongoing dialogue.  The dialogue among 
‘peacemakers’ is over what international law requires in post-conflict situations.39  Local 
actors interpret what international law requires in a way that suits their immediate needs.  
Thus, they can be seen as adopting a ‘lawyer-model’ whereby what the law requires is an 
interpretation that arises out of their political aims.  In this regard, the post-conflict ‘moment’ 
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situates local actors in a political battle over what ought to be done in relation to a range of 
issues.  International law is a part of their argumentative tool-kit.  It is part of the argument of 
what is possible in transition.   
Ronalda, tasked with implementing the peace agreement is a player in the same 
political battle.  Her interpretation of what the law requires depends on her views on the 
conflict, the peace agreement and the future of post-conflict Colombia.  These interpretations 
of what law requires can also be understood as constitutive of a set of post-conflict norms.  
Interpretations create the ‘text’ of post-conflict law and child soldier accountability.  In 
adopting this method to design transitional justice mechanisms they also change the scope 
and content of the international legal rules.   
However, these new understandings may become part of the ‘chain’ of understandings 
of what post-conflict law in Colombia means.  This amounts to an acceptance that there is a 
‘text’ to be interpreted from a Dworkinian perspective.  Future cases in post-conflict 
Colombia can be understood as constrained by previous interpretations of what post-conflict 
law is.  Ronalda can decide to prosecute Juan and justify this interpretation.  But this 
interpretation would make it easier for other judges in Colombia to arrive at similar 
interpretations of what post-conflict law means to them.  Thus, rather than seeing different 
post-conflict situations in Colombia as discrete situations, Ronalda could see them as linked, 
as telling a single story.  It may be useful to think of the relationship between Ronalda’s 
interpretation and other post-conflict societies.  Different post-conflict political situations 
tend to reproduce similar responses to specific post-conflict issues.40 This can be seen in the 
way that peace agreements reflect similar approaches to the post-conflict regulation.  Most 
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peace agreements (59%) contain detailed rules on security arrangements.41  Most peace 
agreements do not contain detailed norms on children (12%).42  The jus post bellum as 
integrity assumes that peace agreement practice functions as a guide or framework for the 
next post-conflict State.   
This has led Bell to argue that there is an emerging ‘law of peace’, the lex 
pacificatoria, in her words.43 This may include the ‘global transitional criminal justice’ with 
which Ronalda was concerned.  On Bell’s account, however, the ‘new law’ is not yet fully 
developed into a coherent legal order.  It is, at best, described as ‘developing law’ or a set of 
international norms.  There may be an important difference, therefore, between the jus post 
bellum as integrity and Bell’s lex pacificatoria.  On a Dworkinian account, the principles of 
post-conflict law that emerge from an interpretation of law are legal principles.  Thus, when 
Ronalda considered the history of transitional criminal justice in Sierra Leone, a purely 
Dworkinian approach means that she is identifying legal principles.  Bell’s account of the lex 
pacificatoria is more limited in that it does not claim full legal force in international law.   
At this stage, States do not appear ready to fully endow the principles of post-conflict 
law with ‘positive law’ status.  Therefore, they do not form part of international law as 
traditionally understood.  However, on a Dworkinian reading, the traditional version of 
international law is deficient and an interpretive argument for international law can be 
made.44 This would accept that the principles that justify particular interpretations of 
international law are a part of international law ‘proper’.  This would be possible once 
theories of international law reject the stranglehold that legal positivism holds on the subject. 
                                                                        
41
 Jennifer Easterday, ‘Peace Agreements as a Framework for Jus Post Bellum’, in Carsten Stahn, Jennifer Easterday and Jens Iverson, 
(eds.) Jus Post Bellum – Mapping the Normative Foundations (New York, OUP: 2014), 379, 388. 
42
 Jennifer Easterday, ‘Peace Agreements as a Framework for Jus Post Bellum’, in Carsten Stahn, Jennifer Easterday and Jens Iverson, 
(eds.) Jus Post Bellum – Mapping the Normative Foundations (New York, OUP: 2014), 379, 388. 
43
 Christine Bell, Peace Agreements and Human Rights (New York, OUP:  2000); ‘The “New Law” of Transitional Justice’ in Kai Ambos, 
Judith Large and Marieke Wierda (eds.), Building a Future on Peace and Justice (Berlin-Heidelberg, Springer Verlag:  2009), 105; On the 
Law of Peace – Peace Agreements and the Lex Pacificatoria (New York, OUP:  2008). 
44





Dworkin’s final publication argues that the legal positivist theory of international law (as 
detailed in 2.1.2) is simply wrong.  Instead, Dworkin constructs an interpretive theory of 
international law that attempts to explain why, in normative terms, the rules of international 
law are binding on States without relying on the fact of their consent.  Dworkin identifies 
international law as part of a larger question of political morality that asks ‘what morality and 
decency can require of states and other international bodies in their treatment of one 
another…’45  In this respect, Dworkin argues that a proper conception of international law 
must be based on the notion that States have a moral duty to accept the limitations of their 
own power.46  Of course, there may be different ways of achieving this, and States may 
legitimately disagree on the best way.  Therefore, Dworkin develops the principle of salience, 
to explain that once a number of States have agreed on a code of practice, other States have a 
duty to subscribe to the practice, as long as that would improve the legitimacy of the 
subscribing State and the international order as a whole.  Thus, Dworkin concludes that  
 
…we should interpret the documents and practices picked out by the principle of salience 
so as to advance the imputed purpose of mitigating the flaws and dangers of the 
Westphalian system…[T]he correct interpretation of an international document…is the 
interpretation that makes the best sense of the text, given the underlying aim of 
international law,…the creation of an international order that protects political 
communities from external aggression, protects citizens of those communities from 
domestic barbarism, facilitates coordination,…and provides some measure of 
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This is a normative argument for interpretivism in international law.  It is very similar to that 
made by other prominent international lawyers, such as Hersch Lauterpacht.48  Ultimately, the 
interpretation of law must keep in sight the point of the practice itself.  In this respect, the 
Dworkinian interpretation of post-conflict law must resonate with the political aims of 
transition and the wider aims of international law in general.  
6.2.5 Internal objection: conclusion   
 
This section has argued that a Dworkinian jus post bellum is plausible and that Dworkin 
ought to be favoured in the Fish-Dworkin debate.  Of course, post-conflict law can be 
understood as reflecting subjective and objective sides of the Fish-Dworkin debate.  On the 
one hand, post-conflict actors interpret international law and create norms as they proceed to 
solve post-conflict issues.  On the other hand, they are constrained by the domestic legal 
system in which post-conflict law ‘happens’ and previous interpretations of international 
legal norms in similar situations.  Dworkin would also argue that they are constrained by the 
principle of salience and that there is a moral argument that overarches the legal dimension 
which forces States to adhere to the ‘emerging’ rules of international law in transitions.  It 
may, thus, be argued that a transnational practice of post-conflict norm production is slowly 
being constituted by these repeated experiences.  These norms, however, are not yet 
‘positive’ legal norms.  In time, they may harden and function in a similar way to the positive 
law.  However, on a Dworkinian reading, this would be unnecessary as the principles that 
support the rules are just as much ‘law’ as the rules themselves.  In becoming aware of the 
similar solutions crafted to recurring post-conflict issues, post-conflict actors can consider 
themselves as joining a continuing story of post-conflict law-making.  This creates a self-
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critical approach that allows for a view of law as providing coherent solutions to similar 
issues.   
Fish is right that the jus post bellum as integrity is a concept which must be 
interpreted.  However, the possible interpretations are limited by the ‘text’ being interpreted.  
Post-conflict actors are engaged in a legal practice, ‘the law’ which is being interpreted must 
be told as part of a linked story where similar situations ought to produce similar solutions.  
In this regard, finding the common principles of justice that underpin the different rules that 
deal with children in Colombia may be a worthwhile exercise and approach.  A commitment 
to principled coherence ought to help foster confidence in post-conflict institutions and also 
help the implementation of peace agreements.  The significance of Dworkin’s argument lies 
in its moral claim.  It urges post-conflict actors to think of themselves as part of a 
‘community of principle’.  It urges post-conflict actors to think about how their 
interpretations of the law are coherent with the approaches of the past and their community’s 
aims for the future.  At the very least, it urges post-conflict actors to ask questions about how 
they ought to proceed.  It asks them to understand that responses to post-conflict situations 
can be measured by the history of post-conflict practice.49 For interpretive purposes, this may 
include responses in other post-conflict societies.  On a Dworkinian approach, better answers 
result from a commitment to integrity in the interpretation of post-conflict law.  In the end, 
integrity demands an ongoing dialogue between the creative and reflective processes of legal 
interpretation.50 This means, simply, that the specific interpretations made are always a part of 
a larger, shape-shifting whole.  In this regard, every interpretation of post-conflict law in 
Colombia is a starting point which demands development by the very act of interpreting.51  
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These starting points offer parameters for future development in the story of post-conflict 
peacebuilding in Colombia.     
In relation to the specific question set, the jus post bellum as integrity may not provide 
Ronalda with absolute certainty.  But the jus post bellum as integrity is an important lens 
through which the past can be seen to provide legal and moral parameters for the 
interpretation she must make.  It is an invitation to see post-conflict law and those 
interpreting the law as part of a broader political process.  This can also be considered as an 
international and transnational process.52  The interpretation that Ronalda chooses is 
constitutive of post-conflict law for the purposes of the Colombian transition.  But the jus 
post bellum as integrity also requires Ronalda to accept her role as part of a community of 
transnational peacebuilders insofar as international law affects these disparate situations in 
similar ways.  Ronalda, if she accepts the jus post bellum as integrity, must try to make her 
interpretation in Juan’s case fit with other rules and principles relating to children in 
Colombia.  She must also find a way to make her interpretation coherent with the peace 
agreement signed between the government and the FARC-EP.  In this way, the jus post 
bellum as integrity urges Ronalda to present post-conflict law as a coherent legal order by 
which she is bound and from which she can identify the best answers in specific cases.     
This section has explored the nature of integrity and its role in interpretation.  It 
concluded that interpretation is a mixture of subjective and objective elements.  This means 
that integrity is a concept that can guide interpretations as a matter of post-conflict law in 
Colombia.  This is not an easy or mechanical task.  It is an argumentative practice and it asks 
questions about the attitude to legal interpretation.  The jus post bellum as integrity can guide 
post-conflict actors insofar as they are made aware of how previous post-conflict societies 
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resolved similar kinds of problems relating to international law.  In becoming aware of their 
participation in a complex and evolving story, an obligation to pursue integrity in 
interpretations of the law appears as a moral obligation.  Integrity is a normative value that 
can be used to identify, interpret and justify what legal interpretations ought to be in post-
conflict situations.53 In this sense, it does guide interpretations and Fish’s radical subjectivism 
can be overcome.  
 
6.3 External objection:  The role of community morality in interpretations of law 
 
This section deals with the second objection to the jus post bellum as integrity.  It focuses on 
the role a community’s political morality plays in Dworkin’s method of interpretation.  This 
is important because, for Dworkin, an interpretation must not only fit legal practice, it must 
also be justifiable from the perspective of the political community’s morality.  The two are 
linked because for Dworkin law is a branch of political morality.54  He argues that an action at 
law is inevitably moral because there is always a risk of an interpretation giving rise to ‘a 
distinct form of public injustice’.55  So, when the law is interpreted incorrectly, ‘the 
community has inflicted a moral injury on one of its members because it has stamped him in 
some degree or dimension as an outlaw’.56 This affects Dworkin’s view on how judges and 
other legal actors should decide cases.  He argues that when they interpret the law, they 
should aim to identify the community morality in a way that would justify the ‘stamping’ of 
the individual as an outlaw.  Further, the more a judge can achieve a principled coherence 
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between the interpretation of the law in a specific case and the political morality of the 
community the better they are interpreting the law.57   
So, in Juan’s case, Ronalda can argue that she made the right decision in the 
following way.  The decision to prosecute is the community’s way of demonstrating its moral 
disagreement with the acts committed by Juan despite his young age.  In prosecuting, the 
community reaffirms its commitment to the principle of responsibility.  It reaffirms its belief 
that all individuals ought to account for their crimes as long as they are mature enough to 
understand the nature of their acts.  This reinforces the principle that citizens must be treated 
equally and according to the law.  However, the transitional nature of criminal justice tempers 
the full effects of the principle of responsibility.  In prescribing a more limited form of justice 
it allows Juan to confess and repair the survivors as a path towards reconciliation.  This 
process reaffirms the community’s commitment to demobilization, reconciliation and, 
ultimately, the principle of peace.  The decision explains and justifies the existence of a 
Colombian legal order founded on certain fundamental principles of political morality.    
This community morality dimension of Dworkin’s theory gives rise to a problem 
insofar as the jus post bellum is a concept in international law.  As the previous section 
argued, the jus post bellum as integrity may represent an ‘emerging global law’ as identified 
by Ronalda in chapter 5.  For this reason, Ronalda attempted to make her interpretation 
coherent with the international legal order.  Dworkin never properly considered international 
law.58  Further, as explained in section 2.1.2, international law is committed to the strict 
separation between law and morality.  As such, insofar as the jus post bellum as integrity 
indicates a ‘global law’ of transitional criminal justice, there may be problems in identifying 
the international legal order as one that affirms a community political morality. 
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6.3.1. Dworkinian communities  
 
Dworkin discussed three different kinds of community.59  These are a ‘bare’ community, a 
‘rulebook’ community and a ‘community of principle’.60  In a bare community, the members 
treat their association as a ‘de facto accident of history and geography’.61 Members of a de 
facto association may treat each other as means towards selfish ends.  They do not share 
purposes or principles other than those which ensure their mutual coexistence.  The second 
‘rulebook’ community has members that ‘accept a general commitment to obey the rules 
established…’62  However, they do not share a common commitment to the ‘underlying 
principles that are themselves a source of further obligation…’63  The only obligations they 
accept are the rules which are the result of negotiation and compromise between ‘antagonistic 
interests’.64  This is important because members of the community cannot insist on members 
complying with obligations beyond what has been explicitly agreed.  Dworkin explains, 
If the rules are the product of special negotiation [where] each side has tried to give up as little in 
return for as much as possible, […] it would therefore be unfair and not merely mistaken for either 
to claim that their agreement embraces anything not explicitly agreed.
65
 
Dworkin’s final model of community is a ‘community of principle’.  In this sort of 
community, members accept a shared understanding that they are governed by common 
principles, ‘not just by the rules hammered out in political compromise’.66 Each member of 
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the community ‘accepts that others have rights’ and that they ‘have duties flowing from that 
scheme, even though these have never been formally identified or declared [my emphasis].’   
Dworkin constructs these three communities for interpretive purposes.  A single 
community might demonstrate elements of all three types.  His point is that an interpretation 
of law will necessarily imply one of these three kinds of community.  The existence of a 
domestic political community in Colombia is relatively unproblematic.  The end of the 
conflict, and the signing of a peace agreement, was taken as a sign that a single political 
community had come into existence.67  In any event, even during the armed conflict, the main 
functions of a legal system (law-making, law-determination and law-enforcement) have been 
centralized.  There has always been a political and legal structure which includes the 1991 
Constitution, the central government in Bogotá, a hierarchical judicial system, and State 
officials which enforce the law.  There is also an identifiable ‘people’ (Colombian citizens) 
that the system governs.  Thus, Ronalda can argue that there is a Colombian political 
community, and that it is based on certain values which, despite all its problems, are based on 
those of a liberal democratic State.  There is little difficulty in arguing that her interpretation 
of post-conflict law is based on the fact that Colombian citizens are committed to peace, to 
the principle of responsibility, to the principle of local ownership and proportionality and to 
the principle of maturity.   
However, the jus post bellum as integrity may also incorporate international law.  
International law is the law that regulates international relations between States.  Thus, 
insofar as international law is interpreted in post-conflict societies, a Dworkinian approach 
may recognise the validity of an interpretation by virtue of the political morality of an 
‘international community’.  In chapter 5, the existence of such a community was taken as a 
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given rather than critically considered.68  Ronalda never asked whether international law is 
the law of a community in the Dworkinian sense.  She did not consider the nature of the 
political relationship between sovereign States.69  This is a unique relationship which has 
given rise to a legal order that is markedly different to those found in domestic legal orders.   
Relations between States are horizontal rather than vertical.  This means that there is no 
overarching world government, or constitution, which is comparable to the structures found 
in Colombia.  The functions of the legal system mentioned above are decentralized.  No State 
has the central management authority to impose its will on the whole community.  The 
political situation is one of ‘relative anarchy’.70   Ronalda’s approach to interpretation 
assumed that interpretations of post-conflict law had to be coherent with the international 
legal order.  The previous section explained that there is a legal obligation to make post-
conflict law coherent across post-conflict States insofar as international law is concerned.  
This section evaluates the jus post bellum as integrity according to Ronalda’s application in 
chapter 5.  She presupposes a Dworkinian version of international law.  In this regard, her 
approach to the jus post bellum as integrity depends on the possibility of identifying the 
values of the international community.  Dworkin’s theory urges that questions of value are at 
the heart of the identification of what the law is.  As explained in chapter 5, questions of 
value validate interpretations when they are balanced against the dimension of ‘fit’.  
Therefore, the external objection challenges the extent to which the theoretical 
presuppositions of Dworkin’s theory are transferrable to the international society of States.71  
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The remainder of this chapter evaluates whether the kind of community that is necessary for 
Dworkin’s theory is identifiable in the international society of States. 
   
6.3.2 Is there an international ‘community of principle’? 
 
This section evaluates whether Ronalda can justify her interpretation of law on the basis of 
the political morality of the international community.  This may be considered a requirement 
of a more expansive and ambitious theory of the jus post bellum as integrity.  It is a theory 
that asks for coherence across post-conflict societies on the basis of the law of the 
international community.  To the extent that this strong claim can be doubted on the 
international level, the jus post bellum as integrity may lack the explanatory force of the lex 
pacificatoria.  As explained, Bell’s theory accounts for the emergence of similar practices 
across post-conflict societies owing to the existence of a transnational community of 
peacemakers that use international law in their conflict resolution mandates.  The jus post 
bellum as integrity must ground the emergence of these norms in Dworkin’s theory of 
associative obligations.     
6.3.2.1 Associative Obligations 
 
Dworkin argues that a community of principle exhibits ‘associative obligations’.72  By this he 
means ‘the special responsibilities social practice attaches to membership in some biological 
or social group’.73  Dworkin’s key point is that the responsibilities that a person owes to 
members of the community of principle are not owed as a result of ‘deliberate 
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commitment’.74  The responsibilities emerge ‘through a series of choices and events’.75  So it 
is the history of the association that attracts the special kinds of obligations as between 
members.   
In relation to international society, this suggests that the kinds of obligations needed 
for evidence of an international community of principle are not those core principles to which 
States have freely consented.76  Any legal order contains ‘a relatively small number of 
principles’ or core elements which ‘make up the fabric of the law’.77 For example, the 
principle of autonomy, which is at the heart of the criminal law in the United Kingdom, 
provides the explanation and justification for other more specific rules, i.e. the rules on 
capacity.78  The international legal order also contains a core set of principles.79  These 
include the principle of sovereign equality and the principle of non-interference. 
However, Dworkin’s theory refers to moral and political principles which explain and 
justify the legal order as a whole.  They emerge out of the political association of a 
community’s members.  These embody the ‘spiritual cohesion’ of the relevant community.80 
A Dworkinian approach to international law needs to ask whether there is an international 
community that shares moral and political principles by virtue of States having interacted 
over time as a community.  For Dworkin, these principles would reflect the fact that States 
hold ‘certain attitudes about the responsibilities they owe one another.’81  They would be 
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indicators that States consider themselves to be a part, not only of an international society, 
but also an international community.   
Dworkin finds that the kinds of obligations that emerge demonstrate four characteristics.  
These are: 
 
1. Speciality: Members accept that the responsibilities arise distinctly within the group 
rather than as general duties to those outside the group.  This means that ‘each citizen 
respects the principles of fairness and justice instinct in the standing political 
arrangement of his particular community, which may be different to those of other 
communities, whether or not he thinks these the best principles from a utopian 
standpoint.82 
 
2. Personality: Members accept that the responsibilities are personal.  They flow directly 
from one member to another, not only to the group as a whole.  It is a community 
where no one is ‘to be left out’ and where all are ‘in politics together for better or 
worse’ and that ‘no one may be sacrificed, like wounded left on the battlefield, to the 
crusade of justice for all’.83   
 
3. Integrity: Members link the responsibilities they have to other individuals as flowing 
from a general responsibility of concern for the well-being of others in the group.  
Dworkin’s community of principle requires that the citizens sacrifice their immediate 
political concerns in the interest of a commitment to integrity of the legal order as a 
whole.   
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4. Equality:  Members accept that the group’s practices are based on an equal concern 
for all members.84 A community of principle produces and demonstrates equality as 
between the individuals.  Dworkin’s thesis argues that when individuals disagree 
about justice, the best way forward is to agree on adjudicating the disagreements 
according to a coherent scheme of principles founded on integrity.   
 
The relevance of these associative obligations for the expansive notion of the jus post bellum 
as integrity is as follows.  In order to be capable of generating ‘right answers’, associative 
obligations of this kind must be a plausible description of a political community of States.  If 
the conditions of a community of principle are met, then an argument about interpretations of 
international law may include the rule of integrity.   
However, the relationship between States might not plausibly be described in these 
terms.  Rather than a community of principle, the international society of States may 
resemble a ‘bare’ or a ‘rulebook’ community.  In this case, the jus post bellum as integrity 
could not ‘generate’ the right answers across different post-conflict States.  Its more 
expansive meaning would be discarded and its impact and usefulness would remain the 
commitment to coherence within post-conflict States.  As a concept in international law, it 
may still be useful as theory that suggests post-conflict law ought to be coherent across 
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6.3.2.2. Community among States? 
 
All societies must exhibit a basic order so that they may continue existing as societies.85  It is, 
therefore, possible to identify certain ‘fundamental tenets’ which underpin the political 
association of the international community.86  For example, the fundamental principle that 
underpins all the international legal order is the principle of sovereign equality.  This is 
reflected in the rules of the UN Charter.87  With the recognition of a number of new States in 
the 1960s, the principle of sovereign equality was reaffirmed and extended to include all 
States (not just UN members) in the 1970 UN Declaration on Friendly relations.88   
The principle of sovereign equality reflects that all States accept, without 
qualification, that they are all sovereign equals in the international society of States.  They 
enjoy certain rights that no other international actors enjoy.89  States have the prominent role 
in international law-making.90 Most of the rules of international law regulate the behaviour of 
States.91  They enjoy a wide range of exclusive powers over individuals in matters that fall 
within their jurisdiction.  Each State must also grant every other State these powers and rights 
(once Statehood is recognised).  A State’s officials, therefore, enjoys immunity before the 
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courts of other States.92  Also, an internationally wrongful act accrues to the State itself and 
not to the individuals that carried out the act in their State official capacity.93   
This unqualified acceptance by States of their sovereign equality might be taken as 
evidence that States consider themselves as members of a ‘special kind’ of community.  
However, the very purpose, or point, of the principle of sovereign equality reflects the fact 
that States do not share principles of justice or fairness.  The default position in international 
society is that States are free to do as they want unless they consent to rules which limit that 
freedom.  The principle of sovereign equality functions to protect States, and especially weak 
States, from the interference of other more powerful States.94  Its role is to ‘keep States 
peacefully apart’ rather than ‘bringing them actively together.95  Its development and 
acceptance is owing to the fact that a universal conception of political community which is 
accepted by all States has, so far, proved unattainable.  Therefore, sovereign equality reflects 
a commitment to agree to disagree on important matters of principle.  It means that, as a 
matter of domestic law, each State is free to develop its internal political order in the way that 
it thinks is ‘best’.   
Naturally, the rules that States implement in their own legal orders vary widely.  The 
different rules reflect adherence to a number of moral principles, sometimes reflecting secular 
and liberal tendencies, sometimes religious, or socialist.  States are under no legal obligation 
to make their internal rules coherent in principle (with the aim that they ensure the equal 
concern and respect of its citizens) in the way that Dworkinian integrity demands.96  States 
that flagrantly deny the equal treatment of its citizens are accepted as members of the 
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international society of States.  But a State is no less a State by virtue of its dictatorial, 
democratic or other internal legal order.97   
As such, it is doubtful that the overwhelming acceptance of the principle of sovereign 
equality can be evidence that reflects the ‘special’ character of the association of States.  
Instead, the principle of sovereign equality is evidence of a ‘rulebook’ community as 
described above.  It asserts that the ‘rules of the game’ for the purposes of international 
relations are those which States themselves agree should be the rules.  The rules are the 
‘product of special negotiation’ [where] ‘each side has tried to give up as little in return for as 
much as possible’.98  It is hard, therefore, not to conclude that it would be a mistake ‘to claim 
that their agreement embraces anything not explicitly agreed’.99  All of this makes it difficult 
for integrity to arise because ‘[i]ntegrity holds within political communities, not among 
them’.100   
One way around this problem is to reconceptualise the international legal order and to 
question the centrality of the State at the centre of a ‘global society’.  States, after all, are not 
alone in the regulation of world affairs.  On the one hand, international organizations, 
international non-governmental organizations, and individuals have a limited locus standi in 
international law.101  Further, in the field of international criminal law, States have agreed to 
impose obligations directly on individuals.102  Thus, although States are still central, the UN 
and other international organizations are ‘ancillary’ subjects in international law.103  Mégret 
has argued that the emergence of these non-State actors has changed the ‘physiognomy’ of 
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international law.104  But many of these developments depend on States who have agreed to 
delegate certain functions to international organizations in pursuit of common interests for 
reasons of mutual convenience.  Therefore, the emergence of non-State actors is not 
necessarily evidence that there is an international community of principle.  International law 
is, primarily, law that regulates the behaviour and interaction of States.  
Another possibility is to ‘look inside’ States and extract evidence of a global 
community from the actual international behaviour of governmental networks.105  Thus, sub-
State-officials (legislators, courts, administrative agencies) interact transnationally with other 
sub-State officials, each representing the ‘national interest’.106  In relation to peace-making in 
Colombia, the participation of individuals, as peace negotiators or mediators, can be taken as 
an example of the multi-layered reality of international relations in international society.  This 
view could emphasize a power-shift within States towards transnational networks of 
individuals that are engaged in the process of law-making.107   
However, it is not clear that a replacement of governments with ‘interest groups’ 
would be useful from the perspective of ‘law as integrity’.  On the one hand, Slaughter’s 
analysis emphasizes the benefits of trans-governmental networks as ‘fast, flexible and 
cheap’.108 There is no indication that the trans-governmental nature of inter-State regulation 
produces a stronger feeling of ‘community’ as between States.  The networks interact 
according to their interests in order to agree upon rules in the same way that members of a 
rulebook community would.  Slaughter’s point is simply that the traditional recounting of 
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international law ought to take cognizance of the new realities of trans-governmental law-
making, not that this is indicative of an international community in the way Dworkin’s theory 
requires.  For Dworkin’s theory to explain international legal order, the transnational law-
makers would need to feel that they were governed by political and moral principles, even 
though they had not ever been posited, or identified, simply as a matter of their trans-
governmental association and activity.  It would mean that the individuals involved felt they 
were part of an international community which had ‘its own principles it can itself honor, or 
dishonor, that it can act in good or bad faith, with integrity or hypocritically, just as people 
can [sic]’.109  Integrity, for Dworkin, has this personal quality.  It is a self-reflective and 
‘protestant attitude that makes each citizen responsible for imagining what his society’s 
public commitments require’.110 This theory of associative obligations is ill-suited to a 
decentralized and horizontal legal order.   
As an alternative, therefore, rather than focusing on the members of the international 
society and how they interact, a more fruitful avenue for evidence of Dworkinian community 
of principle may be found in the hierarchy of norms that international law endorses.  The 
view that States consider some norms more important than others may be evidence that some 
values are shared as ‘community values’. 
In Ronalda’s case, she is aware that Colombia has been under the preliminary 
investigation of the ICC.  The ICC can be interpreted as monitoring States’ adherence with 
the community values that shape international criminal justice.  In this sense, Ronalda may 
feel that she is part of a community that goes beyond the Colombian legal community.  
Therefore, it could be that she feels part of a larger international community in the field of 
international criminal justice.  Other prosecutors may reject the ICC attention and feel that 
the issue is one for Colombia to address.  But in trying to find coherence with the 
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international legal order and other post-conflict societies, Ronalda’s approach indicates that 
she does feel part of this larger community.  One way that she might justify her interpretation 
of post-conflict law is by reference to the values which hold a special place in the 
international legal order.     
 
6.3.2.3 Normative hierarchy 
 
The principle of sovereign equality means that international law is traditionally seen as 
‘contractual’ rather than ‘legislative’.111  In the traditional account of international law, norms 
are structured horizontally, they bind other contracting parties, and there are no overarching 
‘constitutional’ norms that bind all States regardless of their consent.  To the extent that this 
traditional approach can be doubted, the jus post bellum as integrity may find a community of 
principle in the existence of superior norms of the international legal order.  Evidence of a 
hierarchical legal order may be taken as proof that international law reflects the ‘minimum 
foundations of a common ethical project’.112  These foundations may then support an 
interpretation of post-conflict law that is justified according to the principles of the 
international community.   
Hierarchy in international law can be understood in different ways.  As the ILC Study 
on Fragmentation makes clear, a rule can take precedence over another rule because it is 
more specific to the issue at hand. 113   A rule may take precedence because it has emerged 
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more recently.114  But these kinds of functional hierarchies imply that questions of priority of 
rules are determined by the will of States.  Therefore, these are not the kinds of hierarchy that 
are needed for the jus post bellum as integrity.    
Some have argued that a hierarchical legal order is found in the UN Charter as the 
constitution for all the international community.115  According to Fassbender, there is 
evidence that those who drew up the UN Charter intended it to function as a constitution that 
‘grows and develops and expands as time goes on’.116  In this regard, it ought to be considered 
as the material constitution of the international legal order because it ‘consists of those rules 
which regulate the creation of the general legal norms’.117 The UN Charter does, indeed, 
contain the most important rule of the international legal order: the principle of sovereign 
equality.118 Therefore, for the reasons explained above, this is an interpretive dead-end.  
Arguments in favour of viewing the UN Charter as the constitution of the international 
community quickly come up against the fact that the Charter entrenches the main obstacle 
towards such a community (the sovereign equality of States).   
A better approach for hierarchy is to argue that international law is explained and 
justified by certain inalienable community interests.119  In this regard, the international 
community is based on the ‘structuring power of norms’.120  So-called ‘peremptory norms’ 
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are supposed to sit at the top of the normative hierarchy.121 States have explicitly accepted the 
existence of these fundamental norms in international law.122  Article 53 of the Vienna 
Convention asserts that a treaty will be void ‘if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with 
a peremptory norm of general international law’.123 So, for Orakhelashvili, ‘[p]eremptory 
norms prevail not because the States involved have so decided but because they are 
intrinsically superior and cannot be dispensed with through standard inter-State 
transactions.’124 In turn Cassese argued, ‘these peremptory norms have a rank and status 
superior to those of all the other rules of the international community’.125 Similarly, the ILC 
Study on Fragmentation commented that ‘the practice of international law has always 
recognized the presence of some norms that are superior to other norms…’126 In Furundžija, 
the ICTY accepted that the prohibition of torture ‘has evolved into a peremptory norm or jus 
cogens […] a norm that enjoys a higher rank in the international hierarchy that treaty law and 
even, “ordinary” customary rules.127  
These superior norms of can be thought of as norms of ‘international public order’.128  
The concept of public order norms is recognized as a matter of necessity in all domestic legal 
systems.129  They have been recognised as an indispensable instrument of the ‘interpretation, 
application and development’ of all law by the International Court of Justice.130  From the 
perspective of the jus post bellum as integrity, these norms could be identified as the 
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foundational norms of the international political morality.  The expansive notion of the jus 
post bellum as integrity may require that States interpret post-conflict law according to a 
scheme of principles that is consistent with these jus cogens norms.  The potential for the 
disciplining rule of integrity is related to the superior/inferior character of rules in a vertical 
legal order.  As Orakhelashvili has argued, ‘[t]he superior rules determine the frame within 
which the inferior rules can be valid, while the inferior rules must comply with the content of 
superior rules’.131  Therefore, for the purposes of the jus post bellum as integrity, and the 
existence of a community of principle, the necessary step is to identify the norms and their 
effects.   
Necessarily, these norms cannot be identified by State consent.  The entire point of the 
jus cogens doctrine is that they are not dependent on the consent of States.  In Dworkin’s 
theory, associative obligations are the consequences of the political morality of the 
community.  Thus, jus cogens norms are those which protect community interests and from 
which derogation is prohibited.   Orakhelashvili argues that in order to qualify as jus cogens a 
norm must ‘safeguard interests transcending those of individual States’ and that they have a 
‘moral or humanitarian connotation’.132  The importance of these norms must be identified by 
the categorization of their breach as ‘so morally deplorable as to be considered absolutely 
unacceptable by the international community as a whole…’133 A tentative list that has 
received academic and judicial support would include:  the prohibition of the use of force, the 
principle of self-determination, fundamental human rights, and most of humanitarian law.134  
In the Barcelona Traction case, the ICJ distinguished between an obligation that a State has 
to another State, and obligations which a State owes ‘towards the international community’ as 
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a whole’.  As Brownlie notes, the list of norms it gave bears similarities with the jus cogens 
norms.  It asserted, 
Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from the outlawing of 
acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning the basic 
rights of the human person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination.
135
 
In theoretical terms, if these norms are taken as the basis of a community of principle, 
Ronalda’s interpretation of the law might be measured by how coherent it is with these 
norms.  This would be consistent with an expansive version of the jus post bellum as 
integrity.  Her references to the principles of peace, local ownership and responsibility could 
be explained and justified as reflecting the morality of the international community.     
States might agree that some norms are important.  However, this does not say 
anything about why States think that they are important.  The history of the negotiations 
surrounding the Vienna Convention demonstrates that many States (mostly Western) were 
against the creation of jus cogens norms.136  It was clear that once it was accepted (in the law 
of treaties) that certain norms could not be derogated from, that there would be important 
repercussions for general international law.137  Perhaps for this reason, States have not yet 
referred to jus cogens norms in an attempt to resolve a legal dispute.138  This damages their 
value as a sign that the international community is a community of principle.  The very point 
of identifying moral values of a Dworkinian community is so that they are then invoked in 
the resolution of disputes.  Cassese argues that States ‘hesitate to raise crucial issues of 
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alleged deviance from the basic values accepted in the world community’.139  In this way, 
they remain a ‘potentiality’ rather than a fundamental part of the international legal order.  
States prefer to act according to the ‘bilateralist’ paradigm.  Although some norms are 
considered more important, therefore, the rudimentary nature of the international legal order 
means that there are many doubts about the scope and effects of the jus cogens norms.  There 
is still an unresolved tension between a legal order that protects a diversity of beliefs and one 
that proposes the notion that some values do transcend borders.140  
The jus cogens norms demonstrate a potential in terms of Ronalda’s more expansive 
interpretation of the jus post bellum as integrity.  But the relative operational weakness of the 
jus cogens norms means that it is still too ambitious, from a theoretical and practical 
perspective, to argue that States are legally bound by the principle of integrity.  The 
associative obligations between States would need to be much stronger for Dworkin’s theory 
to be a potential explanation and justification of international law.  Ronalda’s interpretation 
of the jus post bellum as integrity cannot be founded on a descriptive theory of community 
morality.  The jus post bellum as integrity provides a normative argument to interpret the law 
in a way that makes it coherent with other post-conflict States and the international legal 
order as a whole.  In truth, this would almost certainly be difficult task.  The lack of an 
authoritative interpreter at the centre of the international legal system suggests that the 
rulebook community version is to be preferred as an explanation of the international society 
of States.  This, however, does not deny the normative power of the jus post bellum as 
integrity as a rule that urges interpretive coherence across different communities in respect of 
international legal norms.  Further, none of the above is to deny that a rulebook community 
may produce non-legal norms with certain constraining effects.  As mentioned in chapter 2, 
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Lowe argues that international law produces ‘interstitial norms’ which are secondary and 
parasitic on the primary norms of the system.141  Interstitial norms, although not legally 
binding, can help to identify the law as a matter of interpretation and the resolution of 
conflicts.  Integrity could be presented as an interstitial norm.  States may be legally bound 
(in the Dworkinian sense) to pursue integrity.  They can rely on the principle in order to 
resolve conflicts.  It may also have some use for practitioners, in identifying post-conflict 
law, and as expressing a desire to negotiate and implement post-conflict law according to an 
appealing interpretation of the global community.  This could be understood as the 
‘expressive’ function of ‘law as integrity’. 
6.3.2.4 Summary:  From ‘right answers’ to ‘expressive integrity’ 
 
Alex Schwartz has argued that law as integrity is not only about generating the right answers.  
It also can be useful to think of the jus post bellum as integrity in terms of fostering a culture 
of a ‘community of principle’.142  Dworkin argued that if legal actors understand themselves 
as acting in a community of principle they can ‘strive to improve [their] institutions in that 
direction’.143 Schwartz argues that this is possible even in divided societies.144 This depends 
on ‘public interpreters’ focusing on the ‘expressive value’ of integrity rather than its capacity 
to ‘generate right answers’.145  This has clear implications for Gallen’s more limited version 
of integrity within a legal system.  It suggests that if Ronalda accepts integrity then a divided 
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Colombia can be pushed towards a community of principle.  The assumption that she is 
acting as part of a community of principle provides for the improvement of institutions and 
this pushes a divided community towards a community of principle.  Here, integrity takes on 
a constructivist tone in terms of the relationship between norms and practices.  The norm 
(integrity) is strengthened by the practice.  But, in turn, the strengthening norm drives and 
directs the same practice.  If Ronalda self-identifies as a member of a community of 
principle, this will affect her practice, which will in turn create those institutions and norms 
which are constitutive of a community of principle.146  Dworkin’s thesis, in broad terms, is 
that integrity is what law is when law is done well. 
According to Schwartz, this is one way that the expressive function of integrity can 
help overcome divisions in divided societies.  As an expressive concept, the jus post bellum 
as integrity may move post-conflict States towards the equal treatment of its citizens. The 
notion of integrity encapsulates equal treatment of citizens.  According to this view, integrity 
rather than ‘norm-identification’ can be understood as a concept or norm that is useful for 
‘norm-generation’.   
This may also help the notion of the jus post bellum as integrity from the perspective 
of international law.  From the perspective of international law, the problem is that there are 
no public interpreters accepted as valid for all the community.  As explained in chapter 5, 
Ronalda could be considered as carrying out a dual role, active in domestic and international 
legal orders.  Thus, she may be considered as a public interpreter for the purposes of the 
international society.  This approach means that there is an overwhelming proliferation of 
such interpreters in international society.  One difficulty, therefore, is to ascertain which 
values make the international society the ‘best’ for interpretive purposes and how this is to be 
ascertained authoritatively.  This does not mean that all agreement is impossible.  To the 
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extent that transnational peace-making communities can agree on certain fundamental human 
rights requirements, then an interpretive method which attempts to find principled coherence 
with ‘global community’ values may ‘steer’ a community towards the protection of those 
same values.  In this limited sense, integrity may be a useful ‘chimera’; relatively implausible 
as a matter of descriptive theory, but alluring and useful in normative terms nonetheless.   
6.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter has evaluated two challenges to the jus post bellum as integrity.  In the first case, 
Fish’s critique was found less than convincing.  Interpretation in law is not only about the 
subjective intentions of the interpreter.  There is an extent to which the object that is being 
interpreted also constrains the possible avenues of interpretation.  It is theoretically possible 
to describe this dynamic as ‘integrity’ in post-conflict law within the Colombian State and 
across post-conflict States in respect of the norms of international law.   
The more ambitious characterization of integrity as descriptive of international legal 
order runs into problems.  It may mean simply that over time, certain norms can emerge from 
a repeated practice.  Thus, most post-conflict situations may reproduce similar responses to 
the issues that arise in transitional justice.  In turn, these responses can strengthen a particular 
set of post-conflict norms, perhaps, the ‘norm of integrity’ in post-conflict law.  Importantly, 
this is not ‘law’ in the traditional positivist sense.  Instead, integrity can function as a 
normative lens that practitioners may adopt in approaching the identification of post-conflict 
law. 
The Dworkinian system was not designed for a horizontal association of States.  The 
lack of a central authoritative interpreter means that an interpretive approach to international 
law is still ‘under construction’ at this stage in the development of global and transnational 





of the law is not necessarily likely to reduce the legitimacy for law in international society.  It 
is true that States assign a central role to the principle of sovereign equality.  This expresses a 
commitment to bounded disagreement between equal sovereigns.  However, the law is never 
static.  Certain values, especially in international criminal law, are difficult to subject to a 
cultural relativist critique.  No State would argue against the prohibition of genocide, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity. Nevertheless, international society remains 
fundamentally different from domestic society.  This is important in terms of the 
enforcement, scope, interpretation and application of the accepted rules.  The introduction of 
substantive moral concerns into the interpretation of international law must be done carefully 
lest the potential of international law in regulating international relations and internal 
relations is damaged.  There is no evidence that the international society of States is moving 
towards a cosmopolitan community.147   Yet, this does not mean that the wider interpretive 
community should not those project core values into the heart of the interpretation of 
international law.  Is it so controversial to say, that when States agree to a set of norms, they 
may also be said to agree to the principles which best explain those norms?  To answer ‘no’ is 
to accept that a Dworkinian vision of international law (and post-conflict law) is more 
plausible than the traditional positive conceptualization of international law would allow.   
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CHAPTER 7:  SITUATING THE JUS POST BELLUM AS INTEGRITY IN THE 




This thesis asks whether the jus post bellum is a useful concept for practitioners.  The 
intention was to decide whether or not it is even worth international lawyers discussing the 
concept any further.  In order to complete the answer to this question, this chapter, fleshes out 
how a Dworkinian approach to international law fits with different approaches to 
international legal scholarship.  The aim of the chapter is to demonstrate that a Dworkinian 
approach to the jus post bellum fits with other existing approaches to the interpretation of 
international law.  This raises the plausibility of the jus post bellum as integrity as a concept 
of international law.  It also helps to answer the overall thesis question.  If the jus post bellum 
as integrity fits within these alternative visions, then it is worth discussing and it may be 
useful for practitioners in resolving interpretive difficulties.  Thus, this helps to reinforce the 
argument made in the previous chapters which asserts that a Dworkinian conceptualization of 
post-conflict law is not altogether implausible.  Fundamentally, how one understands the 
nature of the international legal order affects the evaluation of the jus post bellum as integrity 
in international law.  There are several ways of understanding international law which differ 
from the ‘mainstream’ view explained in section 2.1.2.  Neil Walker calls these competing 
‘meta-narratives’.1  Some of these interpretations of international law are quite well suited to 
the Dworkinian approach.   Among the approaches that Walker mentions, the most important 
for present purposes are:  ‘natural law’ (section 7.2), ‘liberal international law’ (section 7.3) 
and ‘international law as a project of global administration’ (section 7.4).  These three 
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approaches are good fits for the Dworkinian version of international law (and post-conflict 
law).  An evaluation of how well they fit and why helps to explain the relevance of the jus 
post bellum as integrity for practitioners and others working with international law. 
This chapter describes these different approaches and then evaluates how the jus post 
bellum as integrity might be understood from their different perspectives.  As evident from 
chapters 4, 5 and 6, the jus post bellum as integrity is capable of being read as urging 
coherence within a State (Gallen’s theory) or as between States (more expansive, global 
integrity).  This section emphasizes the latter.  Ronalda’s attempt to find interpretive 
coherence between post-conflict Colombia and post-conflict Sierra Leone in child soldier 
accountability may be required by these different approaches to international law.  However, 
these different approaches to international law present Ronalda’s obligation to find coherence 
in different ways.   
7.2. Natural Law and the jus post bellum 
 
Natural law has been the subject of human investigation for over two millennia.2  It should 
not be surprising, therefore, that a number of versions of natural law exist.3  It has been 
defined negatively as that part of the law which is ‘not laid down by the human authority’.4  
On the other hand, it can be defined (‘positively’) as a body of norms and principles that are 
deducible from ‘nature, reason, or the idea of justice’.5    
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Early international lawyers, such as de Vitoria (see section 2.1.2) thought that international 
law (the jus gentium) could be derived from the natural law (jus naturale) through the use of 
‘right reason’.6  This may, at least in part, be owing to the existence of a long and continuous 
tradition of natural law thinking that stretched back to classical Greek and Roman 
civilizations.7  However, the turn towards an objective and scientific approach in the 19th 
century began to separate international law from its natural law origins.  Thus, by the 20th 
century, the positivist school of international law found the law in the acceptance of norms by 
States (see section 2.1.2).  The classic statement of this approach to law is from the 1927 S.S. 
Lotus Case where the Permanent Court of International Justice decided that ‘the rules of law 
binding upon States…emanate from their own free will…’ and that ‘[r]estrictions on the 
independence of States cannot … be presumed’.8  Thus, States were free to act as they liked 
unless a rule had come into existence that prohibited them from so acting.   
Nevertheless, Stephen Hall and others have argued that this positivism does not 
provide a ‘complete account of legal reality’ in the international legal order.9  Instead, the 
precise nature, essence and scope of natural law norms change according to the ‘sentiment’ of 
the modern epoch.10  Thus, a broadly positivist approach to modern international law does not 
have to eschew all naturalistic language which can endow it with a certain humanist spirit.11  
In this respect, natural law ideas can be considered as a ‘gloss’ on the positive international 
law.12  As Hall argues, ‘[t]he positive law lacks coherence and authority without the natural 
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law, and the natural law lacks most of its ability to coordinate human society 
effectively…without the positive law.’13   
As an example, the development of international criminal law, especially through 
judicial opinions in cases before international tribunals, has depended on the persuasiveness 
of natural law ideas.14  For example, Judge Cassese in Tadić argued that  
A State-sovereignty-oriented approach has been gradually supplanted by a human-being oriented 
approach. Gradually the maxim of Roman law hominum causa omne jus constitutum est (all law is 




Judge Cassese did not actually ground his opinion in humanitarian principles but in the 
emergence of rules in customary law and treaty law.16 However, in several places, the 
judgment refers to ‘the elementary rights [or considerations] of humanity’, which are 
recognized as ‘the mandatory minimum for conduct in armed conflicts of any kind’.17  Judge 
Cassese’s opinion never strays from the positivist approach in finding rules in the practice of 
States.  However, the tone of the judgment resonates with a natural law approach that finds 
the law as it is very close to the law as it ought to be.18  
International law’s ‘natural law origins’ are also evident in the field of international 
humanitarian law.  The Martens clause was inserted into the Preamble of The Hague 
Regulations of 1899 and 1907 on conduct during armed conflict.  It States that.  
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Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting Parties think it right 
to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, populations and 
belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles of international law, as they 
result from the usages established between civilised nations, from the laws of humanity, and the 
requirements of the public conscience [my emphasis].
19
     
This clause has been reiterated in a number of international treaties (such as the Geneva 
Conventions and its Additional Protocols) and it has been incorporated into a number of 
military manuals.20  The reference to the ‘laws of humanity’ has been adapted and is now 
usually referred to as the ‘principles of humanity’.21 Thus, as Mégret has argued, this ‘quasi-
metaphysical’ norm in international humanitarian law is a signal that international law, as 
law, oscillates between the positivist method and a certain progressivity in the ‘basic values’ 
that any system of law protects.22  This view of international law as based on basic values can 
be termed ‘idealist’.23  On this view, international law is law because ‘it must be’.24  The 
obligation of lawyers is to be ‘true’ to the idea of law.25  So, for example, in relation to 
sovereign equality, idealist discourse posits something higher than the sovereignty of the 
State as providing the legitimacy and the ‘right to sovereignty’.26   
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In terms of the jus post bellum, an idealist approach would equally emphasize that 
regardless of the ‘posited’ rules and principles that are relevant during transitions from 
conflict to peace, a body of ‘elementary’ or ‘basic’ principles of humanity regulate what 
ought to happen in relation to every issue.  In Colombia, this has been accepted by States 
insofar as the FARC-EP and the government decided to include a version of the Martens 
clause in the Preamble to the peace agreement.  They agree explicitly that in matters not 
mentioned in the peace agreement, ‘the individual remains under the protection of the 
principles of humanity and the exigencies of public conscience’.27  It is not yet clear what 
scope or effect this provision will have.  It may be merely a symbolic recognition on both 
sides that they intend to proceed in good faith and that they intend to cooperate.  But a natural 
law approach to the jus post bellum might interpret the provision as evidence that the parties 
accepted that the peace agreement did not exhaust their rights and obligations which derived 
also from ‘elementary principles of humanity’ or ‘justice’.     
This link between a conception of justice and the law brings a natural law/idealist 
approach to the jus post bellum as integrity very close to the just war theory attempts to 
discuss the law of transitions (see section 2.2).  Each defines the ‘jus’ in a way that expands 
its meaning beyond ‘positive’ law and towards a substantive theory of justice derived from 
the basic ‘principles of humanity’.  These may be linked to a particular political or moral 
philosophy, so for Orend, post-conflict law ought to include moral prerogatives derived from 
Kant’s categorical imperative.28  For May, the law ought to develop along a body of post-
conflict principles which are regulated by the overarching principle of proportionality, and/or 
meionexia.29  In this regard, the jus post bellum as integrity posits ‘integrity’ as the 
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disciplining moral value upon which post-conflict law must be based.  This approach to 
international law emphasizes ‘universal reason’ as the source of legal obligations and it might 
be susceptible to the same criticisms raised before in section 2.1.2.  Integrity may make sense 
to international lawyers well-versed in the jurisprudence taught in Anglo-American law 
schools.  However, it may not resonate with international lawyers from different (non-
Western) legal traditions.  
The discussion in the previous chapter, in relation to Dworkinian principles of a 
community morality, may be reframed as a search for a ‘natural law’ approach to 
international legal order.  Dworkinian principles are positivist in the sense that they emerge 
from the practice of communities.  However, they are also basic moral principles of a 
particular community in the sense that they are identified through constructive interpretation.  
A Dworkinian international law means a moral reading of international law.  Therefore, the 
identification of basic values is bound up with a theory of a community morality that shows 
that community’s practice in its ‘best’ light.   
But rather than emphasizing such ‘higher’ law, the natural law approach to the jus 
post bellum might also emphasize the ‘lower’ law.  In this respect, the jus post bellum as 
integrity could also be understood as embodying those minimal requirements that would 
make post-conflict law acceptable as a body of law.  A natural law approach could also 
emphasize that the jus post bellum embodies those norms which are fundamental to the 
perception of post-conflict law as law.  Lon Fuller argues that these principles could be ‘like 
the natural laws of carpentry, or at least those laws respected by a carpenter who wants the 
house he builds to remain standing and serve the purpose of those who live in it’.30  This view 
of a ‘procedural’ natural law would emphasize that the jus post bellum had to commit to a 
certain morality in the law and legal system.  It could be termed the morality of interpretation.  
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Integrity, the Dworkinian disciplining rule of interpretation, could form a part of this bigger 
moral picture of post-conflict law.   
The jus post bellum as integrity, urges that the rules applicable after conflict be 
complemented by a certain mind-set.  This mind-set emphasizes procedural fairness, 
interpretive coherence with international law and a commitment to humanity over the 
immediate requirements of States.  In this regard, the best prospect for the development of the 
Dworkinian jus post bellum according to a natural law framework is to focus on those aspects 
of international law that already do mix natural law ideas into the positive law.  In relation to 
transitional criminal justice, for example, this approach could then try to reconcile the 
‘naturalistic elements’ in international law with the concept of integrity.  In particular, this 
could include the principle that all individuals everywhere are entitled to equal concern and 
respect in terms of the constraining norms of international law.  Thus, States, and post-
conflict actors, must endeavour to find interpretive coherence across post-conflict situations 
in order to explain and justify the binding moral force of international law as a whole. 
7.3 Liberal international law 
 
The previous section ended by discussing the notion of the equal concern and respect for 
individuals.  This conclusion also links the jus post bellum as integrity to a tradition of 
‘liberal international law’.  It should be noted that ‘there is a great deal of disagreement about 
what exactly one has to believe in order to qualify’ as a liberal.31 Indeed, ‘[s]elf-declared 
liberals’ have supported a wide and divergent variety of political missions throughout 
political history.32  Therefore, it is safer to theorise about a theory of liberal international law 
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rather than the theory of liberal international law.33  A general distinction must be made 
between two ways of understanding the relationship between liberalism and international 
law.34 Gerry Simpson has termed these ‘charter liberalism’ and ‘liberal anti-pluralism’.35   
7.3.1 Two Liberalisms 
 
Charter liberalism reasserts the concept of sovereignty and the foundational principle of 
sovereign equality which underpins the international legal order.36  It has its origins in the 
initial reluctance of the UN to question the ‘democratic or humanitarian credentials’ of its 
members.37 Even today, the only formal requirement for membership of the UN is that a State 
be a ‘peace-loving’ State.38  The internal political structure of the State is not open for analysis 
in terms of its membership of the organisation.  It has little impact on their international 
legitimacy of a State qua States once they have been recognized as such.  For this reason, 
there is no discussion about whether North Korea is a State for the purposes of international 
law despite their illiberal domestic regimes.  As Simpson argues, the principle of sovereign 
equality reflects a liberal philosophy of ‘tolerance, diversity and openness’ in international 
relations.39 In terms of international relations theory, it fits well with the ‘realist’ view that 
international society is anarchic and that law is instrumental of State interests.40 
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Yet, as Kingsbury and Roth have argued, the principle of sovereign equality has come 
under attack in recent times.41  According to Kingsbury, a commitment to certain aspects of 
‘global public policy’ means that a certain pressure is put on the regulatory freedom of 
States.42 He identifies a commitment to ‘markets, civil society, liberal peace, the rule of law, 
untrammelled communication, and transnationalism’ by way of illustration.43  For Roth, this 
global public policy has led to the ‘erosion’ of the principle of sovereign equality.44 This 
erosion of untrammelled sovereignty reflects the other relationship between ‘liberalism’ and 
international law which Simpson identifies as ‘liberal anti-pluralism’.   
The jus post bellum as integrity could be interpreted as constraining interpretations of 
the law according to this anti-plural liberalism.  Liberal anti-pluralism has its historical 
origins in the 19th century exclusion of non-Western States from the international legal 
community.  More recently, a liberal anti-pluralist philosophy was the basis for scholarship 
that emerged in reaction to the end of the Cold War.  An anti-plural liberalism asserts that the 
post-Westphalian legal order promotes, or perhaps requires, liberal democratic Statehood.45  
In an early example, Thomas Franck noted that in response to failed anti-democratic coups in 
Russia and Haiti, ‘the leaders of States constituting the international community vigorously 
asserted that only democracy validates governance’.46 The key analytical shift is the focus on 
individuals as the central subject of international law rather than ‘States’.  For example, 
Andrew Moravcsik has argued that international relations theory should recognise that ‘the 
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configuration of State preferences matters most in world politics’.47  This view asserts that 
States are not ‘opaque billiard balls’ but instead ‘collections of actors with concrete 
interests’.48 Thus, liberal anti-pluralism in international law emerges from a socio-empirical 
claim in international relations theory about actual real-life ‘State-to-State’ interaction.   
According to Anne-Marie Slaughter, accepting this socio-empirical claim should have 
great implications for how international lawyers understand their subject.  In her view, 
international issues, which lawyers have become accustomed to seeing as ‘State-to-State’, 
ought to be reframed ‘in terms of the interaction between individuals and specific 
government institutions’.49 This is the essence of her theory of State ‘disaggregation’.50 A de-
emphasis on ‘States’ allowed lawyers to re-focus on ‘the individual human being’ or 
‘humanity’ as the primary subject of the international legal order.51 This has important 
implications for questions such as why States obey international law because it redefines the 
notion of a ‘State interest’.52  But it can also have implications for the way positive State 
rights and obligations are interpreted.  For example, fundamental principles of the 
international legal order such as sovereign equality have been open to an anti-plural re-
interpretation.  Anne Peters has argued that sovereignty is not only ‘limited by human rights’ 
but also ‘from the outset determined and qualified by humanity’.53  For Peters this means that 
sovereignty ‘has a legal value only to the extent that it respects human rights, interests and 
needs [emphasis added]’.54 This interpretation comes very close to a Dworkinian (or 
Lauterpachtian) reading of international law because it presupposes that the moral/political 
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value and the purpose of the rules are constitutive of their legal value.  Thus, a theory of 
international law is only a part of a wider political theory of international morality.  
Therefore, on this reading, a State’s right to non-intervention depends on the extent to which 
it follows the path of liberal democracy.   
Of course, there are problems with this approach which will be dealt with below.  
Suffice it to mention here that Peters does not make clear how much a State must violate 
human rights norms before its sovereignty is lost.  State-sponsored genocide may be a clear 
example of a loss of State sovereignty (and the corresponding shield of non-intervention).55  
However, on Peters’ account, it is not clear why lesser violations of civil, political or socio-
economic human rights would not also allow liberal intervention.  It is also not clear how 
Peters accounts for the selectivity in the practice of States in terms of enforcing this version 
of anti-pluralism. 
This anti-plural functional approach to sovereignty is evident in Gallen’s version of 
the jus post bellum.56  For Gallen, the ‘principle of stewardship’ is one of the foundational 
principles of the jus post bellum.  He argues, however, that it ‘is predicated on a conception 
of sovereignty that acknowledges that sovereignty is ‘functional’ and designed for the equal 
benefit and protection of the individual citizens of that society’.57  Here, State-sovereignty is 
demoted from its primary place in the international legal order.  Law is subject to an 
overarching interpretive calculus: international law must preserve the liberal principle of the 
equal treatment of human beings.  If a State fails to observe the basic fundamental rights of 
individuals, its sovereignty is affected.   
                                                                        
55
 Though even State-sponsored genocide may be tolerated as in Darfur, Sudan, see Harry Verhoeven, Ricardo Soares de Oliveira and 
Madhan Mohan Jaganathan, ‘To Intervene in Darfur, or Not:  Re-examining the R2P Debate and Its Impact’, 30 Global Society (2016) 21. 
56 
James Gallen, ‘Jus Post Bellum:  An Interpretive Framework’ in Carsten Stahn, Jennifer Easterday and Jens Iverson, (eds.) Jus Post 
Bellum – Mapping the Normative Foundations (New York, OUP: 2014) 58, 65. 
57
 James Gallen, ‘Jus Post Bellum:  An Interpretive Framework’ in Carsten Stahn, Jennifer Easterday and Jens Iverson, (eds.) Jus Post 





The emphasis on equality as the overarching legitimising meta-principle is a 
prerequisite of Dworkin’s philosophy of law.  In discussing legitimacy in government, 
Dworkin argues that two principles are relevant:  the demonstrable ‘equal concern for the fate 
of every person’ (equal treatment) and full respect for the ‘responsibility and right of each 
person to decide for himself how to make something valuable of his life’ (liberty).58  This is a 
liberal political philosophy which emphasizes the central role of the individual in questions of 
political legitimacy.  Integrity, for Dworkin, was about increasing the equal treatment of 
individuals before the law.  In eliminating the possibility for judicial discretion in 
adjudication, Dworkin sought to demonstrate how all legal actors are under an obligation to 
carry out their function in a way that maximizes the equal treatment of citizens.  The idea that 
difficult decisions ought to be made according to a scheme of principles is Dworkin’s answer 
to how best to think of equality in societies where disagreements are likely to be pervasive.  It 
can, therefore, be argued that a Dworkinian version of the jus post bellum fits within (anti-
plural) liberal international law.   
The jus post bellum in this sense privileges the equal treatment of individuals in post-
conflict trade-offs between peace and justice.  In practice this means that the coercive 
authority of peace agreement provisions depend, and ought to depend, on their justification 
according to higher order principles of liberalism.  However, this conception of the jus post 
bellum fits uneasily with the idea that local communities must design their own jus post 
bellum.  This is owing to what has been discussed as an inevitable ‘bottom-up resistance’ 
which emerges from ‘indigenous power structures’.59  The liberal principles of the jus post 
bellum can be accommodated within the first conception of liberalism as political freedom 
and tolerance.  Charter liberalism remains relevant insofar as the jus post bellum requires 
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principles to be drawn from the political morality of the relevant community.  An example 
from practice may be that for some transitional societies, post-conflict law may include the 
direct involvement of a religious authority.  This seems ill-fitting with liberalism’s avowed 
laicism.60   
In Colombia, the Pope had been appointed (by the negotiating parties) as one of a 
five-member Selection Committee.  This institution is, in turn, directed to appoint the 
members of a number of post-conflict institutions.  These institutions will have a significant 
impact on the success or failure of the post-conflict peacebuilding process.  They include the 
magistrates that will sit on the new Special Jurisdiction for Peace and those that will organise 
and administer the new Truth and Reconciliation Commission.61  There is a strong affiliation 
for the Catholic Church felt by many ordinary Colombians.   Yet, the idea that it should play 
some important role in defining the terms and parameters of international law in the context 
of transitional justice may sit uneasily with other liberals.  It is compatible with a charter 
liberalism which supports a view of the jus post bellum that urges every transitional society to 
create its own jus post bellum institutions according to their own local culture.62   
Thus, while the jus post bellum faces ‘outwards’ towards a supposed ‘international 
community’ it also faces ‘inwards’ towards the transitional society itself.  These two 
dimensions of the jus post bellum create a tension which is difficult to resolve.  For example, 
there may be practices and principles which are so illiberal (in the anti-pluralist sense), that 
the jus post bellum as integrity could not support them without losing a connection to 
Dworkin’s theory.  In a hypothetical situation, a particular community in Colombia may in 
good faith hold the principle that communities ought to physically abuse child soldier 
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returnees as part of their reintegration into the community.  This would not be acceptable for 
liberal theory even if it were repackaged as part of an ‘endogenous restoration programme’.  
This suggests that there are limits to the amount of local variation which is permitted by the 
jus post bellum as integrity.  Even allowing for a ‘margin of appreciation’ among local 
communities, the jus post bellum as integrity is difficult to separate from a ‘thick’ liberal 
ethic that reflects a theory of justice drawn from Rawls’ and Dworkin’s political philosophy.   
But if only liberal democratic values validate post-conflict governance then non-
liberal democratic States enjoy less legal rights than post-conflict democratic States 
according to liberal international law.  This amounts to promoting a view of post-conflict law 
that says: ‘Democracies do law better-especially with each other’.63 It explicitly contradicts 
charter liberalism’s principle of tolerance and openness.  According to Jose Alvarez, it 
amounts to placing a ‘standard of civilisation’ ethic over the sources of international law.64  
As a result, law can easily become a tool for powerful States in justifying unwanted (and 
repeated) pro-liberal democratic interventions (economic, military or cultural) in conflict, and 
post-conflict societies.  Of course, Slaughter and others may argue that (anti-plural) 
liberalism is the foundation of the post-WWII international legal order as evidenced by the 
emphasis in the UN Charter on the protection of human rights.  Since the end of the Cold 
War, the collapse of communism and the triumph of free market capitalism might also 
demonstrate that international society is converging on liberal democratic Statehood.  This 
may be owing to the realisation by all States that peace between democracies is almost 
always assured.   
However, there ought to be a more general unease in founding a theory of international 
law on a ‘liberal (anti-plural) / illiberal’ distinction.  Firstly, the practice of self-declared 
beacons of liberalism makes the liberal/illiberal distinctly unstable and, subsequently, 
                                                                        
63 
Jose Alvarez, ‘Interliberal Law:  Comment’, 94 American Society of International Law Proceedings (2000) 249. 
64 





susceptible to abuse.  In this respect, it is only necessary to mention the atrocities of Abu 
Ghraib and the violations of human rights promoted by professional experts on detention and 
rendition.   The liberal/illiberal dichotomy permits (powerful) self-declared liberal States to 
justify intervention in (less powerful) non-liberal States.  Following on from the 
disaggregated State theory, this can occur in a number of ways.  For example, 
 
…legal professionals decide on retaliatory measures, pinpointing houses in Afghanistan, or 
persons in Yemen or Gaza, or […] striking targets in the former Yugoslavia.  The former 
reasonably clear anti-torture norm […] is now being artfully dismantled by inventing new 
categories, such as ‘unlawful combatant’, and by invoking supreme necessity in the war on terror.  




In terms of transitional justice, too strong a focus on anti-plural liberalism also leaves the jus 
post bellum as integrity open to critique on pragmatic terms.  For example, a pragmatist from 
the international community would argue that too strong a focus on integrity in the peace 
agreement negotiations actually causes the conflict to drag on causing more loss of life.66  
This suggests that variations between peace agreements and post-conflict processes which are 
difficult to justify according to the principle of integrity may be permitted, or even required.   
In theory, therefore, each kind of liberal (charter and anti-plural) is likely to see a role for the 
jus post bellum.  It is possible to situate the jus post bellum as either ‘charter’ or ‘anti-plural’ 
liberalism depending on the way the jus post bellum is ‘facing’: outwards towards a potential 
‘international community’ or inwards towards the values of the transitional society itself.    
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7.4 The jus post bellum as global administrative law 
 
A number of scholars have argued that the post-Westphalian system is characterized less by a 
pro-liberal democratic bias and more by the fact that law is created ‘beyond the State’.67 The 
general argument is that the State has lost its place as the central site of legal authority.  
Instead, it has split into its ‘component parts’ each of which is part of ‘a larger, and often less 
formal, system of global law.’68 For the jus post bellum as integrity, this may be relevant if 
the principles which shape peace agreements are understood as part of the ‘global 
administrative law’ project.69  Thus, as Bell has argued, the jus post bellum might be regarded 
more as a ‘discursive legal project’ to be used by peace negotiators in the work of designing 
peace agreements.70 This section explains how global administrative law imagines the post-
Westphalian legal order.  It evaluates how the jus post bellum fits into this version of ‘global 
law’.  It ends with a critique of this version of the jus post bellum as integrity.   
7.4.1 Legal Pluralism 
 
In descriptive terms, global administrative law relies on a theory of legal pluralism.71  In 1981, 
Marc Galanter argued that ‘the relation of law to other normative orderings has been central 
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to many thoughtful explorations of social order from ancient times to the present.72 More 
recently, Brian Tamanaha has argued that ‘the coexistence of more than one body of legal 
norms and systems was the normal State of affairs for at least two thousand years of 
European history’.73 As such, legal pluralism has a relatively long history in legal scholarship. 
John Griffiths defined legal pluralism as ‘the presence in a social field of more than one legal 
order’.74  It was presented as a challenge to the traditional ‘legal centralism’ which had long 
dominated scholarship in socio-scientific studies (including international law).  Legal 
centralism asserts that ‘law is and should be the law of the State, uniform for all persons, and 
administered by a single set of State institutions’.75  This view emphasises the State as the 
fundamental unit of political organisation.  In this respect, legal centralism has some obvious 
similarities with the State-sovereigntist model of international law.76  As Kingsbury notes, the 
post-WWII architecture of the international legal order begins with the axiom that: ‘The 
Organization [UN] is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.’77 
The principle of sovereign equality emphasises that law derives from the consent of 
sovereign States.78 Thus, sovereign equality emphasise the principle of voluntarism that was 
first enunciated by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Lotus case.79  States 
have agreed a set of material sources which can serve as the evidence for their consent.80  
These are listed in Article 38 of the International Court of Justice.  Thus, legal centralism 
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account is also fundamentally based on the principle of positivism.81  Positivism in 
international law asserts that all international law must be lex lata, and that the division 
between lex lata and lex ferenda must be strictly maintained.82  Values are not accepted as 
part of international law.83   For example, ‘peace and security’ or ‘sustainable development’ 
are, at most, ‘guide[s] in understanding the content of legal rules that exist independently of 
these values, … on the basis of inter-State agreement’.84   
For Griffiths, as with other pluralists, such legal centralism provides too narrow a 
view of what law is.  The pluralist narrative asserts that ‘although “official” norms articulated 
by sovereign entities obviously count as “law”, such official assertions of prescriptive or 
adjudicatory jurisdiction are only some of the many ways in which normative communities 
arise’.85  Thus, pluralism emphasis a particular socio-empirical observation - that law exists 
outside or beyond the State.  Early scholarship on legal pluralism focused on hybrid legal 
systems which were the result of colonialism.86  In this context, an imperial legal system was 
imposed on an indigenous legal system creating a hybrid legal system, for example, the 
Dutch and Indonesian legal systems being imposed on the tribal Kapauku of New Guinea.87  
Another site of scholarship is the relationship between ‘territorial law’ and ‘personal 
(religious) law’.  For example, Chibli Mallat’s work on constitutionalism in the Middle East 
which argues that ‘the question of personal, as against territorial law, […] affects the Middle 
East in the arguably most significant challenge of constitutional law since Montesquieu’.88  
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For international lawyers, the focus has been on the overlapping normative communities 
caused by ‘globalization’.89 
7.4.2 International legal pluralism 
 
Global legal pluralists build their theory of global law on the basis of a number of socio-
empirical factors.  These include, inter alia, the increased mobility of capital through 
transnational trade networks and the ‘fluidity of social networks’ through new and better 
information technologies.90  The impact on law is that there are now a large number of 
globally active yet independent, ‘courts, quasi-courts and other forms of conflict-resolving 
bodies’.91  These decision-making bodies operate according to ‘sector’ rather than ‘territory’. 
This means that ‘human rights’, the ‘law of the sea’ or ‘international sport’ defines the scope 
of the relative tribunal.  This leads to a dilemma.  These courts and tribunals are evidence of a 
‘world of normative communities’.92  The proliferation of normative communities will 
increase the likelihood of normative conflicts (as discussed in chapter 5 in relation to the 
‘ILC Report on Fragmentation’).  For Berman, the multiplicity of normative communities 
means that international lawyers need to rethink their subject in terms of ‘managing 
hybridity’.93 The alternative is to try to reassert a territorially-focused international law 
underpinned by the principle of sovereignty or attempt to universalise global regulation.  In 
his view, neither strategy is capable of helping communities to deal with the problems that 
arise for international lawyers in contemporary society.  In his view, ‘hybridity may at times 
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be both normatively preferable and more practical precisely because agreement on 
substantive norms is so difficult’.94  
7.4.3 The jus post bellum and global administrative law 
 
In terms of the jus post bellum this makes some sense.  As explained in chapter 5, 
communities attempting to negotiate peace are faced with a proliferation of norms.  As 
acknowledged in the Colombian peace agreement, most relevant may be traditional 
international law such as human rights law and humanitarian law.  However, global 
administrative law might suggest other norms which fix the parameters of peace.  In relation 
to transitional justice, a global administrative law perspective would argue that the peace 
negotiators in Havana are ‘bound’ to include certain norms in the transitional justice accord.  
These are drawn from the practice of other peace agreements and transitional justice 
mechanisms.  Also, the jus post bellum as global administrate law might include hybrid 
solutions to certain procedural issues.  Berman cites a number of instances of hybrid 
‘mechanisms, institutions and practices’ which may form part of a global legal pluralism 
perspective.95  The existence of ‘hybrid participation arrangements’ in post-conflict societies 
has been thought to increase the legitimacy to proceedings which may be at risk of becoming 
politicised.  The presence of international judges as ‘outsiders’ may ‘add to a sense of 
fairness’ while the presence of local judges protects against ‘rejection of the court as wholly 
“foreign”’.96   
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Indeed, in Colombia, the parties have agreed to a five-member selection committee 
which is tasked with agreeing the judges and magistrates which will sit on the Special 
Jurisdiction for Peace.  Foreign judges are a planned feature of the SJP.  So there may be 
evidence that the hybridity in normative regulation has translated into a hybridity of 
institutional design.  However, this would be slightly inaccurate.  In formal terms, courts in 
transitional societies are either international or domestic.  This depends on the legal system 
which provides the legal basis for the court’s existence.  In Colombia, the SJP will come into 
existence as a result of the eventual peace agreement.  Thus, it will be a domestic court and 
only ‘internationalized’ by the presence of foreign judges. 
As Kratochwil has argued, those arguing in favour of the emergence of global 
administrative law need to establish not only that such a body of rules or principles exist.  
Also, they must establish that ‘these principles represent a set of rules that mutually support 
each other in safeguarding elemental procedural and substantive values inherent in the rule of 
law’.97 In failing to respect the rule of law, global administrative law can hardly claim to be 
‘law’ in any reasonable meaning of the word.  Disregard for the rule of law means that these 
norms and principles (if they exist) are more properly defined as non-binding standards or 
other kinds of ‘social norms’.  These standards may exist and regulate transnational 
communities (such as peacemakers, or sporting bodies, or the internet) however, they need 
not necessarily all exist in conjunction as ‘global law’.98  Kratochwil’s critique is that in 
making this argument the global administrative law project ends up advocating a kind of 
‘global constitutionalism’.  This in turn, is similar to the liberal international law project 
discussed in the previous section.99     
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This chapter has tried to fit the jus post bellum as integrity into pre-existing approaches to 
international law which emphasize values and reject the traditional conception of 
international law.  The jus post bellum as integrity could plausibly be developed according to 
each of these theories of international law. This is evidence of a number of interpretive 
decisions which must be made in order to transpose the concept of integrity into the 
international legal order.  In terms of Ronalda’s approach in chapter 5, each of these theories 
may provide the basis for a development of the expansive notion of integrity across post-
conflict societies.  Thus, a Dworkinian approach to the jus post bellum is useful for 
practitioners.  It is useful in methodological terms.  It is useful in terms of comparative law.  
It is also useful insofar as alternative views of international law exist which can, to a certain 
extent, accommodate the jus post bellum as integrity.   
Today, States are joined by a number of other actors.  For example, in Colombia, 
international law regulates a number of different relationships.  These include the relationship 
between the government and the ICC; the relationship between the government and the 
FARC-EP and the relationship between the government and individual victims of the armed 
conflict.  It is plausible that these relationships are regulated not only by international law but 
also by a number of different kinds of norms.  Some norms may be ‘law’ in the traditional 
State-sovereigntist sense.  For example, the possibility of offering the ‘broadest possible’ 
post-conflict amnesties for the political crime of rebellion is mandated by international 
humanitarian law.100   However, other norms may regulate peacebuilding in less formal ways.  
Here, Bell’s work on the lex pacificatoria is the best example of the new and ‘emerging law’ 
                                                                        
100 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 





that regulates peace processes and peace agreements.101  However, the key to understanding 
Bell’s point is that these norms are not ‘law’ but lex.  Their usefulness derives from their 
flexibility in providing solutions rather than prescribing outcomes.  The expansive notion of 
the jus post bellum as integrity, insofar as it urges coherence between post-conflict States, 
appears to lack this kind of flexibility.  It may be that States need flexibility in finding 
solutions to post-conflict problems.  Integrity suggests that an authoritative interpretation 
must be found with which others must be coherent.   
However, there is no authoritative post-conflict State, or post-conflict court that can 
decide these matters once and for all for States.  If there are different kinds of norms which 
regulate peace agreements, this might suggest that all of the narratives may provide some 
insights into the nature of the international legal order.  This is possible because, as Walker 
argues, each of the meta-narratives can be reproduced in a ‘strong and exclusive’ model or a 
weaker ‘more moderate’ design.102  Thus, the traditional State-sovereigntist model posits 
States as ‘ontologically prior’ in the global order.  In its strong exclusive form, it emphasises 
the ‘old-fashioned realist’ position in international relations.  Law is identifiable through 
State consent.  This position views other actors as mostly irrelevant for the purposes of law at 
the international level.  This produces a relatively limited and narrow set of rules.103  A 
second version of the State-sovereign model is more moderate.  States remain the primary 
actors in the global legal order.  However, law is broader than that which is produced by 
State-consent because of the need to secure ‘peace’ and ‘reliable commitments’ (i.e. pacta 
sunt servanda).  The more moderate version does not rely on a ‘thick’ normative consensus 
(as liberal international law does).  It means only that States assume that cooperation and 
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coexistence depends on ‘mutual respect for overlapping visions of the common good’.104 This 
vision of international law may require that judges adhere to a Rawlsian ‘standard of public 
reason’ in adjudicating in international courts.105 In terms of legislation, it may mean that 
States provide, and ought to provide a justification for their law-making activities which they 
believe is ‘reasonable’ or ‘an appropriate public justification of a binding law.’  In sum, a 
more modest version of the dominant model accepts that State-consent is not the sole 
legitimating principle in international law.  
There is as yet no international legal theory that purports to present integrity as the 
disciplining rule of international law.  Integrity in common law systems is important because 
individuals have to be treated equally before the legal system.  However, on the international 
level, integrity may need to be translated into a different principle of legality.  Little research 
has been done in this regard.  However, considering that Dworkin’s theory is a liberal theory 
of law, it may be that international integrity may draw on liberal (understood as anti-plural) 
values.  It may consist of a theory of law that makes the individual the centre of the legal 
system and not the State.   In doing so, it urges that the individuals of the world be treated 
equally.  It may, thus, function as a theory of political justice that underpins interpretations of 
the law.   
This chapter, however, has argued that such a move may be resisted.  The law ought 
not to be decided according to the liberal/illiberal dichotomy.  The level of hypocrisy and 
selectivity that would be evident (considering current international relations) would bring the 
system under considerable strain.  This would be to the detriment of international relations.  
This thesis advocates instead an acceptance of the limitations of the system without 
eschewing a critical perspective of the law.  The lack of certainty in post-conflict legal 
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situations must be worked out in accordance with the system as it exists.   In relation to post-
conflict situations, the creation of new legal categories (such as the jus post bellum) ought to 
be considered only insofar as they help practitioners to resolve legal dilemmas.  The 
introduction of integrity into the discourse has brought with it a set of questions which are 
useful in terms of the Colombian legal order.  If post-conflict societies are to be successful in 
making transitions, its legal system must aspire to try to treat individuals equally.  Further, 
the idea that there ought to be coherence in principle in the decisions made within a post-
conflict society may be beneficial and it may build the community of principle that was 
missing during the conflict.   A focus on integrity in international law has also raised 
questions about interpretive coherence across different post-conflict societies.  In this respect, 
integrity has a normative force which may be limited or supported according to different 
version of international law and global justice.  In all likelihood, different interpreters will 
decide according to any proposed moral value it may have in the specific situation in 






CHAPTER 8:  CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis has argued that the jus post bellum may be practically useful to practitioners 
within post-conflict societies if it is considered an interpretive framework of principles.  In 
doing so, it has evaluated whether international lawyers and practitioners ought to continue to 
think about the jus post bellum.  It has answered this in the affirmative.  It has looked at two 
different versions of the topic in detail.  Gallen’s more recent jus post bellum theory is a 
useful and practical way to think about what ought to happen after conflict as a matter of law.  
However, an additional dimension has been added in this thesis in considering how integrity 
represents the jus post bellum across different post-conflict societies.        
8.1 Research findings 
 
The first part of the thesis found that the jus post bellum as proposed by Orend was not 
necessary, and not viable, considering the state of contemporary international relations.  
International relations, at the present time, are unlikely to be conducive to a large and 
complex multilateral Protocol to the Geneva Conventions.  There are several post-conflict 
situations which would be implicated in the negotiation of a new Protocol, including 
Colombia.  There is a great deal of controversy surrounding the role of the ICC and its 
excessive focus on African States.  Further, ongoing conflicts, such as in Afghanistan and 
Syria, are causing immense problems in terms of finding post-conflict solutions.  As such, the 
jus post bellum needs to be considered in a less assertive and more nuanced way.  It 
considered a ‘soft law’ document and argued that this has some benefits but also some 





The second part identified the jus post bellum as integrity as one of the more 
interesting recent theories of the jus post bellum.  The jus post bellum as integrity has been 
presented here as a methodology and a normative principle.  It allowed for a measured 
response to unravelling fragmentation of post-conflict law in Colombia.  But it should not be 
thought of as a concept that provides the right answers in post-conflict situations.  Instead, a 
Dworkinian lens might be useful insofar as it emphasizes a certain approach to post-conflict 
law that aims at equality among the citizens and principled coherence in interpretation of 
international law during transitions.  Future developments in international law may be at the 
margins of the basic structure of the international legal order.  Therefore, one way of thinking 
about this more expansive notion of integrity is as an ‘interstitial norm’ of the kind 
propounded by Lowe.  Thus, integrity in international law may be useful for the resolution of 
conflicts and the development of practical solutions to problems.  On a Dworkinian reading 
of international law, it would be a legal requirement for interpreters in post-conflict Colombia 
to ensure coherence across post-conflict societies in the same way that they must ensure 
coherence within the Colombian legal order.  
8.2 Areas of further study 
 
A jus post bellum framework, which integrates law, policy, and philosophy, could illuminate 
the respective obligations of these actors in a post-conflict setting.  An interdisciplinary 
approach could provide useful information in terms of the interpretation of the law as it is, as 
well as what it ought to be.  This section sets out some areas of further study that might be 






8.2.1 The jus post bellum as integrity and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
 
The jus post bellum as integrity is primarily about interpretation of post-conflict law.  
Therefore, one interesting area of research would be to compare how a Dworkinian approach 
to interpretation fits into the debates surrounding treaty interpretation in international law.1  
The rules on how international law ought to be interpreted are already a part of international 
law and a result of States’ agreement.  In this regard, article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties sets out the ‘General Rules of Interpretation’.2  It asserts that treaties 
‘shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose’.3  This 
formulation is a composite of different philosophies and approaches to interpretation of 
international law.  It reflects a tension between a teleological approach to interpretation and a 
more textual understanding.  Thus, how the Dworkinian model interacts with the concept of 
sovereignty equality in this field might be a fruitful endeavour in order to think comparatively 
about how the law ought to be interpreted.  A tentative analysis suggests that a Dworkinian 
interpretation of international law would need to take these rules on interpretation into 
account as part of the dimension of ‘fit’.  An interpretation of the law is less desirable if it 
departs from the previous chapters in the ‘chain novel’.  As such, interpretations of 
international law that reject or deviate from the rules in the Vienna Convention would be 
prima facie damaging to integrity.  Therefore, integrity, in an international context, may 
require an approach that seeks to balance how an interpretation ‘fits’ with the rules on 
interpretation and with the political principles of the international legal order. 
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8.2.2 The jus post bellum as integrity and specific issue areas 
 
Another interesting area to pursue is the extent to which the Dworkinian approach 
highlighted in chapter 5 is useful in helping to identify the law in other issue areas.  As 
chapter 2 mentioned, there are a number of areas of post-conflict law which are unclear. 
These include the law on post-conflict detention, post-occupation law, the law on self-
determination of peoples during transitions and the law on transformative occupations.  These 
areas of law are composites of different legal bodies.  In terms of its commitment to systemic 
coherence, the jus post bellum as integrity provides a way to think about how the different 
issues areas have been resolved and how they ought to be resolved.   
A suggestion may be a project on the UN peacekeeping missions.  UN peacekeeping 
forces are one of the main actors in post-conflict situations across the globe.  The jus post 
bellum as integrity could evaluate the extent to which different issues that arise in post-
conflict UN peacekeeping missions adhere to a concept of principled coherence.  This project 
could look at how they deal with accountability, for example, in the area of sexual abuse by 
peacekeepers.  There is also uncertainty surrounding the law as it relates to the use of force in 
post-intervention situations.4  Areas of uncertainty include ‘transformative occupations’, 
‘long-term occupations’ and the occupiers’ powers of detention.5  Another area of research 
might be to apply a jus post bellum framework to other post-conflict actors, such as NGOs, 
donors and international financial institutions, and multinational enterprises.  These actors 
often play important roles in defining the success or failures of transitions.  However, the role 
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of international financial institutions, States, and other private enterprises has not yet been 
fully explored in jus post bellum terms.   
8.2.3 The jus post bellum as integrity and national vs international law 
 
The Dworkinian approach could be used as a frame with which to investigate extent to which 
national and international courts diverge in their interpretation of international criminal law.  
It could be used to evaluate the extent to which the law is interpreted in a way that 
demonstrates principled coherence in relation to specific issues.  For example, the law on 
command responsibility may be interpreted differently in Colombia when compared to the 
international standards required by the International Criminal Court.  Integrity could be a 
useful frame with which to evaluate the differences and in terms of the purposes or aims of 
international law.  A Dworkinian approach would look at the principles and the purpose that 
best explains and justifies the law of command responsibility. In evaluating the Colombian 
divergence from the international standard, the jus post bellum as integrity is a way of 
criticizing the implementation of peace agreements by transitional actors. 
8.2.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
The jus post bellum concept has given rise to a considerable amount of research.   It has led to 
the organization and delivery of a number of international conferences.  There appears to be 
growing enthusiasm for the concept.  However, some of the fundamentals of the concept are 
still very unstable.  It continues to mean different things to different contributors.  This thesis 
has argued that a Dworkinian approach can be illuminating in implementing peace 
agreements in relation to transitional criminal justice in Colombia.  Insofar as there are 





implementing peace agreements must think of their activities in terms of the principles which 
best explain and justify their interpretations.  Gallen was concerned that post-conflict actors 
tended to be focused on their specific functions rather than on a holistic view of transitions.  
Thus, he suggested integrity as a way of finding coherence across the different activities 
within societies.  The focus on an individual, Ronalda, allowed the thesis to evaluate how this 
might work in reality.  The overall aim of the jus post bellum as integrity is to promote a view 
of post-conflict law which tasks Ronalda and others to view themselves as part of a 
community of post-conflict legal actors.  It is, as Dworkin says, a ‘protestant attitude’ that 
each individual must develop for the benefit of the community with which they identify.6  
The interesting notion that the jus post bellum is also a global emerging law leads to 
questions about whether and how interpretive coherence between different post-conflict 
societies is also plausible.  The structure of the international legal order reflects the legitimate 
differences between States in matters of justice.  Thus, integrity across post-conflict societies 
may appear as a step too far in terms of the normative force of the jus post bellum.  
Nevertheless, insofar as different post-conflict actors are interpreting and applying 
international law, interpretive coherence must be pursued so that the moral legitimacy of the 
international legal order is maintained.  Thus, post-conflict actors would do well to adopt a 
comparative approach to the interpretation of post-conflict law and a focus on integrity may 
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